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UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM AND THE ORTHODOX CHURCH

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795 EASTERN ORTHODOXY, unlike Roman Catholicism, is organized on
● 186 the principle of autocephalous national churches—each constituting an independent administrative entity. This fundamental difference between Eastern and Western Christianity causes the thinking Orthodox Christian to be confronted with a dilemma. He wants the Church to be close to the communicant and the clergy to teach him and pray in his own language, and yet if he desires that the whole Church be able to perpetuate itself and propagate the faith, he must grant to it a sufficiently centralized organization and at the same time combat all fissiparous tendencies. Thus, on the surface at least, there appears to be a conflict between Christ's injunction that there be "one fold and one shepherd" (John 10:16) and the actual establishment of national churches which can easily render unto Caesar what may be correctly regarded as "things that are God's" (Matthew 22:21).

While the communicant may ponder over this dilemma, there is in the last analysis little that he can do to reverse centuries of historical development which have led to the woefully loose organization
[793] of the present day. The titular head of the Eastern Orthodox Church, the Patriarch of Constantinople, is but *primus inter pares* in his relations with the other patriarchs and branches of the Church. Individual ecclesiastical jurisdictions do not extend across political frontiers, and as a result the national churches have rarely been able to oppose secular rulers. The development of each new national movement in the Orthodox world of Eastern and Southeastern Europe has been accompanied by a demand for a separate national church and has accentuated this divisive tendency.

While the Orthodox Balkan peoples were acquiring ecclesiastical independence prior to World War I, the Orthodox Ukrainians living in the Russian Empire were denied the national status which would enable them to establish their own church and, instead, were regarded as Little Russians. Studies of the Orthodox Church made at that time by Western scholars contain no reference to its Ukrainian branch since it did not even enjoy a limited autonomy but was
000 regarded as an integral part of the Russian Orthodox Church.[1] The

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[1] See Adrian Fortescue's *The Orthodox Eastern Church*, 2nd ed. (London, 1908), pp. 285 ff. That the Orthodox Church in Ukraine exercised considerable influence on the Russian Church is made amply evident in the ponderous study by Constantine V. Kharlampovič, *Malorossijskoe Vlijanie na Velikorusskuju Cerkovnuju Žizn'* (Kazan, 1914), which deals with the period beginning in the middle of the sixteenth century and ending in 1762.

101 kunde, herausgegeben vom Ukrainischen Wissenschaftlichen Institut Berlin 1935).

[186] National consciousness increased as a consequence of oppression by Russians and Poles, in spite of whose resistance the name "Ukraine" as a special term for the Ukrainian territory spread quickly, thus emphasising the fact that there is a difference between the Ukrainians and their neighbors in the spheres of language, race, culture, national feeling and policy.

In Tsarist Russia the name "Ukraine" was the symbol of the Ukrainian people's struggle for independence. It was therefore abolished and replaced by "Little Russia", a term very much hated by Ukrainians.

In addition to the name "Ukrayina" Ukrainians originally used the term "Rus" to designate the political entity of the Kyiv empire to which at that time the territory of Ukraine belonged. Originally "Rus" applied solely to the southern parts of Eastern Europe, whilst the northern parts were called Muscovy. Tsar Peter the Great extended this name to the whole empire and entered it into official European nomenclature. In Peter's state, "Rus"-Ukraine was called "Little Russia" to indicate that this part of the realm was not one with the former Muscovite territory which got the name "Great Russia".

Before the First World War Austria had introduced "Ruthenia, Ruthenian" from Latin "Ruthenus" as official name for the Ukrainians in Galicia. But not before the 20th century was some order brought into the chaos of "Ukrainian — Little Russian — Ruthenian". The USSR officially acknowledged the name "Ukraine, Ukrainian" and the "Ukranian Soviet Republic" has succeeded in keeping its ground at least nominally in the world-wide family of nations.

Sea was reached, serfdom revoked (1861), valuable deposits of 175
coal, iron and manganese were discovered; the population increased considerably, all of which caused other national questions to recede into the background. It was only in 1900 that the 175
first unmistakable signs of the spread of national consciousness 186
among the broad masses began to appear. 668
In this year the Revolutionary Ukraine Party included a demand for an independent Ukraine in its program and the Ukraine movement made great progress in the short constitutional period after 1905. Ukrainian books and reviews, the idea of national societies and unions for adult education began to spread. And yet we must admit to-day that national consciousness among the peasants was slow to awaken; the solution of social questions was felt to be more urgent.

In Galicia more progress was made. At the outbreak of World War I there was already a well-developed system of Ukrainian schools, gymnastic societies and cooperative associations built up in constant conflict with Polish officials. The Ukrainians were loyal in their feelings for Austria; they thought that the victory of the German side would bring their own national struggle immediate advantages.

Revolution and Post-War Years

When war broke out, Ukrainian divisions immediately took 175
part voluntarily in the fighting in the Carpathians. Special 669
camps were erected for Ukrainian prisoners of war in which Ukrainians were separated from the Russians and trained in the spirit of nationalism. In the country itself the Ukraine Central Council was formed at Kyiv after the fall of the Tsar and it demanded the right of self-government from the provisional government in St. Petersburg. This was refused and negotiations were broken off when the bolshevists finally seized power. Towards the end of 1917 Lenin sent bolshevist troops to Kyiv, whereupon the Central Council declared the independence of Ukraine on January 22nd, 1918. Now the misfortune that political power was almost exclusively in the hands of members of the socialist and democratic Left, avenged itself; for those parties had no experience in the political control of a state. No

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661 bands in the Ukraine. At the time of the 'purge' he occupied the highest military post in the Ukraine: that of Officer Commanding the Kiev Military District. The drama in the Ukraine did not end with the execution of Yakir; during the years 1935–7 several thousands of persons occupying important posts in the Red Army and in the Soviet administration were arrested and shot or exiled to concentration camps in Siberia and the North of Russia. This whirlwind of arrests and executions even carried away with it Postyshev and Kossior, the former instruments of 'the Revolution against the peasants'.

701 186 In the meantime the last remnants of the national Ukrainian Army, which had flourished in the years 1923–9, disappeared. Units of the Ukrainian Army, based on the system of 'territorial Divisions' in the Red Army, had been quartered in the Ukraine alongside the troops 'of the Union'. The struggle with the peasantry had made it desirable to abolish the territorial system in the Ukraine as well as in other parts of the Union. The Ukrainian units were broken up and distributed to other parts of the country and their place was taken by regiments recruited in Great Russia. After the execution of the staff of the Kiev Command and the senior personnel of many of the Ukrainian regiments, nothing remained of the Ukrainian Army except the names of certain 'Red' regiments which were retained for the sake of form; but the Ukrainian language continued to be used in units where the rank and file were predominantly of Ukrainian origin.

Stalin's Constitution of 1936—which evoked such enthusiasm 642 among European Communists and which was even hailed in the capitalist Press of Western countries as a laudable 'return to democratic institutions' in contrast to the dictatorships of Central Europe —was a cynical accompaniment to the slaughter of so many thousands of Party members which was going on at that time within 'the Soviet Paradise'. Stalin's Constitution marked the final abandonment of the theory that the minority nationalities ranked as equal partners with Great Russia within the Soviet Union. The 'union of different states' was now transformed into one integral state (Paragraph 13: 'The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a unified state'). According to Paragraph 14 all authority on questions relating to international affairs, the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace, the organization of defence and the command of the armed forces, foreign trade, the safety of the state, the management of all banks, all forms of transport, the principles of land distribution, the basis of public instruction, hygiene, and criminal and civil laws, was reposed in the Central Government.

Let us, therefore, look briefly at 175
the outstanding elements of the situation as they were at the beginning of the revolution.

From the time of the organization and Christianization of the Kievan state at the end of the tenth century to the eighteenth century, Ukraine, whether independent, or subject to Poland-Lithuania, or to the Russian Tsars, had remained as a political unit, even though divided. However, in 1775 Catherine II destroyed the Zaporozhian Sich, the centre of the Ukrainian Kozaks, and in 1783 she abolished all Ukrainian political institutions and privileges. From that time the area was divided into *gubernias* as the rest of the Russian Empire and the full Russian methods of administration were introduced.

From that moment, too, the Russian government spared no efforts to destroy every vestige of Ukrainian national and cultural consciousness. The Ukrainian language was treated as a peasant dialect of Russian; the name Ukraine was forbidden and even the substitute Little Russia was treated as a generic term for the area north of the Black Sea, but it did not figure on the political map of the Russian Empire as a distinct entity. The Ukrainian revival in the nineteenth century beginning with the publication of Kotlyarevsky's parody of the *Aeneid* in 1798 was confined to the [536]
cultural sphere and could offer little or nothing in the way of administrative experience to the Ukrainian people. Those Ukrainians who entered the Russian service were usually sent to distant areas, while the administrative personnel in Ukraine was chiefly Russian in origin and feeling.

The great estates were largely owned by Russians or by Poles 186
and even many Ukrainian landowners who had succeeded in retaining their holdings were so thoroughly Russianized that they [423]
felt little sense of kinship with the peasants on their estates. Ukrainian life was lived chiefly in the villages. The Ukrainian language was not taught in the schools or used in the courts, for all education and administration were in the Russian language. Still the peasants continued their own manner of living with their own traditions and their own tastes and desires.

● 186 563 The cities of Kiev, Kharkiv and Odesa had a large Russian population. The administrative, commercial and financial institutions were largely in Russian hands and the directors and leaders of these, whatever their political disagreements, were united in opposing the efforts of the Ukrainians to secure even that minimum of rights that they were guaranteed by Russian imperial law. The Russian element in Ukraine, radical or conservative, acted as a [316] unit during the fateful years 1917-1920. On the other hand, the miners and workers in the Donets basin and Kryvy Rih, the centre of the Ukrainian coal and iron industry, were in very large part likewise Russian and the ideology of St. Petersburg, especially in its radical aspects, was dominant throughout this part of the Ukrainian territory. Many of the most bitter opponents of Ukrainian rights were, in fact, Russian radical miners and workers from this area.

The Jewish population of Ukraine, a large minority, was little interested in the Ukrainian problem. Insofar as they were not actively sharing in the movement for special Jewish institutions, the majority, with certain conspicuous exceptions, were strong supporters of Russian unity, either conservative or radical or, like Leon Trotsky, they were at the service of any government which was opposed to the Ukrainian demands.

186 668 Thus in 1917 the strength of the Ukrainian movement was to be found in the villages. Here Ukrainian life was lived, Ukrainian thoughts and ambitions were sponsored and it was here that the vision of an old and a future independent Ukraine found its chief support. Even so, that population was itself divided, not according to the class principle but on an ideological pattern which included members of all classes and walks of life.

186 565 668 When the revolution broke out in 1917 or, to be more precise, when the tsarist regime collapsed, there were four main divisions in Ukrainian society and they were made clear within a very few months.

The first of these were the nationalists and the advocates of the restoration of order in the country. At the very beginning of the

century Mykola Mikhnovsky had issued a call for an independent 186
state and for a while he had exerted a strong influence upon such 565
future Ukrainian leaders as Symon Petlyura, Volodymyr Vynnychenko 658
and Volodymyr Chekhovsky, but his ideas of placing national liberation in the forefront seemed too extreme for his adherents and by 1917 many of these had in a sense fallen away from his advanced position.

On the other hand, two and a half years of war had shown to many of the Ukrainian officers and men in the Russian army the need of a disciplined force to uphold the national cause. Some of the Ukrainian regiments had early joined the forces of the Revolution, had adopted the Ukrainian flag and introduced Ukrainian as the language of command. Now at the Military Congresses which were held in Kiev in 1917, they took a strong stand in their demands that the Ukrainian National Rada adopt a firm policy toward St. Petersburg and the Provisional Government and they were willing to go much further than the Rada in the setting up of independent governmental machinery.

Opposed to this group were the great mass of the peasants. They were little aware of the involved task of governing or even maintaining order. It would be hardly fair to say that they were anarchistic in temperament. They had rather maintained almost unconsciously their Ukrainian character. Few of them had been further from their villages than the nearest administrative centre and they could not see the necessity of substituting another regime on a broad scale for the fallen tsarist system. For decades they had attributed all their hardships and difficulties to the tsar, the bureaucrats and the police, and with all three vanished, they had no desire to replace them. It seemed to them that the land was intended by God for their use, and once the landlords were dispossessed, they were ready to forget the past and live in peace and quiet with their neighbors. Two and a half years of war had taught them the folly of organized destruction and they willingly accepted the position that a new world had come into being in which there was no need for complicated forms of government, for the collection of taxes and the enforced maintenance of order.

186 565 668 They believed that the Revolution had almost automatically given them all that they desired—the right to use their own language, to have that language placed on a par with Russian and the right to secure their own land and to live peacefully upon it.

186 565 668 665 Between these two groups stood the bulk of the Ukrainian intellectuals grouped in the Social Revolutionist and Social Democratic Parties, each of which was modelled on its Russian equivalent. Yet we must not delude ourselves into thinking that these were political parties in any sense known to the Western world and America, where there has been a long record of political activity. They were before the Revolution rather conspiratorial and debating groups, busied with theorizing about all manner of political questions and (except where they had an opportunity to take part in the work of the zemstvos) without practical experience. A few of their members had served in the First Duma in 1906 but this had been dissolved within a couple of months by Tsar Nicholas II and each succeeding duma had become less representative. Thus the number of those intellectuals who had had practical political experience even in the conduct of elections was very small, while the debators, students, theoreticians, etc. in these parties cared more for the proper solution of ideas than for their application to practical life.

Neither of these groups existed as distinct Ukrainian parties. They tended largely to follow the leadership of the similar Russian groups; they had learned to employ the same methods, listened to the same leaders, and their demands as Ukrainians were loosely connected with their social and political theories. They were conscious, but only potentially active, nationalists and at the moment when it was necessary to make rapid decisions, they hesitated and splintered on the importance which they assigned to national and to economic and social measures.

The Social Revolutionists, largely intellectuals from the villages, were at first the more important. They were populists and non-Marxian socialists who voiced the desires of the peasants for the ownership of their land. They called for the confiscation of the large estates, for they did not believe that any one should have

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larger holdings than he and his family could work. Since the land in Ukraine was held individually and the village community was only a figment of Russian law, they differed sharply from the Russian Social Revolutionists who stressed the existence of the community with an emphasis on the almost annual redistribution of land. Finally, they set themselves up as a Ukrainian party but still grouped around the journal *Narodnya Volya* (The People's Will), the traditional name for a Social Revolutionist paper.

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By the autumn of 1917 this party had definitely split. The left, which stressed the economic and social aspects of the party, established another journal *Borotba* (The Struggle). This was soon followed by a formal schism and the creation of a new Social Revolutionist Party (Borotbisty) with the name taken from their paper. It was only natural that the relations between this group and the Bolshevik Great Russians tended to become closer as radical ideas gained strength in the country.

The numerically smaller Social Democratic Party was purely Marxian and it spoke primarily for the Ukrainian factory workers. Like the Russian Party, it was divided between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, with the latter drifting steadily toward the Social Revolutionists and even some of the bourgeois groups. On the other hand, the efforts of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks to establish their own party met with continual opposition. The Marxian theories of the withering away of the state had long been used by Lenin and some of the German Social Democratic leaders as weapons against the Poles in both the Russian Empire and Germany, and the same ban was now applied to the Ukrainian Bolsheviks. If they wished approval by the central authorities, they were told to become merely a Ukrainian section of the Russian Party. If they persevered in their efforts, they were read out of the party which in Ukraine was dominated by the Russian factory workers and the Russian miners from the Donets basin and Kryvy Rih.

The position of the Ukrainian Social Democrats and especially the Bolsheviks was thus much more difficult than that of the less organized and more spontaneous Social Revolutionists. Strict party

186 565 668 665 discipline hampered them at every turn and ardent Ukrainians as Mykola Skrypnyk, a personal and trusted friend of the Russian Bolshevik leaders, refused to make any schism in the party, even though he and his Ukrainian friends quite regularly appealed for recognition as a separate party, especially after the Bolsheviks recognized the existence of an independent Ukrainian Soviet Republic.

He, as an old Bolshevik, however, refused to cooperate with those Ukrainian Bolsheviks who dared to risk a fight with the central committee in Moscow and who finally tried to set up a Ukrainian Communist Party.

[648] The greatest weakness of both of these intellectual groups was their lack of appreciation of the importance of foreign policies. It was with great hesitation that their representatives in the Central Rada in the summer of 1917 approached the Russian Provisional Government to include a Ukrainian representative in all Russian diplomatic missions. They had had few or no representatives in the pre-revolutionary Russian diplomatic service; relatively few of them had been abroad, even to Western Ukraine under the Austro-Hungarian Empire; they had no distinguished Ukrainian emigrants abroad who could speak to the world with the great authority of Ignace Jan Paderewski, Thomas G. Masaryk or Michael I. Pupin and during the crucial early months they largely neglected any consideration of foreign policy.

They wasted precious time in futile negotiations with the Russian Provisional Government over questions of federalism and they turned rather slowly toward the idea of independence. At each move of the more nationally conscious toward this goal, a certain portion of the more leftist members drew away toward the appropriate Russian camp in the name of internationalism and thus became the unconscious tools by which both the Provisional Government and later the Bolsheviks hoped to retain their control of the wealth of Ukraine.

It was this vagueness on the part of many of the intellectuals which kept them from being true intermediaries between the nationalist and military groups and the great mass of the peasants. It weakened the energy and zeal of some of the Ukrainian regi-

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ments which had declared for the Ukrainian cause immediately after the outbreak of the revolution and facilitated the development of pacifist opinion in the rank and file. So when, at the end of 1917, actual fighting started between the Russian Communists and the Ukrainian Central Rada, the armed forces of the new state were not as well prepared as they had been some months previously, and it was necessary to start again under almost new and more unfavorable conditions.

The pressure of events and the necessity for defense against the Red and the White invaders brought together the more consciously nationalist elements, first to declare the independence of Ukraine and then to organize, but the economic and social divergences were never solved. The dissolution of the Central Rada by the Germans and their support of a conservative government only embittered the political feuds and encouraged the rise of peasant leaders who were content to operate in their own areas and switched sides as questions of the moment moved them. All this weakened the sounder forces of the state and created the bewildering succession of such forms of government as the Rada, the Hetmanate of Skoropadsky and the Directory under Petlyura and gave the struggle at times a bizarre appearance as the different forces raised by the different political groups now combined against one or other of the invaders, only to separate when the other became the more pressing danger.

Under such conditions the central authority was finally overwhelmed and those people who were most strongly committed to a free and independent Ukrainian state withdrew from the country. The Soviet regime was able to take control. This did not, however, end the difficulties for there soon came a revelation that all was not yet well and harmonized. The peasants continued to be restless. The guerilla leaders did not at once cease their activity. Above all, the country was ruined but the relations between the Russians and the Ukrainians were not yet solved.

CHAPTER TWO

The Foundation of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic

186 As the power of the Provisional Government in Petrograd
642 declined and more and more responsibility was assumed by the
665 Central Rada in Kiev, relations between Petrograd and Kiev grew
rapidly worse and the conception of Ukrainian independence gained strength in all circles, except among the Russian population of Ukraine. The seizure of power in Petrograd by Lenin could not fail to hasten the progress of separation.

During the summer and autumn of 1917 Lenin had advocated the widest application of the principle of self-determination and encouraged the non-Russian peoples to demand separation from the Provisional Government. He and his friends had hardly come into power, when he showed at once the cynicism and hypocrisy of his entire policy. The Central Rada in Kiev and the vast majority of the soviets in Ukraine repudiated the demand for the confiscation of all property, the expropriation of the land and the turning over of the control of all industry to the workers, although in the Third Universal it did provide for "state control over production in the interests of Ukraine and Russia" and declared that all land not worked directly by the owners was to become the property of the workers. For all intents and purposes, the Third Universal which was issued on November 20, 1917, did its best to separate Ukrainian affairs from Bolshevik control without as yet resorting to a declaration of formal independence.

This produced a very unsatisfactory situation, for the Bolsheviks attacked the efforts of the Secretary of the Rada for Military Affairs to effect an understanding with the old Russian Army

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186 Headquarters at Mohylev and with the other national groups which
642 were rapidly making common cause with the Central Rada in
665 their opposition to the extreme measures of the Petrograd Soviet. The Council of Commissars in Petrograd claimed to speak for the whole of the former Russia in its efforts to make peace with the Germans. When the Rada denied this and approached the other non-Russian peoples, the Bolsheviks in Petrograd formally accused the Rada of withdrawing Ukrainian troops from the front, of disarming Bolshevik units in Ukraine and of allowing the Don Cossack forces to retire to their homeland across Ukrainian territory. On December 17, it hypocritically recognized the right of Ukraine to independence but threatened war on the Rada if it did not meet the conditions of the Council of People's Commissars.

At the same time the Bolsheviks in the Kiev Soviet arranged an All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in the hope of putting pressure on the Rada. The attempt missed fire for the Congress proved to be under the influence of the anti-Bolshevik parties and adopted resolutions declaring that the Ukrainians had not thrown off the power of the Tsar to accept the domination of the Commissars. The Bolshevik spokesman Zatonsky was unable to make himself heard above the opposition and only 80 members supported the Soviet demands.

As a result of this failure Vasili Shakhray and Zatonsky left Kiev for Kharkiv where they joined a Congress of Soviets largely from the Donets basin and Kryvy Rih. There, on December 20, they established a new Ukrainian Rada under Russian Communist control and set up a Ukrainian Soviet Republic. They were joined by a group of Ukrainian Bolsheviks including Neronovych and George Kotsyubynsky, the son of the well-known Ukrainian author who had been a friend of Gorky.

[701] The so-called Ukrainian army loyal to this new regime was composed almost exclusively of Russian troops and was under the open command of a Russian officer, Michael A. Muravyev. This force occupied Kiev on February 7, 1918 and held the city for about three weeks. Its actions showed clearly the nature of the government. Under the pretext of liberating the Ukrainians from

the control of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie and the Rada, it abolished 186
all Ukrainian newspapers and its disorderly elements not only 642
executed members of the Ukrainian and Russian bourgeoisie but 665
also Ukrainian Communists and radicals who used the Ukrainian language in their hearing.

In the meantime the Bolsheviks had opened negotiations with 648
the Germans in Brest-Litovsk where Trotsky claimed to speak for 186
the entire former Russian Empire. To circumvent this, the Rada 642
formally declared the full independence of Ukraine and sent delegates 665
to the peace conference. As a balance to this, Trotsky introduced into the conference the representatives of this new Ukrainian [728]
Soviet Republic who claimed to be the spokesmen for the Ukrainian peasants and proletariat. Their arguments did not convince the Germans and Austrians, who saw greater possibilities of profit by recognizing the Ukrainian National Republic, so as to secure without fighting a large part of the Ukrainian grain supplies. The Ukrainian National Republic signed this agreement with misgivings, for, in fact, it threw the Rada into the power of the Germans and ended all chance of assistance from the Allied democratic powers which had previously regarded Lenin as the tool of the German General Staff. Now, with the conclusion of this peace, they extended their ill-will to the Ukrainian Central Rada.

The immediate result was German assistance to the Rada and the Soviet forces were quickly forced out of Ukraine and back into Great Russian territory. The leaders of the Ukrainian Soviet government were members of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and could not raise the question as to whether or not their new state was actually independent, and whether it could be, if it did not have its own Communist Party associated on a par with the Russian Party in the Communist International.

This brief Communist interlude in Ukraine should have been most instructive to both the Allied powers and the Germans, but neither drew the true lessons from it. The Allies, who were still opposed to the principles of Bolshevism and were annoyed by the speeches of Zinovyev and Chicherin, became more friendly disposed to the Russian Whites and gave up their efforts to win through

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648 invoking the democratic principles of self-determination the support
186 of any of the non-Russian peoples. The Germans, on the other
642 hand, after aiding the Rada to return, dispersed it on the ground
665 that it was too radical, but when a more conservative regime was set up under Hetman Skoropadsky, they did not give this honest support. They sought only for Ukrainian supplies and by their actions they weakened the power of the Hetman and strengthened discontent against his regime without allowing him to do anything that would weaken the power of the Communists.

The situation became almost ridiculously complicated. Germany, anxious to secure troops for the Western Front, was, by the spring of 1918, at peace with both the Commissars of Moscow and the government of Ukraine. It was therefore opposed to both the White Russians and the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Even the Czechoslovaks on their way to Vladivostok, thanks to the negotiations between President Masaryk and Muravyev, were on friendly terms with the Ukrainian Communists and had difficulties with the Ukrainian government and the Germans. As soon as they crossed into the Russian Soviet Republic, they had difficulties with the Russian Communists and the Germans and found their support among a part of the White Russians. It was the same situation as in the far north where the Germans backed the White Finnish forces under Mannerheim against the red Finns who were the favored party of their friend and associate, Moscow. Yet all the time there was no Ukrainian Communist Party, for the Ukrainian Communists owed their prime allegiance to the Russian Communist Party which was, in theory at least, on the opposite side in the general disturbed situation.

To the Communists, as Skrypnyk, Shakhray and George Pyatakov who had played an important role in the Communist occupation of Kiev, this seemed a serious gap and at a meeting in Tahanrih in April they triumphed over the Communists from Katerynoslav who had insisted upon remaining merely a part of the Russian Communist Party. Their victory was of short duration, for when there came an organization meeting in Moscow on July 5, the Russian authorities definitely made it clear that they would not tolerate

the existence of a Ukrainian Communist Party. Bela Kun warned 648
that in the international civil war that was to be begun, great 186
efforts were to be made not to allow it to assume anything of a 642
national character, but to keep it restricted and fought on class 665
lines. They were also informed that they could in this new struggle have no relations with Mensheviks or any Ukrainian Social Revolutionists or Social Democrats. A few months later Stalin was elected to the Central Committee of the Ukrainian branch of the Russian party as a symbol of the dependence in which the party was to be kept.

The first people to appreciate fully the dilemma in which the Ukrainian Communists found themselves were the Ukrainian Communist leaders who had established, with Russian help, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. They were quickly taught that as long as the control of their Party was not in their own hands, they were completely helpless and at the mercy of the Russians.

Shakhray, who had endeavored to argue at Kiev in December, 1917 that the Ukrainian Communists were to be counted as Ukrainians, very soon in Russia became so disgusted that he resigned from the Russian Communist Party and retired to Saratov to establish a Ukrainian Communist Party of Bolsheviks. He criticized the extreme policy of centralization carried on by the Russian Communists.

Along with S. Mazlakh, he published a book entitled *The Wave—What is being done in Ukraine and with Ukraine.* This book, which was often quoted later by Skrypnyk and his associates, was the theoretical basis for Ukrainian Communism. Shakhray tried to foster discontent against the regime of Hetman Skoropadsky by stressing his relations with both the German forces in Ukraine and the White Russian refugees who had taken shelter in that country. He declared that Ukrainian independence could only be consistently won by the Ukrainian Communists, for they, as the Ukrainian proletariat, were the only people who could advocate and carry through a real revolution in view of the treachery of the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, he attributed the Communist failure in Ukraine to the fact that the Party was entirely under

648 Russian control and looked at the cause of the Communists through
186 the eyes of the Russian colonists in Ukraine who were, in accord-
642 ance with the Russian imperialistic tradition, working not for
665 Ukraine but for Moscow.

He soon left Saratov for Kuban and here he was captured and killed by the Denikin forces. Mazlakh, who had remained a member of the Russian Communist Party, was later shot by them for nationalism. The third Commissar for War, Neronovych, became disillusioned and on the entrance of German troops into Ukraine he gave up politics but he fell into the hands of the Ukrainian National Army and was shot. Thus, the first attempts of the Russian Communist Party to seize Ukraine and expel the Ukrainian National government ended disastrously and relatively few of the early leaders survived. Most of them paid the penalty for their actions to one of the contending forces, with the Bolsheviks executing then or later the larger number.

During the summer of 1918 while Hetman Skoropadsky remained in power, the chief work which the Communists could hope to do in Ukraine was through their mission in Kiev under the leadership of D. Z. Manuilsky. This was ostensibly engaged in negotiations for a definite peace treaty between the Ukrainian National Republic and the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. In reality, Manuilsky was almost openly intriguing with the tacit consent of the Germans who had no desire to see their own position in Moscow jeopardized, as their armies were being driven back on the Western Front. Manuilsky was also able to notice the constant splitting of the leftist Ukrainian parties, which, in their hostility to the policies of the Hetman, tended to move nearer to the Communist position.

The disintegration in both the Social Revolutionist and the Social Democrat ranks became steadily more marked during the summer of 1918. When the German armies collapsed and the Hetman could no longer retain his post, a Directory of five men, including Petlyura and Vynnychenko, set themselves up at the news of the abdication of the German Emperor and they soon recovered Kiev. At the same time the left wing of the Social

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Revolutionists (Borotbisty) refused to recognize the new Direc- 648
tory and drifted rapidly toward the Bolshevik position. 186

The Kremlin, sensing the great change in the Ukrainian situa- 642
tion, at once refurbished the idea of a Ukrainian Soviet Republic. 665
Its real head was now Christian Rakovsky, a Rumanian with Bulgarian citizenship who had never been in Ukraine, but its nominal leaders were Pyatakov and George Kotsyubynsky. These moved from Kursk along the railroad lines into Ukraine at the end of December but Chicherin, in his telegrams to the Directory, categorically denied that the Russians were supporting this movement in any way. He laid all the responsibility upon the Ukrainian Communists. The ruse did not work and finally on January 16, 1919, the Directory, in which Vynnychenko's star was sinking, declared war.

This was opposed by the left wing of the Social Democrats who were very influential in the Directory. On January 10-12, the two wings definitely parted and the left adopted the name of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party (Independent) and insisted upon the establishment of a non-Communist Soviet Republic. The right wing, in view of the weakness of the Ukrainian proletariat, advocated instead a Congress of Workers which would include both peasants and the city proletariat. When war actually started, the left wing split again between those who were willing to stand for an independent Ukraine and those who refused to act against Russia under any circumstances. The latter took the name of USDRP (Independent Lefts).

It was not long before the Borotbisty and the USDRP (Independent Lefts) began negotiations for merging. Both were convinced of the superiority of the Soviet form of democratic government and both were convinced that any Communist government would inevitably recognize the essential rights of the Ukrainian people. In this respect they were far more naive than were the leaders of the first Ukrainian Communist regime who had already become completely disillusioned at the contrast between the theories and the practice of Lenin and his associates. They refused to cooperate with Petlyura and the Directory and, in effect, they with-

648 drew from its support a considerable section of the Ukrainian in-
186 tellectuals at a crucial moment.

642 On the other hand, with their own armies they fought against
665 the White Russians of Denikin, because they saw in these merely an attempt to restore the old order. Yet they declined to be included in the organized army of the Directory and by their independent actions they made more difficult the burden of the army commanders. They encouraged the formation in the country of independent military bands which added to the growing chaos. To emphasize their position they again changed their name to the Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbisty) and constantly sought to ingratiate themselves with the Ukrainian branch of the Russian Communist Party which had again succeeded in reoccupying Kiev and in forcing the Directory to flee.

On the other hand, the USDRP (Independents), almost as true admirers of the Soviet system but far more critical of the Russian influence, did merge their forces for the fighting against Denikin with the forces of the Directory. In the summer of 1919, this group, under the influence of the Khmelevtsevs of Kobilyaky in Poltavshchyna, commenced again to review their position. After the death of their leaders in a crossing of the Dnieper and after the defeat of Denikin, they decided to adopt the appellation of Communists and to rename themselves the Ukrainian Communist Party without any additional description title. Thus, they took the name of Ukapisty and as such they dragged on an independent existence for some years, confidently expecting that they would ultimately receive national and international recognition from the Comintern, the Communist International.

This endless splitting and regrouping of the various parties proved a headache to the Directory which was trying to organize the country for defense against both of the Russian invaders. The individual armed forces, acting independently, aided in wrecking the economy and this inspired peasant leaders of various kinds to seek the control of their own native regions. Some of these men proved themselves able, if short-sighted, leaders. Some, as Nestor Makhno, were unadulterated anarchists who saw no need of any

central regime. Others were mere adventurers thrown into prom- 648
inence by the course of events and willing to shift their principles 186
for the sake of a momentary personal advantage. Others were 642
patriots with no broader vision than their home districts. 665

As a result, throughout 1919 there were some 328 revolts against the extending power of the Russian Communist forces which were fanning out over Ukraine, slaughtering and robbing as they went but still unable to secure a definite control of the villages.

As opposed to this welter of conflicting ideals, the policy of the Russian dominated Ukrainian branch of the Russian Communist Party was simplicity and clarity itself. This supported the paper independence of the Ukrainian Soviet regime and openly avowed its intention of subjugating the country and of exploiting it for the benefit of Moscow. Their purposes were even openly avowed at the Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies on March 22, 1919, when Shlikhter, a Ukrainian German and one of the commissars appointed by Moscow to collect grain, declared: "You all remember how Ukraine began to become Soviet; with every day of the advance of the Red Army, we and you felt more easy; the rich grain-producing Ukraine is ours. We have four central military divisions collecting and on them we rest all our hopes. We have a mass of workmen sent in (from Moscow to Ukraine), who know how to search all the Ukrainian villages. We always remember that the eyes of the proletariat of Russia are turned toward Ukraine."

These remarks represented the cynical attitude of Lenin and the Communists. They ignored the statements as to a Ukrainian Soviet Republic that were being made by Lenin and others to woo the various leftist Ukrainian parties. They were safe speeches made to reassure the Great Russians that the Bolsheviks still had a monolithic outlook, even though they were prepared to go to almost any lengths to create a paper regime which would insure and facilitate the plundering of the rich grain-producing Ukraine. They told, more or less, the truth, that was not recognized by the more idealistic theoreticians, that the Ukrainian Communists were, in fact, the dupes and victims of the Moscow regime which cared nothing for the Ukrainian people, or even the Ukrainian proletariat.

Ukraine Under the Soviets

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By the end of 1919 the Ukrainian Soviet regime was so satisfied with the success of its raiding and collecting parties that it felt able to proclaim an amnesty and to disarm the population completely. To accomplish the latter purpose, new Russian forces were sent into the country, the villages were thoroughly searched and disarmed. The peasants were tiring of the apparently endless exactions of the independent commanders and they turned against many of the patriotic partisan bands and declined to give them further support. This broke the movement and even the alliance of Petlyura with the Poles and the short occupation of Kiev by the combined armies in the spring of 1920 did not suffice to restore the old enthusiasm for the hard-pressed Directory.

By the end of 1920, when the Russian and Ukrainian Soviet delegations met the Poles in Riga in October, 1920, the fighting was nearly over. The Poles signed a treaty of peace without consulting their Ukrainian allies of the Ukrainian National Republic. There was nothing for the forces of the Directory to do but to retire abroad and continue their unsuccessful efforts to secure Western assistance. This was not forthcoming. The French were interested in aggrandizing Poland as a bulwark against Germany; the other allies were openly supporting Denikin through a misinterpreted friendship with the Russian people and there did not seem to be left even a spark of the principles enunicated but a short time before in Wilson's attitude toward self-determination and the rights of people to govern themselves. The struggle was ended and the Ukrainians were left at the mercy of their Russian overlords, now back in a new guise.

665 affirmative triumphed, and the Borotbisty were dissolved as a separate group. They were given the nominal right of choosing two members for the Executive Committee of the KP/b/U but this was, of course, an empty phrase, since that Executive Committee was itself but an agent and tool of the Executive Committee in Moscow.

The Ukapisty offered a more serious threat, for they were trained in Marxian dialectics and they knew the weak points in the program of the Moscow centre. They accepted the Marxian analysis of capitalist society and the Leninist theory of imperialism, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the Soviet regime. As regards the question of nationality, they shared the Marxist-Leninist conception but in contrast to the Russian Communist Party they [186] adapted this to suit a non-ruling and enslaved nation. The Ukapisty[1] theoretically based the difference between its attitude and that of the Russian Communist Party on the fact that the latter represented the proletariat of a dominant nation, while they stood for the proletariat of an enslaved nation. Thus the one considered the question of nationality as a question of tactics connected with the spreading of the proletarian revolution; for the other it was a question of program connected with the liberation of the people and itself not only from capitalistic but also from national enslavement. They condemned the Russian Bolshevik practices in Ukraine and, in contrast to the Bolshevik idea of spreading the revolution by armed force (an idea which collapsed with the defeat of the Red Army at Warsaw in 1920 and which was then condemned by Lenin himself), they believed in the "internal forces", i.e. that the revolution would only be organic and lasting if it was carried out by the internal forces of each nation and not if it was introduced by bayonets from abroad. They stood therefore for an independent Ukrainian Soviet state, with its own red army, its own independent economy, and its entrance into the Comintern on an equal footing with all other Communist parties.

The Ukapisty were allowed to exist until 1925 and it was not until the Comintern was willing to declare that it was Muscovite to the core and that all foreign Communist parties were of right

[1] [Ukrainian Communist Party -- Analyst]

CHAPTER FIVE

Ukrainization

The period of the New Economic Policy was likewise the 186
time when the movement for the Ukrainization of the state reached its highest point. This was a complicated political, cultural and scholarly movement which aimed to develop the Ukrainian self-consciousness in every possible way and to establish the proper role of the Ukrainian language and culture in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. It took many and diverse forms, and while it developed into a definite opposition to Russian influence and Russian methods, it was not primarily so much an anti-Communist as an extra-Communist movement, even though most of its outstanding leaders were tried and tested members of the party.

The basis for the entire movement is to be found in the slight
attraction that Communism as a doctrine possessed for the Ukrainian [665]
people. As late as 1927 there were only 122,928 Ukrainian Com-
munists, that is, about thirty-nine for each ten thousand of the [163]
Ukrainian population. The bulk of the Communists in Ukraine were Russian and the vast majority of these belonged to the urban proletariat or to the workers in the Donets Basin and Kryvy Rih.

The general period of disintegration during the civil war and [369]
the period of Militant Communism had greatly strengthened the power and self-confidence of the peasants and had weakened the power of the city workmen. This showed Lenin and the dominant group that some method had to be found to win at least the passive support of the countryside if new troubles were to be averted.

The Bolsheviks were well aware of the tenacity with which the 186
Ukrainian peasants, whether they were literate or illiterate, clung 191
to their native language. Lenin had used this characteristic with 665

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skill and success in encouraging the Ukrainian opposition to the Russian Provisional Government. The proper recognition of the language had been one of the most insistent demands put forward by all groups which had later come together in the Ukrainian National Republic. The failure of the Bolsheviks in their early occupation of Ukraine to recognize the Ukrainian language had been one of the surest means of arousing opposition to their course and this time with their power established, the Bolsheviks decided to change their policy. As early as December 6, 1919, the Executive Committee of the Russian Communist Party had declared: "In carrying out absolutely the principle of the self-determination of peoples, the Central Committee considers it necessary to repeat again that the Russian Communist Party maintains the recognition of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic." It encouraged the Russians in Ukraine to learn Ukrainian and to aid in developing this as a weapon for the Communist education of the laboring masses.

Yet all was mere verbiage and even Vynnychenko who, at this moment, was sympathetic to the Bolsheviks in his "Letter to the Ukrainian Workmen and Peasants," published in *Forward* (Lviv, 30.10. 2-3, II, 1920), lamented the fact that, despite this, the Ukrainian language did not receive its just due and that many Russian Communists were inclined to look upon even Ukrainian Communists as potential counter-revolutionists.

On the other hand, there was one group of Communists who were sincerely devoted to this goal. They were the former Borotbisty and the Ukapisty who had stressed the need for Ukrainian Communism and who had never lost an opportunity, while stressing their Communist feelings, to express the hope that the Ukrainian Communists might some time be formed into a special party and be duly admitted to the Communist International on a par with all the other Communist parties of the world. They took advantage of the situation offered by the formation of the Union of Soviet Republics and eagerly sought posts in the Commissariat of Education, which was one of the independent republic commissariats. This gave them a very good opportunity to work for the develop-

ment of Ukrainian and Ukrainian culture in a field where there 186
could be little expressed opposition. 191

On the other hand, every step for the fostering of Ukrainian or 665
its development was met by the Russian Communists, and especially by those in Ukraine, with the greatest hostility. This went so far that Dmytro Lebid, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the KP/b/U, declared that there was a conflict of two languages and cultures in Ukraine and that it was not the duty of the Communist Party to interfere in this but to allow the dominant culture to win. In this he was actuated as a Russianized Ukrainian by his hostility to his native language and culture but he failed to win support, for it was very obvious that his policy of favoring Russian was only deepening the gulf between the Party and the Ukrainian peasants, the thing that the Moscow authorities were endeavoring at the time to bridge.

On August 1, 1923, the Communist Party passed a new decree which said: "The government of the workers and peasants regards it as necessary in the immediate future to concentrate its power on the spreading of a knowledge of the Ukrainian language. The former equality existing hitherto between the two most widely used languages in Ukraine, Ukrainian and Russian, is insufficient. Life, as experience has shown, causes the actual superiority of Russian. To remove this inequality, the government of the workmen and peasants will introduce a series of practical means which, respecting the equality of the languages of all nationalities on Ukrainian territory, must assure to the Ukrainian language that place which corresponds to the number and economic importance of the Ukrainian people in the territory of the UkSSR."

It further provided that Russian officials in Ukraine should learn Ukrainian within a definite period. All this sounded well on paper but the date by which Russian officials had either to learn Ukrainian or be recalled was constantly postponed further into the future, and the highest men who came for but short periods and who represented Moscow in the Ukrainian capital stubbornly refused to make any effort to obey these decrees.

On the other hand, every declaration to this effect was eagerly

186 snapped up by the Borotbisty and the Ukapisty in the Commis-
191 sariat for Education. In a short time they worked so effectively
665 that nearly all the books published in Ukraine and about 85% of the newspapers were put out in Ukrainian. The circulation of these Ukrainian publications in the villages increased rapidly and aided in producing a sense of relief among the peasants and a tolerance of the situation which was in sharp contrast to the prevailing mood of a few years before.

[871] A network of Ukrainian schools was set up throughout the country with instruction in the native language and the number of students grew rapidly from among the peasant classes. It had been centuries since the Ukrainian language had reached such a state of popularity. The theatres produced plays in Ukrainian as the chief part of their repertory. The cities assumed a markedly Ukrainian appearance and the leaders could look with satisfaction on their results.

871 The one difficulty was the low level of the instruction in many
186 places but this was equally characteristic of the Russian terrain.[1] The revolution and the Bolshevik laws had abolished the old Russian system of education and had eliminated from the schools the bulk of the older intelligentsia and their children who, on one excuse or another, were excluded from all opportunities for study. The old disciplines were abolished and the Soviet school entered upon a chaotic period. Nevertheless, the changes which the former Borotbist Hrynko introduced, including the establishment of seven year schools which gave the students the right to enter upon a three year course in various technical schools, served to increase rapidly the number of young and partly trained Ukrainians who were available for posts in the government service and who thereby freed the organization from its dependence upon Russian-trained people.

645 In 1925, he[2] was succeeded in the post of Commissar by O.
871 Shumsky, likewise a Borotbist, who had held the post of Ukrainian
186 Minister in Warsaw. He had come back in 1923 to become the
665 Director of Agitation and Propaganda for the Central Committee of the KP/b/U. An ardent believer in the Ukrainian cause, he

[1] [1923 -- Analyst]

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[2] [Hrynko, Commissar of Education -- Analyst]

opposed very strenuously all the Russifying influences in the Party 645 and insisted, as a matter of principle, that only Ukrainian Com- 871 munists should be promoted to prominent posts in the Ukrainian 186 Communist organizations. 665 He even went so far as to insist, when Kaganovich was sent from Moscow as Secretary of the Ukrainian section of the party, that he be removed and replaced by Chubar, an old Bolshevik, and he recommended that Hrynko should be made the head of the state.

Kaganovich, who had been rather on the side of Shumsky in [681] many of his enterprises, now turned against him on the ground that he was breaking Communist discipline and, in a short time, Shumsky was removed and transferred to Moscow, where he received a post as head of the trade unions. From there he was moved to Leningrad to become head of a school of economics, but by this time his star was setting. Shumsky, on more charges, was sent to a concentration camp near the Finnish border. According to the story, he was assured that he had a chance to escape. He tried it and was shot. His leading assistants, Maksymovych, Vasylkiv and Turyansky, were branded as Shumkyists and punished accordingly.

His successor, M. Skrypnyk, took up his work as Commissar of Education under even better auspices. Unlike his predecessors, who had entered the Communist Party from the ranks of the Borotbisty or the Ukapisty and who thereby risked the charge of being Ukrainian nationalists and having bourgeois-nationalist sympathies, Skrypnyk had been an old member of the Russian Social Democratic Party (Bolsheviks). He had been a personal friend of Lenin long before the Revolution. He had been arrested several times by the tsarist government, had taken an active part in the October Revolution of 1917 and was a disciplined member of the party. He was thus above reproach so far as his party standing was concerned.

From the time of the foundation of the Ukrainian National Republic, Skrypnyk had been one of the outstanding Ukrainians in the Communist Party. From the beginning he had taken the definite stand that the Communist organization in Ukraine should be thoroughly Ukrainian, independent of the Russian Communist Party and with a seat in the Comintern. He believed that Ukraine

645 should naturally have a Soviet government and be an indepen-
871 dent state with all the rights and perquisites of the RSFSR and
● 186 he regarded the war between the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and
665 the Ukrainian National Republic as a civil war in which the Soviet Russians naturally came to the aid of the Soviet Ukrainians. At the same time he believed equally strongly that this assistance should be that of a brother-nation and should have no elements of a foreign occupation.

He was a disciplined Communist and he always acted in accordance with the strictest Communist tradition. He never joined any faction or questioned the vote of his superiors but he remained firm in his convictions, and while he was always in the minority and was willing to yield superficially, he always seized the next opportunity to advance substantially the same points but in a somewhat different form. He was on friendly terms with Stalin and he came to his post after a definite interview with Stalin and with instructions that put him in a position second only to Kaganovich.

The appointment of Skrypnyk with his Communist record showed very well that in 1927 the VKP (the All-Union Communist Party) was still playing with the idea of making the Communist International a real gathering of supposed equals, united under the leadership of a central body in Moscow. It was a tacit recognition of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as a political entity, but it was equally the recognition of a Marxian Socialist culture which might lead to some of the later developments of Stalinism. The appointment insured Stalin of the aid of the true Ukrainian Communists in the coming battle between him and the left deviationists.

Once in his own mind Skrypnyk had answered the problem, he did not waver. He accepted the Marxian doctrine that by the development of an urban proletariat he could develop the Ukrainians to the point where they would be justified in demanding an entrance into the Comintern as an independent nation. He interpreted the cases of Czechoslovakia and Latvia as exactly that, since the proletariats of Prague and Brno, as well as Riga, had forced

national independence and he set himself to do the same in Kiev 645
and Kharkiv. 871

Without wavering in his devotion to the principles of Com- 186
munism, he attacked the problem in the broadest possible way. 665
He stimulated derussification by supporting the Ukrainian press, theatre and schools. Under his influence and work, the cities, including Kharkiv, where Ukrainian influence had been relatively weak, came to be predominantly Ukrainian and in smaller places it became very rare to hear Russian spoken. The State Printing House and the smaller cooperative publishing houses produced almost nothing that was not in Ukrainian and during the few years that he remained in control, there were more Ukrainian books published than in the preceding century and a half.

Skrypnyk was still not satisfied. He extended his activity and patronage of things Ukrainian to all those areas in the RSFSR where Ukrainians were living in compact settlements. He provided Ukrainian papers, books and theatres for those who were living in Kurshchyna, Voronizhshchyna, along the Volga, Kuban, Western Siberia and Kazakhstan and the Far East. He sent educated men and women to establish schools and other cultural institutions and, for the first time in history, efforts were made to establish a real community of interests among all the Ukrainians in the Soviet Union.

More than that, he held out a friendly hand to Western Ukraine, [648]
which was under Polish rule. Although by this time the entire control of foreign affairs was concentrated in Moscow, Skrypnyk was allowed to arrange for a Ukrainian consul in Lviv and Yur. Lapchynsky, a former Ukapist, was appointed to the post. The consul's duty was to win support for the Communists in Eastern Galicia and, in pursuance of this purpose, Skrypnyk, too, paid a visit to Lviv. He had a certain success in his work and a few Western Ukrainians, as S. Rudnytsky, who came from Prague to become the head of the Ukrainian Institute of Geography and Cartography in Kharkiv, and the mathematician Chaykivsky, entered the UkSSR. They formed a special club in Kharkiv and had their own literary organization "Western Ukraine." Skrypnyk

645 even worked out a plan to recruit 8,000 teachers in Western
871 Ukraine to undertake Ukrainian work in the Donbas where the
186 Russian influence was strongest.

665 At the same time Skrypnyk was a determined Communist and he lost no opportunity for advancing the doctrines of the movement, even at the risk of doing violence to those Ukrainian ideals in which he believed. Thus, in 1928, he demanded a reformation of
[815] the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences which had been working feverishly in the same cause of Ukrainization but which, from his point of view, was insufficiently Marxist and Communist. In 1929 he won his point and the Academy was forced to elect to membership seven Communists who were chosen for their knowledge of the subject and not for their scientific ability. One of the seven was Skrypnyk himself, and among the others were O. Shlikhter and Zatonsky, the veteran from the earlier Ukrainian Communist movement. He soon promoted Shlikhter to a prominent position and refused to confirm the election of the non-Communist scholar, Krymsky, to the post of secretary. At the same time he forced the election of several Western Ukrainian members, so that for a few years the Academy did become a real centre to represent all Ukrainian scholarship.

Thus, in this complex process Skrypnyk played at times a curious and often contradictory role. He was at once the head of the Ukrainian movement and of the Communist movement in the country and he never realized or noticed the contradictory character of his actions, like Tito in the early years of his dealing with Moscow. Still, during his term of office the Ukrainian movement reached its height and seemed to be flourishing.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

Mykola Khvylovy

Shumsky and Skrypnyk, as Commissars for Education, defended the position of the Ukrainian language in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and among the Ukrainians in the entire USSR. They worked to break down the anti-Ukrainian attitude that had existed from the beginning in the Communist Party of Ukraine, but as men holding public office and busied with the political and administrative problems that were thus raised, they did not go further. The additional step to point out the road for this newly conscious Ukrainian Communism was taken by Mykola Khvylovy. 538 186

Khvylovy, who was born in 1891, was already well known as a Communist writer. A fearless author of strong convictions, he had worked his way early in the Civil War to the position of the Communists and had served as a commissar in the Ukrainian Communist Army. He was now one of the recognized Communist writers and moving spirit of the leading literary group, the *Vaplite* (the All-Ukrainian Academy of Proletarian Literature), the members of which were devoted to him.

Khvylovy was an ardent admirer of Trotsky and when the break came between Trotsky and Stalin, he took the side of the former and held, with him, that the cause of counter-revolution had triumphed and that the rise of a Soviet bureaucracy was merely a return to the old unhappy state. Khvylovy had become a Communist solely because of his belief that it was only through Communism and Communist teachings that humanity could achieve its goal of liberation and self-development and he was impatient with anything that seemed to contradict this theory.

538 He was at the same time an ardent Ukrainian. He could
186 not bear to see the subordinate position which Ukraine and the Ukrainian Communist Party held in the USSR and he resented the already obvious attempts to present Moscow as the supreme representative of Communism and of a general Communist culture.

In 1925, he began to publish a weekly pamphlet as a supplement to the central newspaper *Visti* under the title *Culture and Life.* In this he advocated the development of an independent Ukrainian Communist culture which would be distinct from that of Moscow. His first articles, which were purely literary in character, started a lively controversy in the press and in public meetings. It was difficult to attack him, for he based his arguments entirely upon the official statements of the Communist Party and he revealed the inconsistency which existed in these official statements. The entire Ukrainian section of the KP/b/U was aroused and so was the whole of Ukrainian society. Here was a popular writer who dared, in the name of Ukrainian Communism, to take the statements of the Communist Party (KP/b/U) seriously and to draw the logical conclusions from them. These articles he then republished in book form, *Quo Vadis* (1925), *Thoughts against the Current* (1926) and *The Sociological Equivalent* (1927).

Khvylovy's original arguments had urged the necessity for the new Communist Ukrainian literature to assimilate and build itself upon the great European cultural and literary tradition as exemplified in its greatest and noblest writers and thinkers and not to confine itself to being, as it had been too often in the past, a mere appanage and colony of Russia. He deplored the already evident tendency of Ukrainian Communist literature to base itself on the pronunciamentos of Moscow without testing and analyzing them and this led him to proclaim as his slogan "Away from Moscow."

"The ideas of the proletariat we all know without the guidance of Moscow. Only the young Ukrainian nation, the Ukrainian proletariat and its Communist intelligentsia are the true bearers of the great revolutionary socialist ideas and they must not orient themselves on the centre of All-Union Philistinism, on the Moscow sirens. They need to orient themselves on themselves and Europe, but not on the Europe of Spengler, which is declining and which we all hate, but on the Europe of the great civilization, the Europe of Goethe, Darwin, Byron, Newton, Marx, etc. That is the Europe that the first legions of the Asiatic Renaissance cannot dispense with." 538 186

In another article he wrote. "Russia is an independent country. Independent. We too are independent. Insofar as our literature has its own path of development, we must ask ourselves the question as to which of the world literatures it is to follow. It is not the Russian in any case. This is positive without any reservations. Ukrainian poetry must flee from Russian literature as rapidly as it can. The reason is that Russian literature has dominated us for centuries as the master of the situation and has trained our psychology to slavish imitation. To base our young art upon it means the halting of our development.

"The time has come to put an end to all Little Russianism, to Ukrainophilism and to Prosvitaism (an allusion to the net of elementary Ukrainian educational institutions existing before the Communist Revolution), and also to ragtag Moscophilism."

The ideas which Khvylovy expressed about literature had a far wider significance, for they could be applied to every aspect of Ukrainian life and activity. As the discussion shifted to the broader questions that were involved, Stalin, who was engrossed in the struggle with Trotsky, interfered personally. He wrote in April, 1926, as general secretary of the VKP/b [the All Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)] to the KP/b/U: "If the Western European proletariat look with longing on the banner which waves in Moscow, the Ukrainian Communist Khvylovy has nothing else to say in favor of Moscow but to urge the Ukrainian workers to flee from Moscow. What is to be said about the other Ukrainian intellectuals of the non-Communist camp, if the Communists begin to speak and not only speak but write in our Soviet press in the words of Khvylovy?"

This was the signal for a new series of attacks on Khvylovy by the complacent russifiers in the Communist Party of Ukraine. All the members of the Executive Committee except Shumsky joined

538 in the attack and so did their satellites, but Khvylovy stood his
● 186 ground and reiterated more strongly his demands for an independent Ukrainian cultural development and repeated Trotsky's attacks on Moscow as the centre of the new Philistinism which had devoured the revolution.

By the end of the year, Khvylovy and the *Vaplite* found it necessary to prepare a formal letter of apology and self-accusation for publication. However humble and self-accusing he was in this letter, he was thoroughly insincere, for he had no intention of changing his course and in a few weeks he resumed his hammering at the forces and advocates of Moscow. He merely sought to gain time to let his words sink in more deeply into the consciousness of the Ukrainian people. His opponents recognized this and throughout 1926 and 1927, they ceaselessly attacked him. In fact, at the end of 1927, at the Tenth Congress of the KP/b/, Kaganovich declared that Khvylovy was an "echo of the bourgeois and kurkuls who base their hopes for the restoration of a bourgeois government in Ukraine on the forces of an armed foreign imperialism."

Khvylovy's article on *Ukraine or Little Russia* was refused publication by the *Visti* on the orders of the party authorities and renewed efforts were made to silence him. This it was impossible to do decisively until the final expulsion of Trotsky from the Communist Party, for the leading representatives of Moscow could not be sure until that time that many of the expressions used by the daring writer would not be incorporated into the principles of the party itself, even though Trotsky had never been known for any pro-Ukrainianism.

To make his cause more vocal, Khvylovy began to express his basic ideas not only in his publicistic articles but in his artistic stories and novels which were very popular among all classes of literate Ukrainians. The climax came with his *Woodsnipes,* the first part of which appeared in 1928.

This was strictly a propaganda novel written with all of Khvylovy's artistic skill. In this he depicts types of his Ukrainian opponents, the Russian Bolshevists, the typical careerists, and the character of Aglaya, the new Ukrainian type who speaks in the words and with the views of the author. She denounces the gloomy devils in the Moscow chauvinists who were bent upon the enslavement of Ukraine in the name of the International. "It is the same Russian intelligent-internationalist, who willingly talks about the self-determination of nations . . . only not of those which are in the Soviet Union. Here it sees only followers of Petlyura and does not notice its own interference. It here thinks that Ukrainian culture exists . . . as an Austrian intrigue. He points out to Europe the achievements of the Russian genius and leads out into the arena the other peoples of the Union, as the Russian tsarism maintained its own zoo for the people it had conquered. In a word, he is an internationalist who, behind his cosmopolitanism, preserves his own zoological nationalism." 538 186

The second part of the novel was completed and Khvylovy went abroad. As a result of the storm that this novel aroused, the journal of the *Vaplite* was suppressed. The moment was apparently chosen in the hope that Khvylovy would maintain his position and be forced into emigration, from which his influence in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic would be lessened, if not destroyed. Instead, Khvylovy promised to have the manuscript of the second part destroyed and returned to Ukraine.

"By destroying the *Woodsnipes* and thus buying the right to return home . . . and to continue the struggle in more limited forms," wrote Yur. D., in the introduction to the Salzburg edition of the book,—"Khvylovy assured the possibility of the appearance of a numbers of plays by Kulish, of the pieces of the Berezil, his own compilation of the *Literary Fair,* the Ukrainian films of Dovzhenko, the Ukrainization of the higher schools,—in a word he postponed for five years the assassination of the great cultural renaissance."

The other members of the *Vaplite* joined in their own way with Khvylovy in painting the contrasts between the high ideals set forth in the decrees of the Communist party and the sordid reality of the Bolshevik bureaucracy in the Ukraine, who were making no attempt to turn the visions of the party principles into the life of the people. All of the writers were attacked as Khvylovy and

538 sooner or later silenced, even though for some time they worked
● 186 with him in publishing the *Literary Fair,* a medley of works of all kinds with pungent introductions and comments.

This tendency became so marked that in 1927, Andry Khvylya, one of the most faithful supporters of the official line of the Party declared of the story of Valeriyan Pidmohylny, the *Third Revolution,* "It makes it seem as if Makhno was at the head of the revolutionary movement, that the villagers were with him, as their earth bore them, and that the Bolsheviks were running after Makhno and collecting cream, . . . that the Communist Party were a group of plotters, who had no connection with the masses but through espionage were profiting by the great deeds of other people." Khvylovy found another Communist ally in the person of Volobuyiv. He was a young Ukrainian economist who utilized the materials on the Ukraine prepared by Prof. V. Dobrohayev and published in the central organ of the KP/b/U, the *Bolshevik of Ukraine,* a series of articles which showed the extent of the exploitation of Ukraine by Moscow. He proved clearly that Moscow was carrying out a colonial policy in respect to Ukraine, instead of treating it as an equal republic. This was a sensational revelation for the twenties. Later the works of both Volobuyiv and Khvylovy were condemned by Moscow as anti-Communist and Volobuyiv, shortly after 1933, was exiled to a Siberian prison.

The growing pressure upon Ukraine, the forced collectivization which was beginning and the beginning of the great famine of 1932-3, completed the disillusionment of Khvylovy, who up to this time had maintained a stubborn faith in the principles of Communism and its aspirations for a better future for the common man. His later works made it clear that he had lost all hope that the revolution would accomplish anything except a continuation of the streams of blood that were beginning again to flow throughout Ukraine. Yet there was nothing for him to do but to continue his work.

186 Yet this obvious truth apparently was overlooked by Skrypnyk
631 and, to a lesser extent, even by Khvylovy, who was absorbed in his everwidening discussion of the cultural significance of Ukrainian Communism and the role and mission of the Ukrainian Communists. While these were talking and arguing about certain ideas, the central authorities in Moscow were cleverly laying plans for removing from the field of practical politics and administration the very basis of local government for which they were fighting.

631 In the same way, reform of the administrative divisions was under way with the concealed purpose of changing the boundaries of the local sub-divisions, so that they would have a purely economic basis. This was done by the elimination of the central areas, the *gubernias* and the *okrugs* and the introduction of a two-step system of administration, the *kray* or *oblast* and the *rayon* or region, which was designed on a purely economic purpose and was admirably adapted for the elimination of local and even republic feeling.

By these and other administrative measures the essential features of the New Economic Policy were eliminated but they were done so gradually and locally that a large part of the population only realized the situation when the process was too far advanced to be affected by any scattered protests.

665 At the end of 1927 Trotsky was expelled from the Communist
642 Party and this ended the long feud between him and Stalin for the control of the Party. Trotsky had quite consistently fought the New Economic Policy as a needless concession to capitalism and within a few months of his rival's defeat, Stalin reversed his policy and openly adopted a more rigid system of controls similar to those which he had attacked Trotsky for urging.

As a matter of fact the pretext for a distinction between the Soviet government and the Communist Party was wearing thin. It was a needless piece of propaganda, once the regime felt itself sufficiently strong. There was no longer the need of maintaining non-party men in places of apparent authority and with his practical sense, Stalin speedily allowed the system to lapse into the limbo of obscurity and made the Communist Party openly what it was, the dictatorial party dominated directly from Moscow.

CHAPTER TWELVE

The Early Trials

517 The change of economic policy which had ushered in the
186 collectivization of agriculture seemed at first to offer no threat to the cultural movement which was going on in Ukraine. Despite the open criticisms that had been made of Khvylovy and the more secret opposition that Skrypnyk was meeting, the cultural work continued in all its aspects. Politically the Commissariat of Education was still continuing its work, the new literature was proceeding with more and more important works being produced, and outside and somewhat apart from the political life of the day, Ukrainian scholarship was producing ever more serious works.

No one openly thought of overthrowing the regime although latent discontent could be discovered among the entire population. It had been years since there had been any open opposition. The unruly leaders who had appealed to arms had either gone abroad or quieted down and there was no one who was even suspected of the kind of disloyalty that had been widespread during the period of Militant Communism.

186 Then, in 1929, just as the compulsory collectivization was being
814 prepared, the Ukrainian Soviet government announced that it had
687 discovered the evidence of the existence of a secret society, the
661 Society for the Liberation of Ukraine, and it commenced a series of arrests of some of the outstanding intellectual leaders of the scientific world. This resulted in a public trial and condemnation of the accused but for the most part they received relatively light sentences.

Who were involved? For the most part they were individuals who had played more or less important roles in the Ukrainian

186 National Republic, who had gone abroad after its collapse and
819 who had been invited back to take part in the work of the Ukrainian
687 Academy of Sciences. The government produced what seemed
661 to be definite evidence against these people but the curious fact
[538] was that this evidence was strangely inconsistent with all of their
previous activity. On the prisoner's bench were such men as Serhey Yefremiv, the leading scholar of Ukrainian literature and a relative conservative, the academiciam Mykhaylo Slabchenko, a former Social Democrat, Prof. Joseph Hermayze, a former member of the Executive Committee of the same party, and the well-known writer L. Starytska-Chernyakivska, who was close to Efremiv and who had more or less dropped out of the modern literary movement and was living in practical retirement.

The Soviet record of the trial strongly suggests that all those factions which, during the existence of the Ukrainian National Republic had utterly failed to come to any agreement, had somehow or other composed their differences in the days when Ukrainian sentiments seemed to be dominant in the ranks of the Communist Party and when there were outstanding Communists, like Khvylovy and Skrypnyk, pleading the Ukrainian cause. Yet, as was to be the case in almost all of the later trials, the court record based upon the testimony of the NKVD did not give any clue to the treasonable acts of which the defendants were accused and if they did, the stories passed belief. There was, likewise, no indication of the serious plans on which the organization was working or any details of its formal organization.

All the information that was revealed suggested that it was a definitely anti-Communist movement engineered by a group of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists who objected to the Communist program of Ukrainization. There was no hint that the accused had any connection with the derussification program of Skrypnyk or the demand of Khvylovy and his friends of the *Vaplite* for the development of a definite Ukrainian Communism. The Society for the Liberation of Ukraine appeared like a ghost from the past and the prosecution seemed to have the tacit support of even those elements which were working for Ukrainization.

Up to this moment the only open manifestation had been the 186
demand of Skrypnyk that Communists be included in the Ukrainian 814
Academy of Sciences but this had apparently been answered satis- 687
factorily and, with slight changes, the Academy was working as 661
before. The most that could be said was that the leaders of Ukrainian thought in the Academy had not properly in their old age kept pace with the development of Marxo-Leninist thought but even this was hardly sufficient for the outburst which was loosed against a group of widely respected scholars.

Another curious aspect of the situation was that the most severe sentences were not given to the announced ringleaders and chief
culprits but that there was unearthed on the occasion another [883]
society, the SUM, the Society of Ukrainian Youth, which consisted of relatively obscure students, village intelligentsia, peasants and workmen who were shot by the hundreds and thousands without being brought before any tribunal. The head of this group, Mykola Pavlushkiv, was involved in the trial but once again there was no indication that any members of the SUM had been engaged in any form of sabotage or anti-governmental work. Members of the organization who have escaped abroad have testified that the SUM was organized only on the basis of personal friendships and never undertook or planned any deliberate acts of sabotage.

The discovery of the Society for the Liberation of Ukraine with its assumed anti-Communist tinge was the signal for the opening of a campaign against the most respected older non-Communist members of the Academy. The usual method was by the device of demanding Communist self-criticism, and criticism. Its practice was brutally simple and effective.

The Communist organs, especially the GPU-NKVD, decided which of these scholars were to be broken ideologically .(and morally) and which were to be removed without fanfare. The latter disappeared. The former group were forced to appear for public "self-criticism." This was preceded by a series of attacks in the newspapers as to the mistakes in Marxo-Leninism which the victim had committed.

● 186 Then, on an appointed day, a meeting was arranged in a large
814 hall to which the public was invited by the display of large
687 placards and other notices. Selected speakers attacked in the most
661 scurrilous and abusive language various aspects of the work of
the accused and ascribed to him the grossest errors. Then came the (obligatory) speeches of those who "wished to speak," i.e. his collaborators and students. These were carefully prepared by the Communist nucleus in the Academy or the Committee. The accused was then compelled to admit his mistakes and promise hereafter to work "in the spirit of Marxo-Leninism and the decrees of the Communist Party." These performances usually lasted for two or three sessions and then the critical "testing" of the work went on in special scientific meetings or scientific publications or in the torture chambers of the GPU. If the accused did not humiliate himself sufficiently or if the collaborators showed themselves insufficiently critical, "rotten liberal," "compromising," "opportunistic" or leaving "ideologically (or class) hostile loopholes," the process was repeated with still more bitterness against the main culprit and his collaborators or witnesses who had attempted to defend him were attacked with equal ferocity and their testimony was sent to the proper places for "consideration."

This was the treatment accorded to Prof. Hrushevsky who, in 1930, was criticized publicly and then arrested and deported to Moscow where he was prevented from doing any work and only after he was completely broken was he sent to a rest-house in the Caucasus to die in 1934. With his removal, the old historical studies almost came to an end. The Academy was reorganized as the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and nearly all the work in the humanities were stopped. The Historical-Philological Section was combined with the Social-Economic Section and nearly all of its special fields were abolished, while at the same time there disappeared a large number of valuable books and collections which were ready for publication.

This destruction of the older scholars in the Academy was justified by grouping Hrushevsky with his historical studies in the same

category of public enemies as Mazepa and Petlyura, and the three 186 ●
came to form a trinity subject to constant attack. Their leading 814
crime was declared to be bourgeois nationalism, the object of which 687
was to separate the Ukrainian from the Russian people and to deny 661
the great significance of the teachings of Marx and Lenin.

In 1931 the Soviet authorities found traces of another organization, the Ukrainian National Centre. This is even more mysterious than was the preceding case, for it involved a number of apolitical figures who were living in retirement, as Holubovych, but at the same time it commenced the liquidation of the leaders of the former Borotbisty and Ukapisty. Still heavier sentences were imposed upon these men and large numbers were deported.

Then came an announcement of the extension to Soviet Ukrainian territory of the work of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under Colonel Konovalets, and a number of more prominent Ukrainians were executed or deported for reasons that were never satisfactorily explained.

At the same time the Soviets seem to have spread rumors in connection with collectivization that there were movements for an uprising against the regime. They endeavored to have pseudo-Ukrainian patriots from Poland establish contacts with former officers of the Ukrainian National Republic who had dropped into obscurity and then, at a given signal, called for a revolt and easily overpowered their dupes.

Thus these trials eliminated from Ukrainian life the older scholars who had been trained before the period of Communist rule. They justified in the minds of the emigrés the correctness of their position in refusing to listen to the blandishments of the Ukrainian Soviet government during the apparently rosy years of the New Economic Policy, when it seemed as if there was to be a rapprochement with the West. How far the activity of these men, who had put themselves into the lion's mouth and perished, served to renew the Ukrainian courage and self-reliance has been much debated, especially in view of the fact that they were all destroyed as bourgeois, long before any serious danger seemed to

186 threaten the position of the various groups of Ukrainian Com-
814 munists. Khvylovy, despite the attacks upon him and Skrypnyk, still
637 continued to work for the greater Ukrainization of the population
661 and of the cities and, so far, he had not been subjected to any
too severe criticism. That was to come next.

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

The Turning of the Cultural Tide

The Ukrainian Communists did not realize what they were 786
doing when they launched their campaign against the bourgeois 814
intellectuals and the aged scholars in the Academy of Sciences. For the first time since the period of Ukrainization had started, they had definitely called the attention of Moscow to the existence in Ukraine of a survival of the old independent mode of thinking which had animated the Ukrainian leaders in the struggle for an independent state of their own and they had coined a name for it, bourgeois Ukrainian nationalism. That was to recur again and again and lead to their own ruin.

It is remarkable that neither Skrypnyk nor Khvylovy realized [829]
this earlier. Both men in their own way were seriously threatening the unity of the Soviet Union, to which as an ideal they were loyal. Both men, Skrypnyk in the political field and Khvylovy in literature, realized the danger to Ukraine of substituting Russianism for Communism. Both men accepted in different senses the basic ideals of Communism and both believed in a Communist International which would offer all peoples full rights of cultural and political development. Neither one understood that the Comintern was a shadow structure which was totally dependent upon the forces operating in Moscow and that the situation in 1928 and 1929 was basically different from that ten years before.

In the RSFSR the charter of liberty for the fellow travellers 626
which had been promulgated in 1925 was practically abolished by 538
the granting of extreme power of control to Averbakh and the RAPP (the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers) which, to all intents and purposes, was issuing orders as to how the writers should support the Five Year Plan.

626 It was perfectly natural that a similar situation should develop
538 in Ukraine. The various schools of serious writing, as the *Vaplite,* stood out against this regimentation and ably defended their position, but that position was indefensible in the face of political pressure and without being conscious of any inconsistency, Skrypnyk, as a good Communist and a member of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was willing to exert pressure to bring the literary organization of Ukraine in line with that of the All-Union Communist Party at the very same time when he was deliberately thwarting the unifying tendencies of that party.

[186] The first sign of the changed order came with the arrest and
[68] deportation of M. Ivchenko for his novel *Working Powers* because it endeavored to express in a concrete form the problem of fitting the ideals of the various national groups into the stereotyped formula which was now fashionable. Next came the difficulties of Khvylovy over his novel *Woodsnipes,* despite his willingness to secure an opportunity for further work by the destruction of the second part of the novel.

It must be remembered that the groups which were now being attacked were not by their essential declarations anti-Communist. They reflected, rather, the disillusionment of many people with the prevailing manifestations of Communism, the growing realization that the Communist regime was not giving the people that ideal reality which its teachings indicated they should easily win.
[536] That was the gist of the drama by M. Kulish, the *People's Malakhy,* which reflected the contrast between the ideals of a high-minded but somewhat simple village Don Quixote and the realities of life on any particular level. This, as other of his plays, was well presented in the Berezil Theatre, directed by Les Kurbas, a Western Ukrainian who had developed in Kiev into one of the great producers and had pushed the Ukrainian theatrical art to its highest development. Writings of the same character had marked some of the early Russian works of A. N. Tolstoy after the revolution but, being a Great Russian, he was not involved in the endless controversies over the national questions and, like most of the Russian authors, he was able to work out a satisfactory agreement with the

626 device was also too obvious, for the new journal continued to
538 criticize the Russian policy and in 1931 it was forced to disband and most of the members who wanted to continue to write passed into the VUSPP, which, with all its rigid adherence to the party line, could not be too sure as to what that party line really was.

At one point in his career Skrypnyk, who was in many ways opposed to Khvylovy, dreamed of the establishment of a Federation of the Unions of Revolutionary Writers of Ukraine. He succeeded in forcing this upon the Futurists and many smaller leftist groups and also the *New Generation,* but his failure to make this real in 1931 was but a sign of the future.

By this time the VUSPP, along with the RAPP, had become the dominating force politically and Skrypnyk was forced to give up his endeavors and to allow most of his Federation members to join the VUSPP. This was but another step in the decay of all literary schools and it reflected the period of uncertainty and of a definite degree of opposition to the domination of the RAPP.

By the end of the twenties, the opportunities for independent thinking in literature had grown exceedingly few and scattered. There were still, in general, only the two currents of Ukrainian and Russian Communism, and the former was definitely beginning to wane under the continual attacks that were delivered both by its opponents and the Communist Party through its official organs.
● [186] Still, up until 1931, Ukrainian literature continued to develop and the literary disputes, often over minor points of literature, thought and culture, animated society and lent a zest to the various writings. These now more than ever began to reflect a growing apprehension over the conditions as they were and the impossibility of equating the ideals of Communism and the realities of the Russian domination of the country.

A more decided blow was given by the decree of April 23, 1932.
[656] This ended all literary discussions and abolished all literary societies and groups throughout the entire Soviet Union. In place of these, Stalin announced the establishment of a single society throughout the entire Union, the All-Union Association of Soviet Writers, and turned this over to Maksim Gorky, perhaps the most prominent

the eighteenth century, the bell-tower of the Kiev-Kiril-Troitsky 346
Monastery of the eighteenth century built by the architect Ivan 661
Hryhorovych-Barsky, the Church of Sts. Borys and Hlib of the 633
eighteenth century, the Church of the Birth of Christ and the "good Nicholas," built by Andry Melensky at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Church of the Tithes, the celebrated statue of Samson by Hryhorovych-Barsky, and a long series of other monuments and buildings.

Almost all of these buildings came from those periods when the Ukrainians were the most free from Russian influence or, as in the case of the Mazepa baroque, had the closest contacts with the West. It was a deliberate part of the Communist attempt to rewrite the Ukrainian past.

Of course, their excuse was that the old primarily ecclesiastical culture stood in marked contradiction to the modern era of industrialization and collectivization, the "glorious age of Stalin" which called for the development of a new type of architecture. Still, in a surprising number of cases these new buildings did not make their appearance and the ground was left empty or covered with insignificant structures which could better have been placed on the site of those half-ruined shacks and hovels which were the real expressions of the Communist paradise.

The primary object[1] was the annihilation of the Ukrainian spirit 626
and represented part of the broad general movement which had 186 ●
been launched for the rerussification of the country and the stopping in every way of that spontaneous outburst of development which had been called into being by the downfall of tsarism and the founding of the Ukrainian National Republic. The general debacle was now complete.

Within four years, before the ending of the first Five Year Plan a situation had been brought about which seemed to the Soviet authorities a guarantee of their final victory over what they were pleased to call bourgeois nationalism but which was, in realty, the logical outgrowth of the Ukrainian aspirations throughout the centuries.

[1] [in destruction of churches & monuments of past in Kiev--Analyst

661 681 population. Husbands and wives, parents and children, brothers and sisters hardly dared to speak to one another, to say anything lest their closest friends and relatives had been compelled to join the NKVD or had turned informers for their own selfish purposes. For one arrest of a guilty bourgeois nationalist, a hundred people who had done nothing amiss and had scarcely dared to think, were deported.

661 631 166 The Ukrainians were taken out of Ukraine in large masses and the concentration and labor camps in the far north and in eastern Asia were filled to overflowing as the Soviet authorities continued their policy of developing their industrial centres east of the Urals. The places in the cities and the collective farms thus emptied were, in turn, filled by the importation of Russians and citizens of the other Soviet republics as a means of producing not Ukrainian or Azerbaijanian Soviet loyalty but as a means of establishing a new universal Soviet patriotism and of separating the nationalities from their republics which were henceforth to be mere administrative and economic subdivisions of the Soviet state.

[185] [156] The object of these purges[1] and these changes was the breaking up of the population into individual entities who would recognize no bonds of attachment to anything except the state. It was in a sense the culmination of the efforts to break the sense of national or even racial or clan unity which had been so strong in 1917, when the Ukrainian National Republic had been established. The Communists had broken this by playing upon class feelings; they had broken down the class into families and now, under the relentless pressure of Yezhov, they tried to go further and to break the families into individuals.

626 186 In line with this policy there came a complete ending to the interest in the Ukrainians in the RSFSR and the other Soviet Republics. Skrypnyk had done his best to educate the several million of these in Ukrainian and at the moment of his fall the UkSSR was sending papers, books, and theatrical companies, as well as teachers, to educate and maintain their Ukrainian feelings as loyal members of the Soviet Union. That was abruptly changed in 1932 and the pressure upon them to declare themselves as

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[1] [During 1936-'38 -- Analyst]

simply Russians was constantly increased. It was almost forbidden 626
to mention the name Ukrainian in connection with the older settlers 186
in Kuban, along the Don, in the Green Wedge along the Amur, etc. [191]
and it was a matter of perplexity as to what language they could be said to speak or what dialect in connection with later studies of the dialects of the Russian language. It was inadmissible to regard them as speaking a peasant dialect in view of the attitude of the authorities in recognizing some sort of Ukrainian, but it was even worse to believe that Ukrainian could exist in those regions and so they were simply passed over and forgotten, while the newcomers, usually being under some kind of a ban, were simply treated as Russian deportees.

Even this was not the whole story, for in such cities as Vinnytsya 661
during these same years,[1] the population was slaughtered by the thousands and buried secretly in carefully hidden burial places which were then turned into parks and playgrounds to conceal the extent of the crimes. This was repeated in many places but the situation in Vinnytsya attracted especial attention because during the War, the Germans found the places of burial and revealed the thousands of bodies of the victims, many of whom had been buried alive. The extent of these massacres was as great as was the killing of the Polish officers in Katyn, which was likewise brought to light during the war.

By the time the census of 1939 was taken and this was the last 162
one published, the growth of the number of Russians and the diminution of Ukrainians showed clearly that there was a large scale transfer of nationality which completely reversed the figures in some sections of Asia without regard for the natural laws of reproduction and mortality.

In this atmosphere the nature of the intellectual and literary 626
work in the UkSSR can well be imagined. The Ukrainian scholars 814
were forced to accept the full Russian theories of the Ukrainian 661
past. This led to a complete revaluation of all the "outstanding figures." In 1933 the career of Bohdan Khmelnytsky was condemned on the ground that he was a typical representative of the noble classes. By the outbreak of World War II he became a Rus-

[1] [1936-1938 - - Analyst]

725 668 of July. Thus, during this period of German retreat, the U. P. A. had been able to acquire large stores of munitions, which they could not hope easily to replace, once the major hostilities were over.

It was very soon evident that the efforts of the U. P. A. against the Soviet forces would take quite a different shape from their attacks on the Nazis. In the last stages of the war Stalin had organized many of the mobilized Ukrainians into various Ukrainian armies, so as to give the Western powers the idea that the Ukrainians were loyal to the Soviet Union. [208] This added elements of a civil war to the struggle and the members of the U. P. A. decided ● [186] to reduce their efforts against these Ukrainian forces of the Red Army and to substitute propaganda for a free Ukraine. In this respect they met with considerable success and through their masses of printed material and through personal contact, they more or less neutralized the Ukrainian divisions of the Red Army.

Instead, they concentrated their efforts against the NKVD detachments which were brought in from remote parts of the Soviet Union and in which the Russians formed the predominant personnel. It was the NKVD and the staffs of the Motor Tractor Stations who were now the chief part of the Soviet bureaucratic apparatus in the country and so the U. P. A. devoted its chief interest to working against these and to encouraging discontent on the collective farms, for the war was scarcely over when it was made clear that conditions were to be even stiffer and harder than they had been in the past.

[651] The war in the Ukraine had reduced the population to still worse depths of poverty than had been the case after 1918. Nevertheless, almost at once the villages were expected to make liberal gifts of grain to their beloved Stalin and the elder brothers, the Great Russians, who had, in the words of Stalin, won the victory over the Nazis and who would still protect them from the capitalists and warmongers of the West.

728 648 The events of the last months of fighting had shifted many of the organized forces of the U. P. A. to the Carpathian areas and this section which had struggled for its freedom against Hungary

000 in an ideal organization. Stalin, by his policy in the thirties, blew away that mirage but it required a World War for him to annihilate it.

Soon after the Germans attacked, Stalin dissolved the Comintern to please his Western allies and to dupe them. He substituted the Slav Congress and when he secured the assent of the Big Three to liberate the Slavs, he highly developed this.

● 186 As the Red Army, now transformed by fiat of the Council of
728 Commissars of the USSR into the Ukrainian and Byelorussian armies, "liberated" one Slav capital after another, they were followed by cultural missions who talked to the enthusiastic multitudes on the Slav Brotherhood of Nations in terms of 1848, Peter, the Third Rome and Stalin. Rylsky and Tychyna, Korniychuk and Yanovsky, all the outstanding Ukrainian writers who had yielded to the Russian cause and survived the purges, spoke. They praised the new situation and the democratic powers admired this.

665 It was only a sham because soon there was established the Cominform. Its seat was not in Moscow but its spirit was there. The object of the Cominform was not to create a new and equal gathering of Communist humanity, not the ostensible idea of the Comintern but it was to inform the Communists among the Slavs and elsewhere of the approach to Communism by the elder Communists of the world, the Muscovite Great Russians.

In the purely cultural sphere the answer was the condemnation
[538] of formalism, and still more of internationalism. Formalism was a technical school of literary criticism which had contributed something to the study of literature and culture. It was an attempt to put technique above content, or rather to judge content by technique and its advocates, sometimes great scholars in a narrow field, basked in the light of the admiration of their friends, until they considered themselves great.

814 Internationalism was something else. Its content had been ex-
665 pressed by the Protopope Avvakum in 1666 when he announced at his trial in Moscow that all Orthodox Christians had to come to Moscow to learn. Now it was the same. History was to be periodicized between A. M. and P. M. (Ante Muscoviae and Post

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

p.3

I. THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALISM

727 DURING the summer and autumn of 1941 the German armies
rolled across the plains of the Ukraine; by November the entire
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was in their hands. Observers
everywhere were aware of the significance of the conquest of
[241] this huge area with its thirty-five million inhabitants. The agricultural
wealth of the Ukraine, famous as the "granary of the
USSR," the gigantic industrial complex of the Donets basin, and
the rich mineral deposits were weighed in appraising the loss of
the Soviet Union and the gain of Germany. While the political
effects of the conquest received less attention at the time, in some
ways they were even more important than the economic effects.

● 186 While there is a tradition of separate political development in
the Ukraine,[1] modern nationalism—the doctrine that persons
of a distinctive culture should constitute an independent state—
came late to the area. To a close observer, the first stirrings of
nationalism among educated groups in the Ukraine would have
been apparent early in the nineteenth century, and by the middle
[538] of that century Taras Shevchenko, the greatest name in Ukrainian
literature, was giving poetic expression to nationalist aspirations.
It was considerably later, however, that definitely political
[668*] organizations were formed to establish the claim of the Ukraine
to nationhood.[2] For the student of contemporary politics, it is
precisely this late emergence of Ukrainian nationalism which

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[1] The term "Ukraine" is used throughout this study (except in cases when another meaning is clearly implied) to refer to the territory comprised in the Ukrainian SSR in 1945. Essentially the same area (with the exception of the Carpatho-Ukraine, which is discussed briefly at several points in this study) was included in the Ukrainian SSR in 1941. This territory corresponds fairly closely—except, as noted in Chapter XI, in the east—to the Ukrainian "ethnographical" territory, the area in which the indigenous population speaks Ukrainian.

[2] John S. Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1920: A Study in Nationalism* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1952), p. 12.

186 endows it with peculiar interest. Few subjects are of greater importance for the understanding of the political forces shaping contemporary society than the interaction of nationalism, in its numerous manifestations, and socialism, in its divergent branches. Ukrainian nationalism is especially significant in this regard because it took form at the same time that Marxian socialism became influential as an ideology in the Russian Empire. As Ukrainian nationalism acquired definitely political aims and the dominant element of Russian Marxism took on the political form of Soviet Communism, the interrelationship between these two forces became increasingly complex.

121 This circumstance, together with the intrinsic importance of Ukrainian nationalism as a force directed toward securing the support of one fifth of the population of the Soviet Union,[3] appears to justify a detailed study of Ukrainian nationalism, even though it has never attained its primary aim, the establishment of a truly independent state. Moreover, the importance of the interaction of nationalism and Communism suggests that the study be focused upon that part of Ukrainian ethnographical territory which between 1920 and 1941 was under Soviet control. This region, commonly known as the "East Ukraine," was subjected to the full impact of the Soviet system prior to the period covered in the present study, while the "West Ukraine" was divided among non-Communist Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia during most of the period between the two world wars. While the East Ukraine is emphasized, the West Ukraine is also considered at some length as the region in which nationalism was most vigorous and as that which served as a base for nationalist activities.

The present study is primarily political in theme, being directed to nationalism as a movement aiming at the establishment of an independent state. It is not limited to the political aspect in the narrow sense of the term, however. Since the Ukrainian nationalists did not succeed in organizing a state apparatus, there 121 is little scope for the study of constitutional or legal structures. As will become apparent shortly, the nature of the various nationalist ideologies makes intensive study of Ukrainian political philosophy of limited value. Consequently, an effort has been made to follow the approach sometimes described as the "sociology of politics." The history of the nationalist parties has been traced and, insofar as possible, the diverse social elements of the nationalist movement have been described.

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[3] Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1946) furnishes a comprehensive analysis of available Soviet census information. Some non-Soviet analyses, based of course on considerable extrapolation of available data, place the Ukrainian portion of the population of the USSR as high as one fourth.

Many efforts have been made to analyze the nature of national- 186 ism and to determine the sources of its vitality. None have been entirely successful, for, like all dynamic movements which spread far beyond their original habitats, nationalism has been colored and transmuted by the varied milieus in which it has become established. It is a problem of peculiar difficulty to determine what has caused the movement to take root at all in many countries; this is especially true of the Ukraine. One of the most frequent stimuli of the nationalist spirit is religion, but the establishment of a separate Ukrainian Orthodox hierarchy was the result of growing nationalist feeling rather than its cause.[4] Another stimulus of nationalism is the existence of distinctive customs and ways of living. In addition to distinctive popular art forms, which will be referred to later, there was a marked difference between the pre-1917 social organization of most Ukrainian peasant communities and their Russian counterparts. The people of the Ukraine, for example, did not usually follow the predominant Russian system of "repartition," or periodic redistribution of farmlands, with all its implications of subordination of the individual peasant to the community.[5] In 1905, before this people was generally recognized as a distinct nation, that shrewd observer of the tsar's dominions, Mackenzie Wallace, made these remarks:

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[4] See Chapter VIII.

[5] Cf. Geroid Tanquary Robinson, *Rural Russia under the Old Regime: A History of the Landlord-Peasant World and a Prologue to the Peasant Revolution of 1917* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949), p. 35, on the comparative absence of the practice of repartition.

6 Emergence of Nationalism

> 188 184 The city [Kiev—Kyïv][6] and the surrounding country are, in fact, Little Russian rather than Great Russian, and between these two sections of the population there are profound differences—differences of language, costume, traditions, popular songs, proverbs, folk-lore, domestic arrangements, mode of life, and Communal organization. In these and other respects the Little Russians, South Russians, Ruthenes, or Khokhly, as they are variously designated, differ from the Great Russians of the North, who form the predominant factor in the Empire, and who have given to that wonderful structure its essential characteristics. Indeed, if I did not fear to ruffle unnecessarily the patriotic susceptibilities of my Great Russian friends who have a pet theory on this subject, I should say that we have here two distinct nationalities, further apart from each other than the English and the Scotch. The differences are due, I believe, partly to ethnographical peculiarities and partly to historical conditions.[7]

197 186 As Wallace observed, linguistic differences between the Ukrainians and Russians were significant. The factor of language has indeed been used very frequently as the decisive criterion for distinguishing the two ethnic groups.[8] During the nineteenth century a distinctive, though still evolving, Ukrainian literary language arose based on the speech prevalent among the peasantry. This speech is a member of the East Slavic linguistic group and therefore is closer to Russian than to any other major language, although Russian is not readily understood by most of the peasants. Russian was already established as the literary language of the East Ukraine before literary Ukrainian became prominent, however, and it continued to be familiar to nearly all educated Ukrainians in the Soviet Union.

[6] The second form is the Ukrainian. Usually the place names cited in this study are given in the forms generally used by the power which since 1945 has controlled the area in which they are located. This means that places now in the USSR are designated by the Russian forms, and the few now in Poland by Polish forms. Where the Ukrainian name is different, it is given in parentheses after the first citation. In a few cases (especially rivers) where another form is already familiar to the English reader, this practice has not been followed, and in the case of the city of Mariupol' (Mariiupil'), which has recently been renamed Zhdanov, the old name has been used.

[7] Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, *Russia* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1905), p. 347.

[8] In this study this general usage of referring to those who speak Ukrainian as their native tongue as "Ukrainians" has been followed, although it should be constantly kept in mind that use of the language in childhood does not necessarily imply a belief in Ukrainian independence, or even a consciousness of national distinctiveness.

Fundamentally, though, it is not to the criteria of religion, 186 ●
folkways, or language that the adherents of Ukrainian nationalism have appealed; more basic has been the evocation of a common historical tradition, the claim that the Ukrainian people, once great and independent, had lost its heritage. In the Europe of the turn of the century there were, to the superficial observer, two classes of nations, those which were embodied in independent states and those which were not.[9] Actually, the second group was almost as sharply subdivided into the "historic" nations, which had the memory of having possessed within modern times a stable state form, and those which were not so fortunate. Among the former may be mentioned the Poles, whose republic had vanished only a century previously, and the Czechs, who still preserved a vestige of their ancient state in the Crown of Bohemia. For groups like the Latvians, the Slovenes, and the inhabitants of the Ukraine, however, no such obvious rallying points of statehood existed; hence, the pages of history had to be searched to provide a comparable symbol of unity.

Since it was vital to the emerging nation that its language and 186
its history be embodied in works which could inspire loyalty, it 668*
was only natural that the leaders of the nationalist movement 538
should have been writers. The national poet Shevchenko has already been mentioned, and he was but one of many writers, such as Nicholas Kostomarov and John Franko. Historians, headed by Michael Hrushevs'kyi, who perhaps more than any other deserves the title of father of Ukrainian nationalism, were equally important.[10] The early leaders of the movement were almost without exception intellectuals—men more at home with words than deeds—a fact which was to have great significance for the future development of Ukrainian nationalism.

Part of the effort to stimulate the historical sense of the people 186
of the Ukraine centers around an endeavor to demonstrate that 668*
their ethnic and spiritual ancestor was the people of Kievan "Rus" and to deny that the Russians were descended from the medieval state of Kiev. Much greater energy is devoted, however,

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[9] This concept is expressed in Hugh Seton-Watson's *Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918–1941* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1946), pp. 268–69.

[10] Cf. Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution*, p. 9.

186 668* to studying the Cossacks of the Zaporozhian Sich (the Stronghold beyond the Rapids—of the Dnieper River) and to attempting to show that their struggles with Poland and Russia were in fact efforts to set up an independent Ukrainian state.[11] In this connection, the astonishing success against Poland of the seventeenth-century Cossack leader Bohdan Khmel'nits'kyi, who led his armies to the banks of the Vistula, is given special prominence. The subsequent story of how Khmel'nits'kyi became a vassal [12] of Moscow in order to maintain his independence of Poland, and of how the tsars then gradually absorbed his successors' realm, furnishes the chief historical basis for the allegation that union with the Russians was forced upon the Ukrainians.

While it could in all probability never have taken root without the existence of distinctive historical traditions, language, and customs, modern Ukrainian nationalism developed in the nineteenth century in a dual imitative-defensive reaction to foreign nationalisms. The German nationalist movement of the early nineteenth century, with its romantic emphasis on glorification of the national past and the language and customs of the common people, had a strong influence on nascent Ukrainian nationalism. Moreover, within the Austro-Hungarian Empire a culturally advanced segment of the Ukrainian people was in close contact with the intense nationalism of the Galician Poles. In Austrian Galicia the Poles occupied a privileged position, constituting in effect the ruling class of the area, which had once been part of the Polish kingdom. The Ukrainian-speaking half of the population of the province had never lost all awareness of its distinctiveness, since a considerable gap separates the Ukrainian and the Polish languages, and the ethnic division coincided with an ecclesiastical

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[11] Compare the proportion of space devoted to the two periods in easily available histories by nationalist Ukrainians, such as Mykhailo (Michael) Hrushevs'kyi, *A History of the Ukraine,* ed. O. J. Frederiksen, Introduction by Professor George Vernadsky (New Haven: Yale University Press, for the Ukrainian National Association, 1941), and Dmytro Doroshenko, *History of the Ukraine,* trans. Hanna Keller (Edmonton, Alberta: The Institute Press, Ltd., 1939).

[12] The relationship of vassal is the one accepted by Hrushevs'kyi; see *Pro stari chasy na Ukraïni* (Concerning the Olden Days in the Ukraine) (Scranton, Pennsylvania: Narodna Vol'ia, 1916), pp. 90 ff. Less moderate Ukrainians and Russians have described the agreement between Khmel'nits'kyi and Moscow in sharply contradictory terms.

separation. The Poles were Latin Catholics, while the Ukrainians, [162]
though also in obedience to the Pope, were nearly all of the Greek 186●
(i.e., Byzantine-Slavonic) rite. Consequently, it is not surprising 668*
that the ranks of the clergy provided a large proportion of the 793
awakeners of Galician Ukrainian national feeling. Most prominent of such priests was Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi. He was the scion of a family which was counted among the Polish nobility, but he felt himself to be Ukrainian; his career embraced almost the entire span of Ukrainian nationalist activity, from the turn of the century to the close of the period covered in this study.[13]

The reasons why a Ukrainian nationalist movement arose 186
within the Russian Empire are not so obvious. By the beginning 668*
of the twentieth century, the great bulk of prominent men of 177
Ukrainian ethnic origin appear to have been Russified in culture and feeling, even if they occasionally gave signs of remembering that there were different cultural elements in their family backgrounds.[14] That the Russian Empire could have carried out such a large-scale assimilation is a tribute to the degree to which it was supranational, avoiding the narrower concepts of ethno- 186
centrism. Although a strong current had set in since the sixties, 668*
when N. T. Danilevskii's *Rossiia i Evropa* (Russia and Europe) heralded the advent of Pan-Slavism based on ethnic Russian hegemony, for many, especially for officials in the governing bureaucracy, the rule of the tsars remained an expression of the ecumenical tradition of empire, a "Third Rome," but one which

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[13] See Stepan (Stephen) Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi* (Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi) (Munich: Vernyhora, Ukraïns'ke Vydavnyche Tovarystvo, 1947), and Il'ko Borschak (Elie Borschak—this author is better known by the French form of his name), *Un Prèlat Ukrainien: Le Metropolite Cheptyckyj (1865–1944)* (Paris: Editions Franco-Ukrainiennes, 1946). The fact that the parish priests of the Greek Catholic rite were allowed to marry meant that their nationalist feeling could be passed on from generation to generation, a factor of considerable significance in providing a continuing body of bearers of the "national ideal."

[14] Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution.*

Two of the best Ukrainian sources for the period are Izaac Mazepa, *Ukraïna v ohni i buri revoliutsiï, 1917–1921* (The Ukraine in the Fire and Storm of the Revolution, 1917–21), 3 vols. (Munich: Prometei, 1950–51), and Volodymyr Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia natsiï: Istoriia ukraïns'koï revoliutsiï, marets', 1917 r.—hruden', 1919 r.* (The Rebirth of a Nation: A History of the Ukrainian Revolution, March, 1917–December, 1919), 3 vols. (Vienna, 1920).

186 based its authority on symbols of universality rather than national
668* exclusivism.[15]

186 The claims of the Russian Empire to acceptance, however,
665 were weakened by its failure to solve social questions. However
565 much cultural differences and historical memories may have contributed to the formation of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, it is difficult to conceive how it could have arisen had it not to a large extent corresponded with a basic cleavage in the social structure of the Ukraine. There, to an unusual degree, nationality coincided with economic class. The Ukrainians were, with the exception of a small intelligentsia, almost entirely peasants; the landowners and officials were Poles or Russians, while the commercial bourgeoisie was largely Jewish. Under such circumstances, any nationalist movement was likely to become a class movement as well, a movement whose leaders would stress agrarian reform and liberation of the peasant from "exploiting" groups.

186 It was in this way, of course, that Ukrainian nationalism be-
668 came a rival of Communism. Basically, Communism[16] in the Russian Empire in the period before and during the Revolution of 1917, was a movement of townspeople. Both its ideology and its practical possibilities induced it to seek especially the support of the urban industrial workers, led and inspired by a group of dissident intellectuals. The latter were drawn from all the nations of the tsarist realm, but were predominantly Russian and Jewish. The workers were predominantly Russian, and those few Ukrainian laborers who had settled permanently in the cities prior to 1917 had for the most part become Russified in speech and consciousness. But the Communist leadership, with its sharp insight into the real social conditions of the country, realized that no purely urban movement could succeed in a country four-fifths peasant; hence, it sought, especially after the March Revolution

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[15] An especially interesting treatment of this aspect of the Russian Empire is presented by Hans Rothfels in *Reich, Staat und Nation im deutsch-baltischen Denken: Vortrag bei der öffentlichen Sitzung der Gelehrten Gesellschaft zu Königsberg am 12 Januar 1930, Schriften der Königsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft, 7. Jahr. Geisteswissenschaftliche Klasse, Heft 4* (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1930).

[16] Actually the "Bolshevik" faction of the Social Democratic Party in Russia did not adopt the designation "Communist" until 1917. To avoid confusion, however, the latter term has been used throughout this study for the essentially continuous movement.

in 1917, through the instrumentality of the soviets, to draw the 186
villager into the revolutionary movement. At this point the Com- 668*
munists encountered the opposition of the Ukrainian nationalists. In the confusion and disorganization following the overthrow of the tsar in March, the Ukrainian nationalists had been able to pass from the stage of a quasi-legal group of parties, intent primarily on arousing an attachment to cultural nationalism, to a real, if shaky, political force. From the spring of 1917 to the 642
summer of 1920, this force, though now no longer representing a single "movement," was able to maintain a series of Ukrainian governments on the soil of the Ukraine.

It is no purpose of this study to detail the nature of these governments which have been described elsewhere in comprehensive fashion.[17] For future reference, however, it is necessary at least to list them. The first, formed in April, 1917, was known as the Ukrainian Central Rada (*rada* means council and is the equivalent of the Russian word *soviet*), but during the first months of its activity it was really a semiautonomous administrative organ admitting the supremacy of the Provisional Government in Petrograd. Democratic and strongly socialist in its ideology, the Rada was the creation of the leftist intellectual groups which had predominated in the national movement before the war. It declared Ukrainian independence in January, 1918, but when it collided with the demands of the Germans, who occupied the Ukraine in February, 1918, the Rada was ousted. It was replaced by a quasi-monarchial regime under a member of the landowning aristocracy, Paul Skoropads'kyi, a descendant of a *het'man* or chieftain of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. After the armistice of November, 1918, this government, no longer supported by German troops, fell, and was replaced by a new regime, known as the Ukrainian People's Republic (Ukraïns'ka Narodna Respublika—UNR). This government lasted nearly two years, but was subject to extreme vicissitudes because of the strength of the Communist effort to conquer the Ukraine, attempts of the White anti-Bolshevik armies to reincorporate it in Russia, and the desire of Poland to extend her sphere of influence to the Dnieper. The administration, known as the "Directory," soon came under the

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[17] Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution.*

The administration, known as the "Directory," soon came under the
642 control of its most forceful member, Simon Petliura, who, through
186 his military command, acquired such fame in this period[14] that
668* among the less educated elements of the Ukrainian population his name has since been synonymous with the struggle for national independence.

Because they represented a measure of stability, the successive Ukrainian governments attracted the support of many persons who desired a regime independent of Communism. To be sure, many persons in the Ukraine who desired the establishment of a firm authority supported the conservative military commands of Denikin and Wrangel, the White generals. Before the latter became prominent, however, the equally conservative authority of the Het'man attracted the support of a considerable section of the upper classes of the tsarist society, including a number of military officers.[18] Once they had accepted the idea of an independent Ukraine, several of the officers, like Generals Vsevolod Petriv and Michael Omelianovych-Pavlenko, remained adherents of the nationalist Ukrainian regime which succeeded Skoropads'kyi, and were of valuable assistance because of their professional skill.[19]
186 On the other hand, except for Skoropads'kyi's group, the leader-
668* ship of Ukrainian nationalism remained predominantly in the hands of intellectuals throughout the revolutionary period, and even many of the Het'man's followers were writers and scholars. The educated youth of the Ukraine was divided between those who desired to join in the Bolshevik movement and those who chose the way of a left-wing nationalism. Victor Prykhod'ko, a

[1918-1920 --Analyst]

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[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 158–59.

[19] The biographies of these officers are extremely interesting because of the light they throw on the process of Ukrainization of tsarist aristocrats. Thus General Petriv had more Norwegian and Finnish than Ukrainian ancestry, but his family had been settled in the Ukraine for several generations; it is said that "his national consciousness was awakened" by association with ardently nationalist Finnish and Swedish officers from the grand duchy of Finland while on duty in Warsaw in 1904. Actually, the fact that the division of which he was chief of staff when the October Revolution took place was 80 percent Ukrainian may have decided him to throw in his lot with the national movement (cf. *Za Ukraïnu*, January 28, 1945, p. 2, and February 1, 1945, p. 2). Omelianovych-Pavlenko was the son of a Don Cossack general and a Georgian princess, but being stationed in Odessa when the Bolshevik Revolution took place, he joined the Ukrainians. See Myroslav Martynets', "Gen.-Polk. M. Omelianovych-Pavlenko," (Colonel-General M. Omelianovych-Pavlenko), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD UNA*, August–September, 1952, p. 1).

nationalist who lived through the period, describes the former as 186 ●
persons who thought on a "planetary" level, desiring to solve 668*
all the world's problems at once and regarding the claims of national
affinity as "parochial." One, his schoolmate, was Volodymyr
Zatons'kyi, who was later to become one of the most implacable
of Communist officials in the Ukraine. Even before the war, he,
according to the writer, refused to have anything to do with
Ukrainian cultural activities, like the Prosvita [enlightenment] [575]
society in the city of Kamenets-Podolsk (Kamianets-Podils'k),
where they were students. Rather, he associated with "foreigners,"
Russians and Jews, and was rapidly drawn into the revolutionary
socialist movement.[20] The basis for a choice in this generation of
young intellectuals appears to have been chance, or the psychological
make-up of the individual, which was reinforced increasingly
by the cumulative impact of associations formed after the
initial choice was taken. Thus by the time the revolutionary conflicts
drew to a close, the educated classes in the Ukraine were
deeply split. Even more divided was the real foundation of any 565
independence movement, the peasants. They—or at least those 668*
who were somewhat more prosperous than the average—had 641
initially welcomed the Ukrainian governments. The increasing
impotence of the new regimes and their preoccupation with factional
strife and unrealistic programs instead of practical measures
caused much indifference or disaffection among the peasants. In
the judgment of one of the ablest students of the revolutionary
period, however, the Ukrainian peasant preferred a nationalist
government to either a Red or a "White" administration supporting
a central regime.[21]

That the Communists were victors in the physical struggle is 642
no proof of greater popular support, for much of their strength

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[20] Vyktor (Victor) Prykhodko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 2.

[21] William H. Chamberlin, *The Ukraine: A Submerged Nation* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944). Moreover, one of the best Communist historians of the revolutionary period in the Ukraine, M. G. Rafes, a former adherent of the Jewish Bund, says the "natural" development of the peasants (and workers, especially in the sugar refineries in the small towns) was to "national socialism," "the Ukraine for the Ukrainian peasants," although he of course adds that they were inspired by the "reactionary bourgeois intelligentsia"; see *Dva goda revoliutsii na Ukraine: Evoliutsiia i raskol "Bunda"* (Two Years of Revolution in the Ukraine: The Evolution and Division of the "Bund") (Moscow, 1920), p. 8.

642 came from the Russian workers of the cities, or from outside the Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian government under Petliura was to a considerable extent discredited, because it had failed to devote sufficient attention to the needs of the peasantry and to [648] establish law and order. Moreover, by an eleventh-hour alliance with Poland, it had compromised its claim to represent the entire Ukrainian nation. This resulted from the fact that Galicia, which, upon the dissolution of the Hapsburg monarchy had formed its own West Ukrainian Republic, was surrendered to the Warsaw regime as a price for aid in the east, a solution in which most Galicians refused to acquiesce. Nevertheless, Poland and the Soviet Union made peace, and shortly afterwards the remnants of the Ukrainian army and bureaucracy retreated across the border for internment in Poland. From this sanctuary a group of a few hundred under Colonel George Tiutiunnyk sortied in October, 1921, for a last desperate raid into the Soviet-occupied Ukraine.[22]

36 After that the East Ukraine lay under Communist rule, which 665 could no longer be challenged by military force. For a time, however, it appeared as if the rising tide of nationalist sentiment—it rose even among those who had long been adherents of Marxist doctrines—might bring about what arms had failed to accomplish. To understand this situation it is necessary to recall that the Communists under Lenin had modified their original stand in order to appeal to the nationalism of the non-Russians. In January, 1918, soon after the Bolsheviks came to power, the Third Congress of Soviets asserted a theoretical right of all the nations of the tsarist empire to go their several ways, to secede from the Bolshevik government in Moscow. At the same time, it deprived this right of any content by insisting that it be exercised only by the "toiling masses." Although the Communist Party's stand was more ambiguously phrased, its insistence that the interests of the toilers were represented only by the Communist Party and that the non-Russian Communist Parties formed inseparable parts of the central Bolshevik organization, in fact rendered self-determination a fiction. During the following years, the central Party [661] leadership used armed force when possible to insure that these local Communist Parties, thus reduced to mere branches of a

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[22] Mazepa, III, 96–105.

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unified Party, should "rule" within each smaller nation which had [661] formed part of the tsarist empire. [665]

Having provided for the initial objective of substantial Com- [656] munist control, however, the Bolshevik leaders made sweeping statements against "Great Russian chauvinism," and directed that the culture of each nation be "national in form, socialist in content." Encouraged by this apparent desire for development of the national culture at the expense of the Russian cultural supremacy, which had been grafted on their peoples in tsarist days, many of the Communist leaders of the non-Russian nations set about vigorously promoting an independent cultural life as soon as Communist control was established. In the Ukraine, the major leader in the effort during the early twenties was the commissar of education, Alexander Shums'kyi; after his deposition in 1927 he was succeeded by Nicholas Skrypnyk, an even more devoted Communist, but a firm adherent of Ukrainian cultural nationalism.[23] To what extent these men were sincere adherents of Ukrainian nationalism and to what extent the favor they extended to it was motivated by a desire to secure popular support and to curb the overweening power of Moscow in the interest of an internationalism which, to them, was in closer accord with original Communist ideology, it is hard to say. At any rate, they went to very considerable lengths to encourage specifically Ukrainian traits and traditions, especially in scholarship, literature, and the schools. While these Communist supporters of Ukrainian nationalism always formed only one segment of the ruling group in the Ukraine, and hence could not completely eradicate Russian permeation of

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[23] No thorough treatment of the Ukraine under Soviet rule exists. Among the best brief analyses in English are John S. Reshetar, "National Deviation in the Soviet Union," *American Slavic and East European Review*, XII (April, 1953), 162–74; Michael Pap, "Soviet Difficulties in the Ukraine," *Review of Politics*, XIV (April, 1952), 204–32; and an older but generally accurate account by Lancelot Lawton, "Ukraina: Europe's Greatest Problem," *East Europe*, III (Spring, 1939), 28–45. The continuation of Hrushevs'kyi's *A History of the Ukraine* by Professor O. J. Frederiksen, based on notes by Luke Mishuha (Chapter XXV) is also useful, as are more general works on the Soviet system, such as Julian Towster, *Political Power in the USSR* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), Chapter IV, and Edward H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923* (London: The Macmillan Company, 1950), I, 289–307. The sources are, of course, voluminous and highly scattered. I can claim no special mastery of them, although my limited acquaintance leads me to the conclusions cited in the text, which are approximately those of Reshetar and Pap.

186 Ukrainian cultural life, they nevertheless developed a generation of young people who were accustomed to think and write in the Ukrainian literary language, although many continued to regard the use of Russian as a sign of culture.

Perhaps the Communists of the Skyrypnyk group remained at heart more devoted to Communism than to nationalism. Such was certainly not the case with a very large group of intellectuals, some from the rising generation, others from the group which had supported the national governments of the revolutionary period but later accepted the Soviet regime. Foremost among the latter was Michael Hrushevs'kyi; although he had served for a time as president of the Rada, he decided to return to the Soviet Ukraine when it appeared to offer an outlet for nationalist activity. For him and his group, which consisted predominantly of scholars and men of letters, the real aim was to reverse the Communist prescription by building a culture "socialist in form, national in content." Thus Hrushevs'kyi, who had always accepted a certain amount of socialist doctrine as the basis for needed reforms in the Ukraine, occasionally made room for Marxist ideology in his historical writings but left it clear that the real apex of his values was the Ukrainian nation. Moreover, he and his group persistently maintained that historical and economic links bound the Ukraine more closely to Western Europe than to Russia.

From the Communist point of view, such ideas were dangerous enough in themselves; while Communism could tolerate for a time basically antipathetic forms, it could not allow its own forms
186 to be used as a cover for developing an independent ideology. It
661 appears that Stalin, the most ruthless insister on conformity, moved to crush the "national deviation" of the Ukrainians as soon as his power was sufficient; indeed, the first steps in this direction were taken as early as 1927. The great attack came in 1930, however, with the dismissal of Hrushevs'kyi from his academic post and the suppression of his scholarly organ *Ukraïna.* Along with this attack, which was carried out against all elements of intellectual life—including some obviously devout Marxists like the historian Iavors'kyi—which favored independent development of the Ukraine, went trials of suspect scholars who were

accused of having belonged to a subversive League for the Libera- 186
tion of the Ukraine.[24] That this campaign of suppression[1] coin- [661]
cided with the drive for the collectivization of agriculture in the 423
Ukraine is hardly coincidental. In many respects the Ukrainian peasant was much more profoundly affected by the establishment of the kolkhoz (Ukrainian *kolhosp*), or collective farm, than was the Russian. The former was frequently more prosperous, hence had more to lose; moreover, the lack of a traditional communal agricultural organization in the Ukraine made the new system more alien and repugnant.

It appears certain that the Ukrainian peasantry formed a disproportionate, if not predominant, part of the hapless millions deported as "kulaks" to Siberia or Kazakhstan or driven by famine to the primitive slums of the expanding Soviet cities. Very probably this situation created a potential basis for a national rebellion based on economic and social oppression by alien rulers, just as had the Polish and Russian preponderance in governmental and landowning groups before the war. The Communists were frequently forced to use non-Ukrainians, Russian and Jewish intellectuals, workers from the towns, where they had real support, or persons imported from Russia itself, in order to carry
out collectivization. Consequently, it is probable that the suppres- 661
sion of the nationalist intelligentsia at this time was at least in 517
part a precautionary step to destroy a group which was of limited danger in itself yet might have presented a real threat to the Communists if it could have utilized the discontent of the peasants to turn them to nationalism. To what extent the Soviet regime succeeded in eliminating the nationalist intellectuals is one of the principal topics which will be dealt with on the basis of the evidence provided in this study. It should be noted at this point,

[1] [1930 movement by Stalin to crush "national deviation"--Analyst]

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[24] Cf. Reshetar, "National Deviation," p. 166; T. Skubyts'kyi, "Klassovaia bor'ba v ukrainskoi istoricheskoi literature" (The Class Struggle in Ukrainian Historical Literature), *Istorik-Marksist*, No. 17 (1930), pp. 27–40 (one of the principal Communist assaults on the Hrushevs'kyi school and other "deviationists"). The whole question of the purge of intellectuals, with special reference to historians, is discussed at length by Boris Krupnyts'kyi in "Die Ukrainische Geschichtswissenschaft in der Sowjetunion 1921–1941," in *Jahrbücher für die Geschichte Osteuropas*, 1941, pp. 125–51. For Skrypnyk's official statement, see his *Statti i promovy* (Articles and Speeches) (Kharkov: Derzhavne Vydavnytsvo Ukraïny, 1930), Vol. I: *Spil'ka Vyzvolennia Ukraïny* (The League for the Liberation of the Ukraine), pp. 413–36.

[661] however, that their resistance was undoubtedly crushed between
517 1930 and the closing series of purge trials in 1937–38.[25]

While articulate nationalism was being crushed in the Soviet
● 186 Ukraine, a somewhat different development was taking place in
[563] the West Ukraine. In Poland the extreme policy of the ruling
nationality, which had been chauvinistic enough under the Austrian empire, became still more violent toward the Ukrainians after the reestablishment of the Polish national state. As was previously noted,1 Petliura's agreement with the Poles had been deeply resented by the Galician Ukrainians. While most nationalists endeavored to smooth over criticism of Petliura personally, especially after his assassination in Paris in 1925, most West Ukrainians gave no support to the émigré UNR government. The West Ukrainians, on the contrary, tried their own approaches to the problem of carrying on Ukrainian life under conditions of oppression by non-totalitarian, but intolerant, alien nationalist governments.

186 One attempted solution was the formation of legally recognized
665 parties which carried on electoral campaigns and sent representa-
tives to the Polish Sejm or parliament where they attempted to protect the interests of their group within the framework of means permitted by the ruling nationality. This type of political activity, together with a wide variety of cultural work aimed at developing Ukrainian culture and maintaining the national distinctiveness of the masses, absorbed the efforts of a very large proportion of the West Ukrainian intelligentsia during the twenties and thirties. In particular, most of the older generation which had been reared under the relatively peaceful and stable conditions of Austrian rule, circles closely associated with the Greek Catholic Church, and most of the liberal professions engaged in this activity. Although there were a number of minor parties, some of which had authoritarian leanings, the majority of this segment of Ukrainian political workers was grouped in the Ukrainian National Democratic Union (Ukraïns'ke Natsional'ne Demokratychne Ob"iednannia—UNDO), which was definitely democratic in character, with varying amounts of Catholic, liberal, and socialist ideology embodied in its program. Its efforts met

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[25] Cf. Reshetar, "National Deviation," p. 166.

1 [see category 116, p 14--Analyst]

with very uncertain success, fluctuating from periods of relatively 186
satisfactory cooperation with the Poles to embittered boycott of 665
an unbearably oppressive regime.[26]

Some West Ukrainians soon rejected the road of accommoda- 186
tion to the Polish government; in the early twenties they turned 668*
to Communism as the champion of both nationalist aspirations and social needs. While the Ukrainians of Galicia were not so badly off economically as were those in the East Ukraine before and after the war of 1914, they suffered from a high ratio of population to available land, from inadequate agricultural productivity, and above all from the fact that the vast majority of [464] bureaucratic and urban jobs which would have served as the natural outlets for their sons, compelled by ambition or lack of employment to leave the land, were absorbed by Poles and Jews. In Volhynia, conditions were much worse; probably they were as bad, as far as purely economic circumstances went, as those within the Soviet Ukraine prior to 1930. Consequently, a broad economic basis for Communist propaganda existed; under the circumstances in which a nationalist Ukrainian Communist regime appeared to be taking form in Kiev, this propaganda appealed strongly to the nationalist element among West Ukrainians as well. As a result, two Communist-front organizations, the [665] Ukrainian Party of Labor (Ukraïns'ka Partiia Pratsi) and the Peasants-Workers Association (Selians'ko-Robitnycha Partiia—Sel-Rob) had considerable success, especially in Volhynia. More serious from the strictly nationalist point of view, a large number of the students, the backbone of the new generation which would have to carry on national life, was attracted to the Communist program.[27]

At the same time, an extreme movement of a different type attracted wide support. The movement which is commonly known in American scholarship as "integral nationalism" arose in Western Europe at the close of the nineteenth century, considerably before Communism became a factor of any real political importance. It is generally recognized that one of the first exponents

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[26] See Raymond L. Buell, *Poland: Key to Europe* (3rd ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939).

[27] See especially Stepan Baran in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 2.

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of the ideology was Charles Maurras, who, together with a group of extreme French nationalists and advocates of political reaction, established the Action Française at the turn of the century. Integral nationalism never had much appeal in France or other Western European countries, but in modified forms it became a dominant force in the "dissatisfied" countries of Central and Southern Europe in the twenties. Here it was one element which provided an ideological platform for Mussolini's Fascism and for the rising Nazi party in Germany. Its influence was also felt strongly in the extreme nationalist parties of Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. Because integral nationalism is by definition a movement of individual nations rather than a universal ideology and because its adherents reject systematic rational programs, it is difficult to define its precise nature. The following characteristics, however, stand out: (1) a belief in the nation as the supreme value to which all others must be subordinated, essentially a totalitarian concept; (2) an appeal to mystically conceived ideas of the solidarity of all individuals making up the nation, usually on the assumption that biological characteristics or the irreversible effects of common historical development had welded them into one organic whole; (3) a subordination of rational, analytic thought to the "intuitively correct" emotions; (4) expression of the "national will" through a charismatic leader and an elite of nationalist enthusiasts organized in a single party; (5) glorification of action, war, and violence as an expression of the superior biological vitality of the nation.[28]

In the twenties these concepts came to permeate much of European—and to a much lesser extent American—thought, even when they were not accepted explicitly as a political program. Among the suppressed nations of Eastern Europe, where conditions were different from those in the Central European states in which the new ideology eventually won control, the new ideas were readily received, but in a somewhat modified form. This was the case in the West Ukraine in the twenties, where two essentially distinct groups prepared the ground for integral national-

[28] For a discussion of integral nationalism, see Carlton J. H. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948).

ism.[29] One drew its strength from the resentment of the Galician soldiers who had borne a heavy part of the burden of the Ukrainian struggle for liberation, only to be consigned to second-class citizenship by Poland. The most active were veterans of the Sichovi Stril'tsi (Sich Sharpshooters), a unit which had operated under Colonel Eugene Konovalets' in the East Ukraine. After the collapse of the UNR, the unit disbanded in Galicia; many of its members united in forming an illegal, para-military organization known as the Ukraïns'ka Viis'kova Organizatsiia (Ukrainian Military Organization—UVO). In the bitter struggles with the Poles in the twenties, this group was harshly treated and retaliated with some deeds of violence. Basically, however, it was a military protective group rather than a terrorist underground. 186 668*

As a reaction to Communism, more radically nationalist groups arose. As has been noted, Communist influence threatened to win the bulk of the Ukrainian student population in the early twenties; this was true not only in the legally recognized universities, but also in the underground university established illegally in L'vov by Ukrainian scholars to give academic training to hundreds of the young people to whom the Poles denied admission to institutions of higher education. One of the principal factors in turning the students from Communism to a nationalist movement, which was organized as the Union of Ukrainian Nationalistic Youth (Soiuz Ukraïns'koï Natsionalistychnoï Molodi—SUNM), was the work of Dmytro Dontsov. Dontsov, an East Ukrainian by origin, had been an active propagator of nationalism even before the First World War. By the early twenties his teachings had come to resemble those of the integral nationalists, although apparently he derived most of his ideas from the Ger- [873]

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[29] The following account is based on numerous oral and written sources. Three which may be mentioned in particular are V. Martynets', *Ukraïns'ke pidpillia vid UVO do OUN: Spohady i materiialy do peredistoriï ta istoriï ukraïns'koho organizovanoho natsionalizmu* (The Ukrainian Underground from the UVO to the OUN: Memoirs and Materials Concerning the Prehistory and the History of Organized Ukrainian Nationalism) (Winnipeg, 1949), a voluminous though overly sympathetic account; a series of articles in *Ukraïnets'-Chas,* June 10, 1951, p. 4, June 17, 1951, p. 4, July 1, 1951, p. 4, and August 8, 1951, p. 5, by Bohdan Kravtsiv; and Vasyl' Rudko ("R. Lisovii"), "Rozlam v OUN" (The Split in the OUN), *Ukraïns'ki Visti,* May 23, 1949, p. 3.

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man nationalists, like Fichte and Herder, rather than from Maurras or Italians like Pareto and D'Annunzio. Space does not permit any real analysis of the ideology which Dontsov propagated with great success among the youth of Galicia. Insofar as it deviated from the general pattern of integral nationalism, however, it stressed especially the following features: (1) the emphasis on force inherent in the ideology was largely expressed, in the absence of the possibility of sustained open opposition to the dominant group, in advocacy of terrorism; (2) since a state which could be glorified as the bearer of the "national ideal" did not exist, enormous stress was placed on securing absolute adherence to the "pure" national language and culture; (3) absence of the tradition of a state which, through its institutional and legal structure, had supported the national aspirations, and opposition to existing states, led to extreme glorification of "illegality" as such; (4) in close connection with the two preceding points, the essential irrationalism of the ideology was expressed by fantastic romanticism, which was, however, among the comparatively unsophisticated Ukrainians more spontaneous and genuine than the cynical rejection of reason by Germans and Italians; (5) the failure of the efforts of the older generation, and its tendency to compromise with the Polish "occupiers," enhanced the natural tendency of integral nationalism to rely on youth and reject the moderation of its elders.

How these elements in the ideology of the dominant nationalist parties influenced the course of events during the Second World War forms a major topic of this study. Here it should be stressed, however, that integral nationalism was not the only foreign influence on the ideology of the nationalist parties between the two world wars. Also of great importance was the tradition of revolution which had its field of development so close at hand in the tsarist empire. In their terrorist underground activity during the late twenties and early thirties, which included especially assassination of Polish officials and Soviet representatives, the Ukrainian groups modeled themselves on movements like the Russian Narodnaia Volia of the 1870s. In other respects they (and indeed other integral nationalists like the German Nazis) copied Bolshevik methods, especially the organization of a secret political police to maintain the "purity" of the party and the ruthless 186 methods of intraparty strife. The stridency and lack of regard for 668* the truth in propaganda show similar influences. There remained, however, strong elements of liberal and democratic, as well as Christian, principles, even when the participants in the movement verbally rejected them. Formal learning, respect for established authority, individual decision, and popular choice were never completely absent from the real workings of even the most radical groups. Integral nationalism was a fever which gripped some of the most active elements of the Ukraine in the generation after 1918, but it is easier to understand and perhaps to condone in this nation than in others which have had more opportunity for self-expression through the development of a state based upon law.

During the twenties the Ukrainian Military Organization and the Union of Ukrainian Nationalistic Youth gradually won over nearly all politically active elements in the West Ukraine, except those which adhered to the moderate legal parties. Moreover, there were always close connections between the veterans' organization and the students' group; in 1929 these connections were formalized by the establishment of the OUN (Organizatsiia Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv—Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) which joined both groups into a single party which was to carry on the struggle both by political means and by force against all oppressors of the Ukrainian nation.[30] Through its appeal to the frustrated youth living under Polish rule and through its attraction for many of the embittered émigrés from the East Ukraine, the new movement rapidly attained considerable strength. For eight years it was directed by the former commander of the Sichovi Stril'tsi, Konovalets'. His assassination, almost certainly by a Soviet agent, on May 23, 1938, was a severe blow to the OUN.[31]

Before the new leadership of the organization could fairly estab-

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[30] Most Ukrainian writers apply the term "nationalist" (*natsionalist*) to the OUN alone. Non-integral nationalists strongly reject its application to their parties. While I have felt it necessary to conform to the usage current in Western studies when using the term "nationalist" without capitalizing, I have begun the word with a capital letter whenever referring to the OUN.

[31] Stephen Davydovych, "Colonel Eugene Konovaletz," *Contemporary Russia*, II (August–October, 1938), [illegible].

186 lish itself, it was confronted with a situation which would have 668* severely tried the capacity of a much more experienced body. The agreements made at Munich in October, 1938, had weakened the Czechoslovak republic; the Ukrainian nationalists of the small and backward province of Carpatho-Ukraine began to agitate for autonomy. In this they were encouraged by the Nazi regime, which wished to use Ukrainian nationalism as an element tending to disrupt the Czechoslovak state, facilitating subsequent domination by Germany. Apparently the Germans also wished to encourage Ukrainian nationalism in the Carpatho-Ukraine as a potential threat to the Soviet Union and to Poland. In October, 1938, the nationalists declared the Carpatho-Ukraine to be a "free, federated [in Czechoslovakia] state," and eventually Prague recognized its autonomy, although the economically most valuable part was ceded to Hungary. Local Ukrainian nationalists, most of whom were members of, or sympathetic to, the OUN, were organized and excited to more extreme action by OUN leaders who had been living as émigrés in Germany and who had been dispatched to the Carpatho-Ukraine by the OUN directory on the advice of the German intelligence service.[32] A major part of their activities was devoted to forming a para-military organization, the Carpathian Sich, which, they hoped, would form the nucleus of an army of an all-Ukrainian state.

When the Germans occupied Bohemia and Moravia in March, 1939, they agreed to permit Hungary to occupy the remainder of the Carpatho-Ukraine. The Ukrainian nationalists were informed of this decision and advised to submit to Hungarian rule;[33] they resolved, however, to take the desperate course of proclaiming the independence of the Carpatho-Ukraine under a government headed by a priest, Monsignor Augustine Voloshyn. This "independence" lasted only a few days, however; the Carpathian Sich was unable to offer any effective resistance to the heavily armed Hungarian forces. The first major attempt of the nationalists in nearly two decades to liberate Ukrainian soil from foreign rule had failed. It was the forerunner of many such disappointments for the OUN and for all nationalist Ukrainians.

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[32] For accounts by participants in the early development of the Carpatho-Ukrainian "state," see Vasyl' Veresh-Sirmians'kyi, "Zakarpats'ka Molod'" (The Transcarpathian Youth), *Ukraïns'ki Visti,* March 16, 1947, p. 6; Stepan Rosokha, "Karpats'ka Ukraïna v borot'bi za derzhavu" (The Carpatho-Ukraine in the Struggle for Statehood), *ibid.;* and Iurii Tarkovych, "Sontse iz zakhodu" (The Sun from the West), *Ukraïns'ki Visti,* March 17, 1948, p. 5. On the role of the OUN see also Rudko (*Ukraïns'ki Visti,* May 23, 1949, p. 3) and Seton-Watson, p. 395.

[33] German Consul in Hust [Carpatho-Ukraine] to Foreign Ministry, March 14, 1939, and Staatssekretär von Weizsäcker to German Consul in Hust, March 15, 1939, Germany, Auswärtiges Amt, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945,* ed. Raymond J. Sontag *et al.,* Series D, Vol. IV (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953), pp. 210, 237.

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II. THE UKRAINIANS AND THE POLISH CATASTROPHE

● 186 FEW GROUPS in the Europe of 1939 had more to gain from a change in the *status quo* than did the nationalist Ukrainians. All who dreamed of an independent and united Ukraine realized that it could arise only out of a series of catastrophic changes in Eastern Europe. The only event likely to initiate such upheavals was a major war.

For many years the most probable war of this nature had appeared to be one between Poland—perhaps with the backing of one or more Western powers—and the Soviet Union. Later, after Hitler's accession to power and the phenomenal increase of German strength, the likely antagonists appeared to be Germany and Poland on the one hand and the USSR on the other. Either contingency, the Ukrainian nationalists felt, would probably lead to a liberation of the Soviet Ukraine, since both Polish and German leaders had long included detachment of this area from Moscow among their major aims in the East. The end of the Polono-German *rapprochement* of the the middle thirties dispelled the hope of an immediate Central European combination against the Communist oppressor, but it opened up the prospect, scarcely less attractive for many Ukrainians, of German destruction of the hated Polish state. Consequently, in spite of the severe disappointment suffered when the Germans failed to support the embryonic Ukrainian "state" in the Carpatho-Ukraine, most nationalist circles were prepared in late 1939 to go along with German policy as they had in the preceding years. While the shock of the German-Soviet nonaggression pact in August caused considerable questioning of the validity of this course, it did not deter the more active elements from maintaining their collaboration 186 ● with Germany. Few, if any, could foresee that Germany would actually allow the Soviet Union to absorb the West Ukrainian lands.

Perhaps of all Ukrainian nationalist movements the least pre- 168* pared to cope with the startling changes which took place after August, 1939, was that of Paul Skoropads'kyi. As was previously indicated, this movement had never been strong numerically, even in its days of dominance in the Ukraine. In emigration it was further weakened by the fact that many of its original followers had really been adherents of the Russian monarchy at heart, and saw little advantage in supporting a Ukrainian "monarch" unless he was the only ruler available. It is true that, following these defections, the Het'man and his remaining followers had become much more nationalist in their outlook; it was, however, scarcely possible for them to compete with the OUN in this respect, and they lacked the prestige of the UNR, which could claim lineal descent from those who had first endeavored to realize the dream of a modern Ukrainian state. With the exception of a small group in Great Britain, the bulk of Skoropads'kyi's émigré followers were organized in the Ukraïns'ka Hromada (Ukrainian Community) in Greater Germany, where they claimed some 3,500 members in 1940.[1] Most were middle-aged or older.

What the Het'manites lacked in numerical strength and youthful vigor they had in part made up through the prestige of their adherents. Foremost among these, until his death in 1931, was [812] Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi, a talented historian and philosopher who is widely acknowledged to have been the most original and profound Ukrainian thinker of the post-1918 era. In the period now under consideration, his influence in the Hromada was continued by a group of able historians headed by Dmytro Doroshenko. The official ideology of the movement was a compromise between the

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[1] See the first issue of *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, November 15, 1940, p. 1, the organ of the Het'man group. For a succinct but generally accurate and penetrating summary of the position of this and other Ukrainian groups in mid-1941, see a memorandum from the files of the Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, Occ E-4 (5), in Yiddish Scientific Institute (hereafter referred to as Occ E-4 [5]). Since the signature is illegible, I have not been able to determine the name of the author of this memorandum.

The campaign to win friends in Galicia and Volhynia was in 661
part negative; measures which were most likely to inflame anti- 626
Soviet sentiments were avoided. The church was not entirely suppressed, though it was sharply criticized.[63] Its real property was confiscated and the religious orders disbanded.[64] The Soviet authorities weakened the influence of the church on the youth by liquidating the Catholic school system and forcibly inducting the children into Communist organizations.[65] However, the person of Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi was respected.[66] The part of the intelligentsia which was not prominent in politics was allowed to remain at large, although persons in callings such as the law sometimes found it necessary to turn to nonprofessional work.[67]
On the more positive side, the Ukrainian language was given a [198]
far greater scope than it had enjoyed under Polish rule. In 186
particular, the University of L'vov was formally Ukrainized in language and personnel, although it is said that the resistance of remaining Polish professors to lecturing in Ukrainian was not harshly dealt with.[68] Students from the East Ukrainian universities were brought on tours to the West Ukraine, and L'vov students made Communist-sponsored trips to Kiev.[69] Other ele-

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cited. Either this is one of the not too infrequent examples of ability of the [167]
Prague publication to print items contrary to German policy, or someone in authority gave the signal for an anti-Soviet attitude even at that early date. In the latter case it may have been a subtle riposte in the hidden conflict over Soviet demands for Bukovina. On the other hand, as early as March the *Krakauer Zeitung* printed a report by a German who had visited the villages of the Lemko area. He praised the young Ukrainians, noting that they wore the national blue and yellow colors and greeted him with "Heil Hitler!" and "Slava Ukraïna!" (Glory to the Ukraine) (*Krakauer Zeitung*, March 7, 1940, p. 5).

[63] See F. Iastrebov, "Uniats'ke dukhovenstvo na sluzhbi u polskoho panstva" (The Uniate Clergy in the Service of the Polish Aristocracy), *Komunist*, October 9, 1939, p. 2.

[64] "Die Tragödie der ukrainisch-katholischen Kirche," *Ukraine in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*, January, 1952, p. 14.

[65] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 18, 1942, p. 4; Stepan (Stephen) Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi* (Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi) (Munich: Vernyhora Ukraïns'ke Vydavnyche Tovarystvo, 1947), p. 112.

[66] *Ibid.*

[67] Interview 36.

[68] For the official Soviet version see M. Marchenko (the new rector of the University of L'vov), "L'vivs'kyi Universytet na novykh shliakhakh" (L'vov University on New Paths), *Komunist*, December 16, 1939, p. 2.

[69] Interview 51; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 17, 1943, on a trip of about forty students of the L'vov veterinary school to Kiev in the spring of 1940.

● 186 ments of the Galician population—teachers, physicians, artists—were brought to Kiev to participate in Ukrainian cultural activities.[70]

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186 After a comparatively short time, however, the Soviet administration appears to have become convinced that this "generous" treatment of Ukrainian national aspirations was unrewarding. About the middle of 1940, the Ukrainian occupation troops, which had evidently been on too friendly terms with the local population, were withdrawn and replaced by units recruited in Central Asia.[71] A strip along the border with the Generalgouvernement was cleared of its population to a depth of several miles, [423] and crossing was made almost impossible.[72] A start was made in the collectivization of agriculture.[73] No less important than these deliberate measures perhaps was the sending of tens of thousands of "carpetbagger" Soviet state, party, and army officials to the West Ukraine, where by their alien aspect (many were Russian) and their sheer numbers they severely irritated the local population.[74]

While it is impossible to know what the Soviet motives for introducing a harsher policy were, one may guess that the negative reaction of the population to the "tolerant" epoch played a part. The Soviet authorities probably discovered soon that the student exchanges had an effect opposite to that intended, for the West Ukrainian students were disagreeably surprised by the material

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[70] Arthur W. Just, in *Krakauer Zeitung*, August 12, 1941, p. 5.

[71] Mykhailo Kohut, "Iak zhylo halyts'ke selo pid bol'shevykamy" (How a Galician Village Lived under the Bolsheviks), *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 1, 1942, p. 6; Report of interview with Dr. H. J. Beyer (a German official who had been active in Galicia), *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, July 16, 1941, p. 3.

[72] *Nastup*, June 29, 1940, p. 3; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 10, 1940, p. 3, based on an article in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*.

[73] Kohut in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 1, 1942, p. 6; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 25, 1941, p. 2, and May 17, 1942, p. 4.

[74] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 13, 1942, p. 4, states that, due to the influx of Polish refugees from the German military campaign and the arrival of Soviet officials, the population of L'vov increased from 318,000 to 450,000 under Soviet occupation. On August 14, 1941, it printed a letter from L'vov stating that Soviet officials and their families in L'vov had numbered 100,000. Just (*Krakauer Zeitung*, August 12, 1941, p. 5) concludes from the number of votes cast in the Soviet election in Stanislav in the summer of 1940 that the population of that city must have increased by over 40,000, 1,000 of whom, he says, were NKVD officers.

poverty of the East Ukraine and the predominance in many 186
nominally Ukrainian places of the Russian language and cul- 626
ture.[75] East Ukrainian students coming to L'vov, on the other hand, had their first opportunity to become infected with the "virus" of "bourgeois nationalism." [76] Aside from producing these 668*
undesired ideological results, the earlier policy[4] failed to prevent underground work by the Nationalist youth of Galicia.

Most of the members of the OUN were not able, of course, to [486]
leave the Soviet-occupied area. It is impossible to secure reliable evidence concerning the exact extent to which those who re- 668*
mained could carry on their activities, but it is certain that they 661
carefully refrained from open opposition. Nevertheless, late in 1940 the NKVD succeeded in tracking down a large number of Nationalists; they were sentenced to death or prison after a proceeding in L'vov known in the OUN accounts as the "trial of the fifty-nine." Among those sentenced to death was Krymins'kyi, the chief of the OUN movement in Soviet-occupied territories.[77] In all likelihood, he and his companions had sided with Bandera in the dispute with Mel'nyk. Certainly, the remaining members who, in spite of severe losses, were able to continue as an organized underground, were firm adherents of the new leader. The new underground director, John Klymiv, was in fact one of the most fanatical supporters which this fanatical movement of the younger generation could boast.[78] While there were undoubtedly many supporters of Colonel Mel'nyk in Galicia, it is doubtful whether they were active—or rash—enough to form what could be called an underground, although apparently agents kept up sporadic contacts with headquarters in the Generalgouvernement.

The situation in Volhynia was less favorable to Nationalist 668*
activity than that in Galicia, since the OUN had never enrolled such a high proportion of the youth there. Throughout most if not all of the area, Mel'nyk and Bandera apparently had no

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[75] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 17, 1943, p. 3.

[76] Interview 51.

[77] See, for example, Mykhailiuk, p. 4. Cf. *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, August 17, 1941, p. 4, reprinting an article from *Ukraïns'ki Shchodenni Visti* (L'vov).

[78] Interview 48.

4/ [Non-interference with Ukrainian national aspirations --Analyst] not all of the young men had joined the rebellion; a fairly large 668* number of the youths of Galicia and Volhynia remained with their elders, and probably a majority of the younger generation in the Carpatho-Ukraine and Bukovina did also. Secondly, the older group embodied a great deal more experience than did the young rebels; this was to be particularly valuable in operating in the East Ukraine, where most of the older men had lived during the revolutionary period, if indeed they were not natives of the area. Along with experience went contacts, for Konovalets' had managed to maintain a few tenuous lines of communication with sympathizers in the East Ukraine.[38] Fourthly, the OUN-M, although it appeared temporarily to have been replaced by its rival in the Wehrmacht's plans, never lost contact with the Germans, and was in a position to profit from this contact when the Bandera group lost favor.

On July 6, 1941, a number of the leading Ukrainian nationalists 668* who had served as officers in the Ukrainian Republican Army 186 joined Mel'nyk in addressing an appeal to Hitler through the Abwehr. The signers of the appeal, besides Mel'nyk, who signed simply as "retired colonel," were Generals Omelianovych-Pavlenko and Kapustians'kyi, Colonels Sushko, Stefaniv, and Diatchenko, and Michael Khronoviat. Their appeal read as follows:

> The Ukrainian people, whose century-old struggle for freedom has scarcely been matched by any other people, espouses from the depths of its soul the ideals of the New Europe. The entire Ukrainian people yearns to take part in the realization of these ideals. We, old fighters for freedom in 1918–1921, request that we, together with our Ukrainian youth, be permitted the honor of taking part in the crusade against Bolshevik barbarism. In twenty-one years of a defensive struggle, we have suffered bloody sacrifices, and we suffer especially at present through the frightful slaughter of so many of our compatriots. We request that we be allowed to march shoulder to shoulder with the legions of Europe and with our liberator, the German Wehrmacht, and therefore we ask to be permitted to create a Ukrainian military formation.[39]

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[38] Cf. Iurii (George) Boiko, *Ievhen Konovalets' i oseredno-skhidni zemli* (Eugene Konovalets' and the Central-Eastern Lands) (1947), pp. 34–50.

[39] Chief of the SP and the SD, Report on Events in the USSR, No. 15, July 7, 1941, NO 5154 (hereafter referred to as NO 5154).

727 While Ukrainian territory was being partitioned, a still more serious danger for the nationalist cause was shaping up. An exception to the authority of the Ostministerium in the occupied areas was the police power, which was lodged in Heinrich Himmler's hands. From the beginning of the campaign the Reichsführer SS had been charged with "establishing order" in the conquered areas in the east. The instruments employed for this task were *Einsatzgruppen,* task forces consisting of specially selected, ruthless police officials, headed by SS officers from Himmler's inner circle. During the stabilization period, these commanders were given powers within the broad range of "pacifying activities" in the rear areas, superseding those of all military commanders. These activities included especially the extermination of the Jewish population and the liquidation of all Communist organizations; "kommissars" and NKVD officials were to be shot outright.

661 The causes for conflict between the *Einsatzgruppen* and the
668* Ukrainian nationalists have been suggested in the preceding chapter. At first the Mel'nyk group was spared because it was thought to be politically impotent.[20] During the summer the SP claimed that "the splinter group under Colonel Andrew Mel'nyk, predominantly émigrés, no longer has any political significance," and regarded the OUN-M as a useful counterweight to Bandera's organization. By early November, 1941, however, SP reports were warning that Mel'nyk's group could become dangerous if it was left entirely unwatched because of the struggle against the Bandera party.[21] As soon as the OUN-M revealed ability to build an organization in the East Ukraine, it too was crushed.

668* The first major incident of repression against the Mel'nyk
661 forces occurred on November 21, an important anniversary for
186 Ukrainian nationalists. On that date, in 1921, Tiutiunnyk's band,

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the Generalgouvernement, as not corresponding to "the principle of nationality" (*Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk,* August 31, 1941, p. 3). Within the next week, several branches of the UNO in Germany sent petitions directly to Hitler, protesting the transfers of Ukrainian territory; for petitions from the groups in Pilsen, Berlin and Luxemburg, see Occ E-4 (8), in Yiddish Scientific Institute (hereafter referred to as Occ E-4 [8]).

[20] NO 2650.

[21] Chief of the SP and the SD, Report of Events in the USSR, No. 133, November 14, 1941, p. 31, NO 2825 (hereafter referred to as NO 2825).

one of the last important nationalist forces to penetrate the Soviet 668*
Ukraine, had made a "last stand" near the little town of Bazar 661
on the edge of the wooded region north of the Kiev-Zhitomir line.
The OUN-M now decided to make this anniversary the occasion 186 ●
for a great patriotic demonstration, which a participant has since described in considerable detail.[22] A large group of organizers was sent in from Zhitomir; on the appointed day many thousands streamed to Bazar for commemorative ceremonies. This demonstration of the strength of Ukrainian nationalist sentiment greatly alarmed the Germans, especially since the affair had been the work of an organized group which had secured the complete cooperation of the local Ukrainian authorities. The chief of the Bazar *raion* addressed the crowd, the police under the command of an old Ukrainian officer stood guard, and the police band provided music. All of these features must have indicated to the suspicious German police authorities that the Ukrainians had deliberately flaunted their independence. The reprisals were quick, and crushing. An inquiry was instituted at Bazar, which led to the arrest of several of the organizers; the trail led back to Zhitomir, where about two dozen OUN members, including one of the leaders of Ekzekutyva, were shot. The younger Iatseniuk and Anthony Baranivs'kyi, the remaining OUN leaders there, escaped only by fleeing to the woods. OUN-M influence in Zhitomir was sharply reduced, although few, apparently, of the administrative officials who had sympathized with it were molested.[23]

In the absence of direct evidence, it would be unsafe to con- 661
clude that the Bazar demonstration was the cause of the further
attacks which were now carried out against the Mel'nyk group. 668*
At about the same time, however, drastic repressions of the Nationalists occurred in numerous cities, resulting in the destruction of the small Bukovinian expedition in Nikolaev and of groups in Kamenets-Podolsk (Kam'ianets'-Podil's'k), Chernigov (Chernihiv), and Poltava.[24] The chief repressive campaign was

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[22] P. Dub, "V rokovyny demonstratsiï v Bazari (spomyn)" (On the Anniversary of the Demonstration in Bazar [In Memoriam]), *Za Samostiinist'* (November, 1946), pp. 8–11; see also *OUN u Viini* (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, pp. 69–72.

[23] Alexander Iatseniuk, for example, remained chief of the *oblast* administration.

[24] *OUN u Viini*, p. 72.

casionally a monopolistic part in municipal activities. As was 668* inevitable, they sometimes exhibited an attitude of superiority; 578 even when they behaved more tactfully, many local inhabitants nevertheless were inclined to suspect that they harbored such an attitude. Their presence in municipal offices, even when they were on a plane of equality with local officeholders, was bound to lead to some friction. Moreover, emphasis on the principle of integral nationalism meant the neglect of social welfare and civil rights questions which were of great concern to the local population after twenty years of Soviet rule. The "leader principle," which was expressed in the East Ukraine in as extreme terms as Mel'nyk ever permitted it in the emigration, was alien to the native inhabitants. The slogan "Petliura, Konovalets', Mel'nyk—three names, one idea" was at first meaningless to the average East Ukrainian, since the second and third of these names were unknown to him. When their meaning was explained, the phrase signified to many that after Petliura's death the nationalist movement had fallen into the hands of leaders from the half-alien West Ukraine.[28]

All of these irritations might have been accepted, however, had 668* it not been for an ideological theme which resulted in more prac- 186 tical discomfort. The Nationalist creed required emphasis on the "purity" of the Ukrainian people. According to the OUN leaders' belief, this "purity" had been endangered by the intrusion of Russian elements—the physical immigration of Russians, who had become especially numerous in Kiev bureaucratic and intellectual circles, and the penetration of Russian influences into Ukrainian culture and speech. The extent of this penetration will be discussed in a later chapter; it is necessary to point out its importance here, however, in order to understand the Kiev reaction to OUN policy. The Nationalists set about radically "purging"

[28] Surviving OUN-M publications of this period are rare, many existing only in private collections. *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk* of September 28, 1941, p. 3 contains a reprint of a leaflet distributed in the East Ukraine describing Mel'nyk as the successor of Konovalets', who in turn was a successor of Petliura, "killed by the Jew Shvartsvart." For a criticism of OUN propaganda in the East Ukraine during this period, and notes on the reaction of the local population, see the account of the East Ukrainian émigré Fedir (Theodore) S. Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* November 1, 1941, p. 2.

668* alien aspects of life in the city. A certain number of local Ukrainians accepted this campaign enthusiastically, sometimes carrying 182 it further than the newcomers themselves. Others, although Ukrainian by background, had long been used to employing the Russian language and associating freely with persons of Russian ethnic origin. Consequently, the "purifying" process meant in many cases serious disruption of their accepted way of living and social relationships.

Because of the extreme importance of this factor it is worth describing in some detail a case which provides a striking illustration of the Nationalist psychology during this period. It is contained in the diary of a prominent Kiev author, Arkadii Liubchenko, who was evacuated by the Soviet forces but managed to remain in Kharkov until the German arrival. He then made contact with the Mel'nyk groups (which, as was previously pointed out, pursued the same policy there as in Kiev). Always nationalist, he soon became an enthusiastic convert to the creed of integral nationalism. In December, through his association with the Nationalists, he obtained a post on the Kharkov newspaper, *Nova Ukraïna*. Shortly afterwards, a Kharkov writer named Filipov appeared in the editorial offices; he told Liubchenko that he had prepared an article on the evils of the Communist regime which he wished to publish. When Liubchenko turned it down because it was written in Russian, Filipov protested that his mother had been Ukrainian and that he would submit the article in Ukrainian, as the question of language was indifferent to him. This brought the sneering reply that real Ukrainians, such as those dominating *Nova Ukraïna,* could have nothing to do with one who could not make up his mind whether he was a Ukrainian or a Russian, since such a person was an "internationalist" just like the Bolsheviks.[29] It may easily be imagined what effect such ideas had upon the rebuffed applicant. This is especially the case, since work for an organ like the newspaper was for many not merely a matter of prestige, or even of expression of opinion, but of life
511 and death. With the rapidly deteriorating food situation in Kiev
228 and Kharkov, employment by an agency which was recognized by

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[29] Arkadii Liubchenko, *Shchodennyk* (Diary), Vol. I, ed. M. Dmytrenko (Toronto: Novi Dni, 1951), p. 25.

soil, forests, water, mineral deposits; at the same time, the arable land is to be turned over to the creative peasant economy in permanent usufruct 668?

(k) State ownership of heavy industry and transport; turning over the right of free extensive cooperative activities by small producers to the cooperative associations in light industry and food industry

(l) Assurance of free trade within the limits set by law

(m) Assurance of the free development of artisanry and the right to the formation of individual artisan establishments and undertakings

(n) Assurance of the right to free work for physical and mental workers and assurance of the protection of the interests of the workers by social legislation.

Although the above quotation indicates considerable attention to concrete problems, it must be emphasized that many practical deficiencies continued to obstruct the development of a coherent nationalist political theory. A much greater portion of the "Universal" was devoted to romanticized history and emotional appeals for action than to the proposal of clearly defined steps to be taken. The formulation of the other UHVR resolutions is frequently unclear, and the provisions are often inconsistent. These obscurities may sometimes have been inserted for deliberate tactical purposes, but in many cases, especially in the provisions for the governmental structure, they appear to have resulted from insufficient training in law and logic and from lack of real interest in constitutional questions. Moreover, it is evident that UHVR members had not undertaken the careful study on which to base real solutions to major problems, such as the agrarian question. In place of carefully worked-out programs, broad principles were proclaimed which indeed pointed the way to new systems but failed to indicate how they would be implemented.

Most important, nationalism remained the central point of the ideology, about which all else revolved. As the introductory paragraph of the "ideo-programmatic principles" put it: [186]

> The protection of the life of the nation, of national unity, and culture is the first and highest goal of every healthy national organism. The national sovereign state is the chief guarantee of the preservation of the life and the normal development of the nation and the well-being of its citizens. Therefore the Ukrainian nation must at the present time devote all its forces to obtaining and strengthening its own state.

668* violently denounced by the Soviet rulers, it is likely that a large
[661] part of the intelligentsia was "liquidated as a class."

At the same time,[1] a certain outlet was offered to nationalist
186 feeling, with a class-conscious twist, by emphasizing the heroic
208 feats of certain Ukrainian leaders of Red partisan units in the L'vov area.[37] This theme was relatively subdued, however, probably because there were not enough Ukrainian subjects suitable for glorification. In the Carpatho-Ukraine, where the Red partisans had evidently attracted genuine support as liberators from the de-nationalizing Hungarian regime, the tactic was employed much more extensively. Whole lists of partisan leaders, including at least one priest, were published. Moreover, one partisan was explicitly declared to speak "pure Ukrainian," and apparently all bore Ukrainian names.[38] This propaganda was followed up by the customary practice of forming a People's Committee which requested union of the province with the Soviet Union.[39] Even after the war was ended and the new acquisition securely incorporated into the Soviet Ukraine, however, an article was published which, had it been written by a non-Communist, would have been denounced as "racist." It was stated that some villages in the Carpatho-Ukraine spoke only Magyar, but that their "purely Ukrainian" character was shown by the family names of the inhabitants and their "Slavic appearance." [40]

661 Fortunately for them, the majority of the West Ukrainian nationalist intelligentsia did not stay behind to enjoy the benefits of Soviet "re-education." It is one of the strange paradoxes of German-Ukrainian relations during the war, however, that at the very period when Germany was most in need of securing Ukrainian support, and when a minimal amount of such assistance was being developed in the form of the Galician Division, a new wave of repression fell upon the nationalist leaders. This occurred in the fall of 1943; its immediate causes cannot be determined, but it appears that it was basically a result of that tendency to strive for large results by employing force and trickery which marred

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[37] *Pravda Ukrainy*, July 26, 1945, p. 3.
[38] *Radians'ka Ukraïna*, December 14, 1944, p. 2.
[39] *Radians'ka Ukraïna*, December 23, 1944, p. 2.
[40] *Pravda Ukrainy*, July 28, 1945, p. 3.
[1] [After the Ukraine was conquered by the Red Army in 1944.--Analyst]

795 of the Orthodox Church—its close dependence on the secular
659 authority. Historically, the Orthodox Church has been the official church par excellence; union of church and state is not only a legal expression but a vital reality in the history of Eastern Europe. Consequently, the actual extent of authority of each body of the church has usually coincided with the boundaries of the state in which it exists. A corollary of this coincidence of state and ecclesiastical authority has been the establishment of, or the endeavor to establish, a new hierarchical authority whenever a
[668] major change in state sovereignty has taken place. Moreover, as nationalist movements became powerful in the Orthodox lands in the nineteenth century, they often demanded a separate church organization as a consequence of their growing sense of national distinctiveness, and as a preparation for their separate statehood.

795 Until 1917, almost all Orthodox East Slavs were united in a
659 single state, the Russian Empire, with a single church, the Rus-
● 186 sian Orthodox Church. Since the seventeenth century this church had lacked the customary patriarch or primate, and was connected to the secular power, and to a considerable degree controlled by it through an imperial official, the Procurator of the Holy Synod. The October Revolution destroyed the formal links between these historically intertwined institutions. At this point, the growing strength of Ukrainian national consciousness gave rise to a demand for state independence. It was in accord with the history of Orthodoxy that this demand should have been accompanied by a parallel movement for the establishment of a church organization independent of Moscow, for that seat of ecclesiastical authority had lost its preeminent prestige through the disestablishment of the Russian Orthodox Church, while its role as a symbol of East Slav unity was necessarily repudiated by those who saw the Ukrainian future as distinct from that of Russia.

000 Had the group desiring continuation of the Russian state (whether as an empire or a constitutional democracy) won out, it is probable that ecclesiastical unity would have been restored, since the Russian church, while it lost many of its privileges after the February Revolution, stood to gain in prestige through the reconstitution of the office of Patriarch of Moscow. Had, on the contrary, an independent Ukrainian state been able to maintain

795 tion that this union was inoperative because of continued Soviet control of the church in Moscow. Doubtless influenced by these considerations, Polykarp, the bishop of Lutsk, declined to attend the *sobor,* presenting the excuse of "difficult conditions of communication," although his episcopal see was less than fifty miles from the Pochaïvs'ka Lavra.[20] Shortly afterwards Dionysius appointed Polykarp "vicar" of the Vladimir Volynsk and adjacent Gorukhov (Horukhiv) areas; at the time, apparently neither explicitly rejected Alexius as head of the Orthodox hierarchy in Volhynia.[21]

During the fall of 1941, opposition to Alexius's predominance gradually mounted. In addition to the friction over the investiture of the Lypkivite priests, great resentment arose from the fact that the bishops of Alexius's group were either predominantly of Russian origin or were known for past adherence to the [186] church of Moscow. The acceptance of continued subordination to Moscow, however theoretical the tie might be under the prevailing conditions, was of course resented by the Ukrainian nationalist elements. Moreover, many among the latter, especially the intelligentsia, strongly desired the replacement of the Old Slavonic liturgy by services in the living Ukrainian language, while the Volhynian *sobor* had merely provided for certain prayers in the latter speech.[22] As these points of friction accumulated, prominent Orthodox laymen like Stephen Skrypnyk, the publisher of the newspaper *Volyn'* in Rovno, rallied to the side of the Autocephalous group.[23] On November 28, Polykarp definitely broke with Alexius, declaring the Archbishop's group "anarchical," and repudiated him as ecclesiastical superior.[24] Shortly afterwards, Alexius replied by proclaiming himself Metropolitan of the Ukraine, in accordance with a decision of a second *sobor* of Volhynian bishops.[25]

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[20] *UAPTs,* p. 3; *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist',* November 15, 1941, p. 3.

[21] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist,* November 15, 1941, p. 3. In a move evidently designed to conciliate Polykarp, the *sobor* had named him bishop of Kamenets-Podolsk (*ibid.*).

[22] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist',* November 15, 1941, p. 3.

[23] Cf. Skrypnyk's article in *Volyn',* reproduced in *L'vivs'ki Visti,* January 11-12, 1942, p. 5, and an article from the Kremenets *Kremianets'kyi Visnyk,* cited in *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist',* October 15, 1941, p. 4.

[24] *L'vivs'ki Visti,* January 11-12, 1942, p. 5 (Skrypnyk's article cited).

[25] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* December 27, 1941, p. 3.

While the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine was splitting into 195 two antagonistic factions, the leader of the Greek Catholic Church was endeavoring to effect an ecclesiastical union of all Ukrainians. The separate development of the Greek Catholic Church has been sketched already. It may be pointed out, however, that what had originally been regarded as an instrument of the Poles for consolidating their dominion in the western Ukrainian lands had long since developed into a truly national church, in the sense of being independent of any foreign secular power, although it [186] was largely confined to one province of the Ukraine. Since the Greek Catholic Church of the Ukraine possessed a rite and a body of ecclesiastical regulations quite different from that of the churches of the neighboring Catholic nations, which were of the Latin rite, the mere fact of adherence to it tended to set the Galicians apart as a national entity. As was pointed out, Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi had long been a vigorous supporter of the Ukrainian nationalist movements, although he had tried to turn them away from an extreme nationalism incompatible with Christianity. His influence was naturally greatest among his own coreligionists, but extended also to Ukrainians of the Orthodox faith. Hence Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi felt that the Soviet retreat offered an opportunity for bringing about the union of all Ukrainians in a single national church within the framework of the universal church in which he believed. The immediate opportunity for advancing this desire was a letter, October 21, 1941, to Archbishop Hilarion, congratulating him on his elevation to the episcopacy; Sheptyts'kyi explained that he could not do so before because of the severance of communications between the Soviet- and the German-dominated areas. Together with cordial felicitations, the Metropolitan expressed his hope that Hilarion would play a leading role in cleansing the Ukrainian church of "uncanonical" "Muscovite" influences introduced by Peter the Great, and hoped that this process would prepare the way for union of all the Ukrainian churches.[26] Two months later he addressed a

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[26] The text of the letter is printed in Stepan (Stephen) Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi* (Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyts'kyi) (Munich: Vernyhora Ukraïns'ke Vydavnyche Tovarystvo, 1947), pp. 123–24.

for reasons which will be discussed in the next chapter, little is 634
known about their activities in connection with nationalism. The 727
city administrations were more closely supervised by the Germans,
but their size prevented them from being completely controlled.
In spite of the fact that the populace soon realized that
only the shadow of power was permitted the local administrations,
the concept of the omnipotence of state control was so well established
that even the outer signs of authority behind the nationalist
cause were of some importance in winning support for it.
Throughout the occupied Ukraine, except for the Donbas, which [191]
was very mixed ethnically, the languages of administration were
German and Ukrainian only. Although it is said that the officials
who carried on the governmental work in the prescribed language
frequently spoke Russian as soon as they had left their desks,
and sometimes even wrote their reports and orders in that language,[4]
having them translated into Ukrainian, the prestige value
of the change was considerable. The same was true of the widespread [186] ●
use of national symbols, which had been forbidden under
Soviet rule, such as the trident and the blue and yellow colors;
they appeared on the uniforms of the police, as banners decorating
the administrative buildings, even on the streetcars. On the
other hand, the removal of these symbols, when Russophile
elements were introduced into the administration to replace the
nationalists, was equally important as a negative token of loss
of prestige; the official language, however, always remained [191]
Ukrainian.[5]

Some indication of the influence exerted upon the overt attitudes 186
of the inhabitants of the East Ukraine by the apparent
ascendancy of Ukrainian nationalism is furnished by nationalities
statistics obtained from censuses taken by various city administrations
in late 1941 and early 1942,[6] since each citizen was usually

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[4] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 14, 1942, p. 3.

[5] When the *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* group was arrested, the cultural department of the Kiev city administration was ordered to remove all tridents and Ukrainian flags; see Iurko Stepovyi, *Syn Zakarpattia: Ukraïns'ke revoliutsiine pidpillia v Kyievi 1941–1942 r.* (A Son of Transcarpathia: The Ukrainian Revolutionary Underground in Kiev 1941–42) (Munich, 1947), p. 11. In Dniepropetrovsk, the Germans followed up the destruction of the Ukrainian *oblast* administration by removing the trident from the masthead of *Vil'na Ukraïna* (The Free Ukraine), the city's newspaper, and changing its name to *Dnipropetrovs'ka Hazeta* (Interview 77).

[6] See Appendix.

186 permitted to determine his own nationality. There was an enormous increase in the proportion of persons claiming Ukrainian nationality as compared to the Soviet census of 1926, which had been conducted in the same fashion. That many factors were involved in the shift is indicated by the extreme variations from [626] city to city, which will be touched upon in a later chapter. There is, moreover, little doubt that pressures, ranging from fear of the nationalist-dominated police (which, in Zhitomir at least, took the census) to desire to obtain material benefits reserved for Ukrainians only, were significant. There is no question, however, that a large number of those who claimed Ukrainian nationality in 1941–42 were influenced by a desire to "climb upon the band wagon" by obtaining affiliation with the national group which they thought would be in favor in the future. The nationalist mayor of Kiev, Leontii Forostivs'kyi, during whose administration the census in the capital was taken, freely admits the importance of this factor.[7]

633 From a material standpoint, too, the municipal administration played a considerable role in the provision of support for nationalist activity. The funds at its disposal were not inconsiderable, the Kharkov city budget amounting to the equivalent of some eight million dollars annually.[8] The number of municipal employees was also sizable. In Kiev the total under Bahazii's direction, evidently largely dependent on the central municipal authority for their positions, was twenty thousand.[9] This figure was regarded as so excessive by the Germans that it figured in the charges made against him, but several months after his arrest the number employed by the city—apparently the purely administrative branches only, exclusive of education and manufacturing and commercial enterprises—was still 1,138, and 1,065 more were working for the *raions*.[10] Even the smaller figures are quite significant in a city whose total population had by that time sunk to 350,000, an extremely small percentage of which consisted of

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[7] Leontii Forostivs'kyi, *Kyiv pid vorozhymy okupatsiiamy* (Kiev under Enemy Occupations) (Buenos Aires: Mykola Denysiuk, 1952), p. 50.

[8] *L'vivs'ki Visti*, May 23–24, 1943, p. 2, quotes Mayor Semenenko as saying the budget for the last quarter of 1942 totaled 50,000,000 *karbovantsi* (10 *k.* = 1 RM = $0.40).

[9] PS 192.

[10] *Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, May 10, 1942, p. 1.

employable men. From the point of view of political sentiment, 633 as will be shown, the composition of the administrative force [565] made it even more significant, for over one fourth were of the upper levels of the intelligentsia—those having a higher education—while another 35 percent were probably of the Soviet "intelligentsia," since they possessed secondary educations.[11] The city administrations, with their appurtenances of schools and publications, thus served as refuges for the intellectual class in general, which was shorn of its customary economic role by the terrible dislocations of war. Consequently the orientation of the structure in which they found a place could play a vital role in determining the direction this group's sentiments would take.

At least two East Ukrainian mayors,[12] in addition to Bahazii, 186 ● lost their lives for too ardent devotion to the nationalist cause. 633 Even when they were not in conflict with the occupying power, the mayors knew that their positions singled them out for Communist vengeance, from either secret agents or the returning Red Army. That a considerable group of officials was found to remain true to the nationalist cause—even if a bit timidly at times—is an indication that a considerable reservoir of leadership for nationalism existed in the East Ukraine.

While the city administration as a whole was both a symbol 727 of Ukrainian nationalist ascendancy and an instrument for ad- 633 vancing the nationalist cause, the individual departments were frequently of equal or greater significance. Their importance derived in large measure from the fact that administrative divisions entrusted with very important functions were frequently operated in considerable independence of the central municipal administration.

In practice the amount of authority exercised by any major official depended more on his own character and his relations with the German authorities than upon any formal apportionment of power. This was especially the case in the large cities, where in addition to the *Stadtkommissar* who stood above the native mayor, there were German officials in charge of each of

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[11] *Ibid.*

[12] In Kamenets-Podolsk and Poltava.

Moreover, since there were several German police authorities— 727
ordinary security police, secret police, railway police—operating 625
in the same area, unified at the top but having different Ukrain- 633
ian subchiefs operating under them, the possibility of several competing or antagonistic influences existed. In spite of the special concern of the Reichskommissariat to root out all OUN members in the police, the latter were able for many months to maintain their positions in several cities. For example, while the city administrations of Vinnitsa and Dniepropetrovsk were in the hands of Russophile elements opposed to Ukrainian nationalism, the police chief in the former city[14] and the Ukrainian in charge of the secret police in the latter[15] were supporters of the OUN. Close as was the supervision of the German police authorities, it was obviously impossible for them to watch every action of their subordinates, so that possession of such support within the police force was of great value to the nationalist groups.

In the wave of repression in Kiev in December, 1941, the fact 186●
that his sympathizers controlled the police in the *raion* in which 625
he was arrested allowed the chief of the OUN-M in the East 727
Ukraine, Dr. Kandyba, to secure his release, thus enabling him to prolong his activities for more than two years.[16] Moreover, the presence of nationalist elements in the police force served to prevent the control of these groups by secret Communist agents, who were successful in penetrating the police in a number of places in the southern Ukraine, and for a while in Kiev itself, through the German practice of retaining the Soviet *militsiia* as a matter of convenience.[17] Whatever value the nationalist penetration of the police force may have had in this connection was largely offset by the odium which attached to the nationalist groups when it became known to the population that they were collaborating with the Germans in this fashion. Moreover, the ill repute of the police was sometimes increased by the actions of the nationalists themselves who used the police as an instrument for terrorizing non-Ukrainians.[18]

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[14] Interview 1.

[15] Interviews 1, 18.

[16] L. Dniprova, article in *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* (Paris), June 18, 1950, p. 3.

[17] Interview 59.

[18] It is said that the Ukrainian police in Kiev, when ordered to secure hostages

Komitet Dopomohy), was able, even on the eve of German evacua- 747
tion, to provide meals for 36,000 persons (children and others 727
unable to work),[22] one sixth of the city's population; its great popularity[23] was of tremendous importance in enabling Bohatyrchuk to secure support for his stand in favor of coalition with anti-Soviet Russians. On the other hand, in Dniepropetrovsk, where the city administration was largely in the hands of pro-Russian elements, the Ukrainians, inspired by an OUN-M organizer, [186]
formed a Red Cross organization which acted as a center for nationalist forces.

The nationalist element was more successful in the field of 474
cooperative organization. While each city administration con- 727
tained a department of trade, the cooperatives, as quasi-public bodies, appear to have been considerably more important as channels of local initiative. Far from being a product of the Communist regime, the cooperative movement was indigenous to both East and West Ukraine, having played an important role before the First World War, when it was already imbued with nationalist overtones.[24] In the NEP period of Soviet rule, and until the late twenties, the cooperatives had been able to maintain a considerable degree of independence and had, at least in the Kharkov region, served as a center for nationalist elements which worked with the Republican government.[25] In the Five Year Plan periods, the urban cooperatives had become adjuncts of the state trading systems, and other cooperatives had been closely integrated into state commercial operations.[26]

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[22] *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo,* September 19, 1943, pp. 4–5; see also *Volyn',* January 28, 1943, p. 3.

[23] Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* February 8, 1942, p. 4.

[24] For abundant details on the complex system of cooperatives developed in the Ukraine prior to 1917, see Eugene M. Kayden and Alexis N. Antsiferov, *The Co-operative Movement in Russia During the War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), a volume in the *Economic and Social History of the World War,* ed. James T. Shotwell, Russian Series, compiled for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Economics and History. Cooperatives were far more developed in the Ukraine than in most other heavily populated areas of the Russian Empire (*ibid.,* pp. 40, 41, 266–69, 357), and served educational as well as economic development. Kharkov was the chief cooperative center in the Ukraine and was largely independent of the Russian centers.

[25] Interview 73.

[26] Alexander Baikov, *The Development of the Soviet Economic System* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1946), p. 253; Arthur C. Arnold, *Banks, Credit, and Money in Soviet Russia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), p. 477.

727 When the Germans arrived, surviving leaders of the former
474 independent cooperatives were again able to assert themselves. As early as the winter of 1941–42, there was a total of 643 cooperative organizations in the Kiev region, including forty-eight *raion* food societies which bought agricultural produce and carried on economic organization;[27] in the city of Kharkov there were 150 cooperatives, which maintained close contacts with their sources of food stocks in the countryside.[28] There were, in addition to numerous distributing cooperatives, twenty-eight producing cooperatives in Kiev, in such diverse fields as transport, printing, and haberdashery.[29] The Ukraïnbank (All-Ukrainian Cooperative Bank), which had been formed in 1922 for financing all types of cooperatives, but incorporated in the Soviet central Torgbank in 1936, was revived.[30]

727 Moreover, there were more direct links to the nationalist move-
474 ments. An effort was made, with German approval, to organize
● 186 a general center for the food cooperatives, known as the All-Ukrainian Cooperative Society (Vseukraïns'ka Kooperatyvna Spilka), which coordinated local organizations, published a bulletin, and restored the museum of the history of cooperative development, an institution of considerable significance for nationalist sentiment.[31] Under an old officer of the Ukrainian army, Professor Perevertuna, a close collaborator of the OUN-M, it carried out activities on a large scale in the Kiev area, especially training replacements for the diminished ranks of cooperative workers.[32] In addition to more indirect fostering of nationalist sentiment, its aid to the nationalist cause included employing persons whom the Germans had dismissed from the municipal administration.[33] In early 1943, however, such activities resulted in the execution of the director.[34]

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[27] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 4, 1942, p. 3.

[28] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 24, 1942, p. 2.

[29] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 5, 1942, p. 2.

[30] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 10, 1942, p. 4. Cf. Baikov, p. 86, and Arnold, p. 477, for the background of this bank.

[31] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 4, 1942, p. 3.

[32] *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung*, July 11, 1942, p. 3.

[33] *OUN u Viini* (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, p. 75.

[34] *Ibid.*; *Entsyklopediia Ukraïnoznavstva* (Encyclopedia of Things Ukrainian), eds. Volodymyr Kubiiovych and Zenon Kuzelia (Munich: Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1949), p. 585.

Like the cooperative movement, popular education had long 727
been a cornerstone of Ukrainian nationalism, more important in 658
many respects than direct political action. In the conflict between 871
the national Communists in the Ukraine and the Stalinist central- 626
ists, it was especially the commissars of education, such as Shums'kyi and Skrypnyk, who had led the fight for Ukrainization of cultural life. Consequently it was natural that nationalist Ukrainians were determined to control the municipal departments of education under German occupation.

A major aim of the Reichskommissar and his henchmen, however, was to prevent the development of a cultured Ukrainian class, to convert the people into a race of submissive peasants. Rosenberg's vision of a university in Kiev went by the board, and the standard schooling for every Ukrainian child was set at four years.[35] Few material injuries were as deeply resented as this drastic curb on the opportunities for education. Since there were real shortages of materials, books, and teachers, the Ukrainians held to the hope that the restriction did not represent a permanent policy, even in the face of the closing of *gimnaziias* which had been reopened under the army administration through the efforts of the local population itself.[36]

To a limited extent the ban on secondary and higher educa- 874
tion was evaded by the extensive use made of a loophole in the 727
German regulations which allowed the reopening of technical 186
schools. The enormous loss of artisans and professionally trained persons incurred by the annihilation of the Jewish inhabitants compelled even the power-mad Nazis to recognize the need for training Ukrainians in such occupations. A large number of technical secondary schools, agricultural schools, and even institutes of higher education like medical faculties, were permitted. The extent to which these facilities were utilized by the Ukrainian population is indicated by the fact that the enrollment of the Kiev medical institute reached 2,000 in 1943 when the total population of the city was only 300,000, while Kherson, with a fifth

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[35] Report of Rosenberg to Hitler, August 11, 1942, PS 42 (hereafter referred to as PS 42); PS 1198.

[36] E.g., in Berdichev (*Nastup*, September 20, 1941, p. 3, quoting *Nova Doba* [Berdichev] for September 1), Zhitomir (Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941), and Belaia Tserkov' (*Nationalist*, December 20, 1941, p. 2).

874 that number of inhabitants, had 541 students in its medi-
727 cal school.[37] Medical institutes were also reopened in Stalino,
186 Dniepropetrovsk, and Vinnitsa, and perhaps in other cities, although it is doubtful if any of these were the centers of nationalist youth organization which the faculty in Kiev became under the leadership of the OUN-M.[38]

The educational structure described in the preceding paragraph was designed for adolescents or young adults, and thus could be used for direct propagation of nationalist concepts. It was, of course, partly for this reason that the Germans confined advanced training within such narrow limits. Even these restrictions were not the end of the difficulties faced in inculcating a nationalist type of education in those about to assume the role of citizens,
[466] for the technical schools were frequently emptied of their students and faculty to meet the demands of the *Ostarbeiter* recruiters. The elementary schools were also drained of teachers by the *Ostarbeiter* program, and the pupils, though too young for forced labor, were decimated by famine and plague. If the task of building national consciousness had to be viewed as a long-term one, then the four-year elementary school offered a considerable field for cultivation.[39]

191 The problem confronting the nationalist leaders in education
727 was twofold: they had to ensure a basis for the development of
an independent Ukraine by making certain that all instruction
872 was in the Ukrainian language, so that the rising generation
186 would be fully at home in this speech; and they had to replace the Communist ideology by a positive nationalist concept. The first task was relatively uncomplicated, though far from easy in practice. In line with their policy of encouraging the purely non-political aspects of Ukrainian nationality, the Germans ordered all instruction to be in Ukrainian. The nationalist directors enthusiastically supported this rule, but it was sometimes difficult to enforce it, since even teachers who were themselves nationalist in sentiment were not always able to conduct classes in Ukrainian.[40]

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[37] Occ E-4 (1); *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, October 10, 1942, p. 1.

[38] See Chapter V.

[39] In Kiev alone there were fifty elementary schools with 17,000 students (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 11, 1942, p. 2).

[40] Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 12, 1942, p. 4; M. Prykhod'ko in *Krakivs'ki*

It was much more difficult to secure a predominant place for 727
the nationalist ideology in the schools. As is usually the case in 186 ●
nationalist indoctrination in the schools, the efforts were concen- 872
trated upon the teaching of history.[41] This was especially important, since the justification of the Ukrainian independence movement is largely based upon the conception of a proud history distinct from that of the people of Moscow. Naturally enough, no Soviet textbooks were acceptable for the teaching of history from this point of view or from the general standpoint of eradicating
Communist indoctrination. To some extent the gap was filled by [214]
books published in the year preceding the Soviet war by the educational press of the Ukrainian Central Committee in Cracow.[42] Some texts were printed by the cultural department of the Kiev city administration. An amateurish effort was made also by certain OUN-B organizers to print locally a new version of Ukrainian history with an introduction of their own composition.[43] In view of the great material shortages and the brief time available, however, the lack of printed materials could not be made good. Consequently, a great deal depended on securing the proper teachers. To what extent the many thousands employed in the schools adhered to the nationalist doctrine is of course impossible to determine, but a number of purely indigenous formulations of nationalist concepts to be inculcated in the schools attest to the strength of nationalist feeling. The head of the Mariupol' school system proposed to stress the native language, love of the fatherland, and respect for elders; the educational ideology advocated by the group of young men who reorganized life in Krivoi Rog was instillation of Cossack ideals, the code of the Zaporozhian Sich, which was to lead to a spiritual, moral, and physical regeneration.[44]

Since the formal school program was largely confined to young 186
children, great efforts were also concentrated on developing a 517
voluntary system of adult education. The Prosvita societies had 515

Visti, June 5, 1942, pp. 3–4; *Krakivs'ki Visti,* January 27, 1943, p. 4, quoting D. Nitsenko in *Nova Ukraïna* (Kharkov).

[41] Prykhod'ko in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* June 5, 1942, pp. 3–4.

[42] Druzhynnyk in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 10, 1941, p. 2.

[43] Zynovii Matla, *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa* (The Southern Task Force) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), p. 28.

[44] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* September 29, 1942, p. 2; November 15, 1941, p. 2; and November 18, 1941, p. 3 (referring to an article in *Dzvin* [Krivoi Rog], September, 1941).

186 been founded by the nationalist intelligentsia of the East Ukraine
517 many years before the Revolution. They were now revived, after
575 long suppression by the Communist regime, to carry on the work
of developing national culture and inculcating a feeling of
national identity. The two aims could be combined because all
nationalist Ukrainians felt it essential to instill a love of the in-
digenous popular arts and customs, emphasizing their distinctive
nature. That this effort had a political as well as a cultural sig-
[661] nificance is indicated by the fact that not only the Soviet regime
(both before 1941 and upon reconquest, as in Kharkov)[45] but the
German police as well attacked the Prosvita societies, and in the
Reichskommissariat they were able, for varying periods, to lead
only a clandestine life. The desire for national expression was
shared by so many, however, that the Germans felt it was im-
possible to dam up all outlets; therefore the Prosvita was gen-
erally permitted, though under close observation.[46] Together with
the church (and a few local societies not using the Prosvita name
but having the same function), it was one of the few organiza-
tions of a nationalist character which was not under direct Ger-
man control.

533 The work of the Prosvita groups, although arranged in various
517 ways in different localities, may be classified under four general
186 headings. Playing a major role everywhere were musical activities,
575 particularly choral groups, in which the Ukrainians had always
excelled, and which served as a powerful intellectual and emo-
tional stimulus to nationalist feeling, since most of the songs
were distinctively Ukrainian. In addition, groups of *bandura*
players (the *bandura* is a small lute-like stringed instrument in-
digenous to the Ukraine) were sponsored, and orchestras were
545 trained. In the larger centers, Prosvita collaborated with regular
517 professional musical organizations, such as conservatories and
575 operas, to produce nationalist-inspired performances. For ex-
186 ample, operas were reopened in Kiev and Kharkov, and offered
a considerable repertoire of native Ukrainian pieces (*Taras
Bul'ba, Natalka Poltavka,* etc.) as well as traditional Western

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[45] Cf. *Nastup,* September 26, 1943, p. 3 (based on *Vinnyts'ki Visti,* August 29, 1943), on the destruction of Prosvita and its personnel in Kharkov during the Soviet interlude in February-March, 1943.

[46] MS E; PS 3943, May 22, 1942.

operas such as *Madame Butterfly* and *Les Cloches de Corneville.* 545
Like other forms of national expression, however, operatic per- 517
formances ran afoul of the Nazi hatred of independent activity. 575
At first, the desirable places in the Kiev opera were reserved for 186
Germans, and then, in December, 1942, the performances were suspended altogether, an action which aroused the indignation of all elements of the population.[47]

Within a matter of days after the Red Army was driven out, active theatrical groups likewise sprang up, usually with Prosvita sponsorship, even in the smaller cities of the East Ukraine. For example, a theater had been started in Zhitomir before the first month of German occupation was past.[48] Even in cities like Chernigov and Simferopol' (in the Crimea), where evidences of nationalist activity were scanty, the theater was soon in full career.[49] Since the players were generally amateurs interested in using this medium of expression of their nationalist feeling, the performances were nationalist in content as well as language (evidently to a greater extent than the opera which, being composed largely of professional performers, was imbued with an "all-Union," i.e., Russian, character, at least behind the scenes).[50] Some presentations were so strongly imbued with nationalist ideology that they were censored by the Germans; the author of one of the most popular, Constantine Hupalo, was arrested for nationalist activity.[51]

Prosvita and related groups sponsored a wide variety of more 517
directly educational activities. These included lectures, valued 575
as a means of propagating knowledge of the language as well as 186
for their content; libraries and reading rooms, vital to the spread of the printed word in view of the extreme scarcity of even periodical literature; nationalist cultural work in the schools; and research and discussion on themes of national history and ethnography. In the more vigorous and less restricted societies, like the

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[47] Interrogation of Shtepa, CXLVa 78; PS 1198.

[48] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, September 15, 1941, p. 1 (from *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* [Zhitomir], August 3, 1941).

[49] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 6, 1941, p. 4 (based on an interview with Theodore Pipa, the Chernigov editor).

[50] Cf. Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 15, 1942, p. 3.

[51] His play, entitled *The Triumph of Procurator Dal'shii*, was a drama of the Ukrainian nationalist movement under Soviet rule (*OUN u Viini*, p. 74).

186 Prosvita in Kharkov, these activities were greatly extended. The
515 latter group operated a House of Popular Culture which served
517 as a center for most nationalist organizations in the city, and came close to developing into an unofficial government.[52] Moreover, under the leadership of the energetic Professor V. V. Dubrovs'kyi, it undertook economic as well as purely cultural activities, such as book publishing and the provision of material aid for needy teachers and students.[53] Some indication of the scope of Prosvita's activities in Kharkov is provided by the fact that membership reached one thousand, while four thousand persons attended one of its concert series.[54]

In most places *Prosvita* and other cultural activities appear to have developed quite independently of the Nationalist party organizers from the west. To a certain extent the ideology of the Nationalists, especially that of the OUN-B, made them contemptuous of such gradual and unspectacular methods of developing nationalist strength.[55] To be sure, in centers such as Kiev and Zhitomir, which were strongly permeated by the OUN-M forces, cooperative relations existed between the latter and the local founders of Prosvita, but the Nationalist party did not have the personnel to carry on cultural work itself and apparently did

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[52] Cf. Serednopolets'kyi in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* February 24, 1942, p. 2, on organizations operating in the House of National Culture. Erich Koch, in his letter to Rosenberg of March 16, 1943 (PS 192), complained that the Wehrmacht permitted the Kharkov Prosvita to become a sort of national government, and its role as a political as well as a cultural force is confirmed by Interview 73.

[53] *Nastup,* September 26, 1943, p. 3, based on an interview with a leading member of the Kharkov Prosvita, Professor P. Petrenko, in *Vinnyts'ki Visti,* August 29, 1943.

[54] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* February 10, 1943, p. 2.

[55] For example, Ievhen (Eugene) Stakhiv ("E. Pavliuk"), "Borot'ba ukraïns'koho narodu na skhidno-ukraïns'kykh zemliakh, 1941–1944: Spomyny ochevydtsia i uchasnyka" (The Struggle of the Ukrainian People in the Eastern Ukrainian Lands, 1941–44: Memories of an Eyewitness and Participant), in *Kalendar Provydinnia na 1947 rik. Stovaryshennia Ukraïns'kikh Katolykiv v Amerytsi* (Calendar for 1947 of the Providence Society of Ukrainian Catholics in America) (Philadelphia: Ameryka, n.d.), p. 40, writes that it was necessary for OUN-B members to withdraw from Prosvita, amateur groups, etc., as these (after the introduction of the Reichskommissariat) were only tools of the Germans, and nationalist participation in them gave color to the Communist propaganda which represented the OUN as an agency of the Germans. On the other hand, the clandestine *Biuleten'* (No. 4, previously cited), in calling for an extension of OUN-B activity to all fields of life, criticizes those who condemn activity which is not of a strictly terroristic, revolutionary nature as "Prosvitanstvo."

not find the Prosvita organization well adapted to its tactic of 517
underground work after German suppression.[56] On the other 575
hand, the extremely important Kharkov Prosvita was organized 186
almost entirely by local residents who had in many cases been associated with the Prosvita of pre-Soviet days, and who were unassociated with, or even to some extent hostile to, the OUN-M.[57] Here again there is strong indication of the survival in the East Ukraine of leadership capable of taking direction of important aspects of national life. That this leadership was directed to such a considerable extent to the less aggressive aspects of national development, however, indicates that a certain gap existed during the war years between nationalism in the East and the West Ukraine.

The means employed in the educational systems and in the 186
cultural societies for propagating the national ideology can be 208
classed for the most part under the heading of oral propaganda. The face-to-face type of communication has a long history of effective use in the east Slavic countries and, under the name "oral agitation," has been widely cultivated as a means of strengthening the Communist regime. Hence the population was used to this type of propaganda. Moreover, it was especially suited [727]
to the work of the nationalist groups, which were seeking to spread ideas frowned upon by the German authorities. The latter could suppress a performance or dissolve a society, arrest or execute a leader, but with their small number of personnel, their ignorance of the language, and their lack of sufficiently numerous and reliable local agents, they could not overhear everything and thus prevent the clever teacher or cultural worker from communicating political concepts to his audience. Since nationalist propagandists were so few and ill-equipped by organization and training to cope with the gigantic task of indoctrinating a population of thirty million, however, the problem of securing access to mass communication media under control of the propaganda departments of the municipal administrations was vitally important. Through such media nationalism might reach thousands

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[56] Interview 61.

[57] Interviews 57, 73.

186 where oral methods by the same number of agitators reached
208 scores and live theatrical performances reached hundreds.

The principal activity of the propaganda department of a
727 Ukrainian municipal administration under German occupation
186 centered around the local newspaper, for other media such as the radio and motion pictures were under complete German control. It is worth devoting considerable attention to journalistic activity throughout the East Ukraine because of the value such study can have in elucidating the whole problem of the extent of nationalist activity in that area. Newspapers not only reached large numbers, but represented a symbol of authoritative pronouncement to a people accustomed to viewing the statements of the Soviet press as announcements of policy not subject to question.[58]

However much the German authorities may have feared the existence of a Ukrainian press, it was absolutely essential for them to authorize and support it for their own purposes. Under the Wehrmacht administration, especially in the early days, a very nonrestrictive policy was pursued, as was indicated by the ideologically independent nature of *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* in Zhitomir and Kiev. General ground rules laid down included prohibition of the term "Ukraine" in the sense of a state, rather than as a territorial expression; insistence on reference to Germany as the "protector" of the Ukraine, rather than as an "ally"; and designation of the Wehrmacht as "saviors" rather than "occupiers."[59] Under army control newspapers sprang up in scores of towns, including all of the important cities of the East Ukraine, although in at least one (Poltava) the establishment of a paper was considerably delayed by the unwillingness of any officer to accept the responsibility of censoring it.[60] One reason for the Wehrmacht's

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[58] There is considerably more information available on newspaper activity than on other politically significant aspects of the East Ukraine. Since many of the observers who have written accounts of the war period were themselves journalists, they naturally paid considerable attention to this field of activity. Moreover, the West Ukrainian newspapers published during the same period, which furnish the principal source of material on the East Ukraine, were also especially interested in journalistic enterprises. Consequently, one must guard against the assumption that the real importance of these newspapers was as great as the attention devoted to them indicates. Nevertheless, they were unquestionably very significant as means of transmitting nationalism and reflecting national feeling.

[59] PS 053.

[60] USSR Exhibit 278.

liberality was a desire to carry propaganda to the numerous de- 727
serters who, if they were afraid to submit to German authority, 204
might join the Red partisans. Consequently, papers were fostered 186
in the swamp and wooded regions, even in small towns such as Ovruch, Olevsk, and Shchors. Indeed, the propaganda section of the army itself played a major role in founding newspapers, and even provided for the journalistic staffs in Zhitomir, Kiev, Poltava, and Kharkov the services of a competent and comparatively neutral Galician journalist, Peter Sahaidachnyi.

However, as was previously noted, the OUN-M took a leading role in establishing the papers in Zhitomir and Kiev. Its importance was also considerable in a number of the smaller cities. In Kharkov, Dniepropetrovsk, and Krivoi Rog, on the other hand, the initiative was taken by persons who had been journalists under the Soviet regime. In Krivoi Rog, Michael Pronchenko, a writer and poet who had been imprisoned by the Soviet regime, but later worked for the local Communist paper, upon Red army evacuation, took over the Communist press and, with the aid of other young men, began publishing a paper called *Dzvin* (The Bell).[61] In Kharkov, it was a former member of the staff of the defunct *Sotsialistychna Kharkivshchyna* who proposed immediately after the German arrival to start a newspaper under the name of *Novyi Chas* (The New Times).[62] It was some weeks before the paper could actually be started; the name then became *Nova Ukraïna,* and a large number of Mel'nyk adherents were on the staff. The chief editor and a majority of his subordinates, however, were local persons unaffiliated with the OUN. In a number of places Bandera organizers, too, assisted local men to establish papers.

When the Reichskommissariat took over the bulk of the East 626
Ukraine, a quite different policy was pursued; the outspokenly 204
nationalist organs were suppressed, their staffs executed. Even 186
the official policy of the Reichskommissariat, presumably ap- 727
proved by the Ostministerium, provided that all matters concerning newspapers in the native language should be submitted to the Press and Enlightenment Division of the Reichskommissariat.

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[61] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* November 15, 1941, p. 3; Interview 7.

[62] Arkadii Liubchenko, *Shchodennyk* (Diary), Vol. I, ed. M. Dmytrenko (Toronto: Novi Dni, 1951), pp. 7–9.

204 Newspapers were to be held to the minimum necessary to satisfy
626 the Ukrainian desire for news, and they were to be founded only
727 where "politically unobjectionable" journalists and adequate cen-
● 186 sorship machinery were available.[63] Nevertheless, as even this directive indicates, the need for a Ukrainian press could not be questioned. It was absolutely essential to have some means of reaching the population with directives, of quieting rumors, and of playing up the few positive features of the German administration. Since there were very few German personnel who could write Ukrainian, local men had to be turned to, although strong requests for newspapers were frequently refused when the Germans felt the burden of providing censors outweighed possible gains in propaganda or administrative convenience.

204 While important as a symbol of Ukrainian nationalist ascendancy, the newspaper had certain severe limitations as a vehicle for nationalist ideology. Its frequency and size limited its utility. There were a few dailies, but the vast majority of newspapers appeared much less frequently, as the following figures on East Ukrainian newspapers show:[64]

Papers issued	
daily	5
three times a week	18
twice a week	25
weekly	9
unknown	41
TOTAL	98

Moreover, none exceeded four pages, and a large number could print only one page (being printed on the back of Soviet posters, etc.). This sharp curtailment was due primarily to the extremely severe paper shortage, especially in the south. *Nova Ukraïna* in Kharkov was forced to reduce its printing from fifty thousand to twenty-five thousand daily;[65] the daily *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta* had to limit publication to three times a week; one paper in the Taurida *Generalbezirk* had to issue one copy of each number to each commune in the area, rather than to individuals.[66]

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[63] PS 702.

[64] Figures compiled from numerous sources. It is very probable that the papers marked "unknown" appeared infrequently.

[65] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 21, 1942, p. 3.

[66] PS 1693.

204 If all the limited space available had been at the editor's dis-
626 posal, it would have sufficed for the expression of a wide range of
727 political comments. Actually, a large part, usually the front page, was taken up with "news," mostly military or concerning the allegedly superior attributes of the Germans.[67] Another large body of material consisted of notices and orders of the German administration. Furthermore, the editors were frequently compelled to write, or to print over their signatures, editorials prepared by the German propaganda officers stressing some point (usually fictitious), such as the joys of the *Ostarbeiter* program or the rapid progress of land distribution, which the authorities desired to have propagandized. There was also a considerable number of articles of a factual nature, designed to "educate" the Ukrainians on some topic such as agricultural technique, in which the Germans thought them to be deficient; these were frequently translated from the German press. A certain number of notices of the activity of Ukrainian agencies—the local administrations, the church, cultural activity—was permitted under close surveillance against political propaganda. A very small number of articles on history, literature, and other cultural topics was allowed.

204 These limitations came close to placing the Ukrainian editor in
727 a strait jacket. It is almost universally recognized by persons who
626 were active in journalism at this time, however, that there were
● 186 a few points at which the jacket might be stretched enough to justify the effort to use the newspaper as an outlet for nationalist expression. The few literary articles permitted, while deprived of overt political content, could be used to a certain extent to

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[67] With the exception of a few issues of *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* and *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo* from Kiev, the actual copies of these East Ukrainian papers have uniformly disappeared, so that it is impossible to make an investigation based on direct inspection. Their disappearance is readily explained by the hasty evacuation of the Ukraine by the German forces, the danger of having German organs on one's person in a flight to the West when one might fall into Soviet hands, and above all by the desperate need for paper of any kind for ordinary household uses. As a matter of fact, extensive, but by no means complete sets were gathered by the Institute for the Study of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement in Prague, as well as by certain émigré newspapers. The former collection, however, remained in the Czechoslovak capital after the end of the war and eventually fell into Soviet hands after the Communist coup (Interview 30). As a result, the presentation followed here must be based almost entirely on postwar information, and especially upon the numerous descriptions of East Ukrainian newspapers and reprints of their articles contained in the West Ukrainian and émigré press.

stress themes which were basic to the formation of national pride, 186
themes such as the nobility of Ukrainian literature, the separate 204
development of Ukrainian and Russian history, and the value of 626
Ukrainian folkways. Articles ostensibly directed against Com- 727
munists or Jews could contain oblique thrusts at Moscow and the Russians as well; sometimes such articles did indeed represent extremes of xenophobia. Even the articles giving purely factual accounts of Ukrainian activity were prized by the nationalists, since they brought to the public's attention phases of national life which had been prohibited by the Soviets. The fact that a considerable number of such items could be found for reprinting in the relatively free West Ukrainian and émigré presses (although of course the articles so treated were far from representative) indicates that the censorship barrier was not insuperable, and simple a priori consideration of the difficulty of securing alert and reliable censors for such a large body of publications substantiates this assertion.

While it was therefore true that the newspapers could be used, to a limited extent, for nationalist propaganda, the fact that they were edited by writers known to be nationalists had a certain negative effect on the regard in which the nationalist cause was held by the population, since the newspapers were obviously tools of the Germans. Communist propaganda—and Bandera propaganda after the OUN-B workers were forced from editorial posts—made a great deal of this fact. The most courageous nationalist editors tried to overcome this accusation of serving German interests by occasional sly attacks on the Germans, using the "Aesopian" language which the subjects of the Soviet empire had been forced to learn. Thus one editor, when ordered to write an article glorifying the *Ostarbeiter* program, described in glowing terms the luxurious dining cars on the trains to Germany; few Ukrainians observing the miserable cattle cars actually provided could miss the irony.[68] Not a few editors were willing to pursue such dangerous tactics.

As far as can be detected, the only papers which were controlled by pro-Russian elements (aside from the Russian-language papers) were *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo, Dnipropetrovs'ka Hazeta,*

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[68] Interview 3.

204 and possibly one or two of the Ukrainian-language papers in the
727 Donbas. A number of papers in the latter area and a few in the
186 southwest Ukraine were influenced by Bandera agents, although
626 edited by local people, and maintained a semblance of independence from German control. The important papers in Vinnitsa and Proskurov remained under OUN-M editors, who, however, had to exert the utmost care to avoid arrest. Some papers, like a group in the area northwest of Poltava, which were led by a young resident of Mirgorod (Myrhorod), Michael Voskobiinyk, who was the editor of the paper there, did what they could to propagate nationalist sentiment, while others in the same district were completely subservient to the Germans.[69]

It is probably safe to say that the majority of editors would have liked to insert nationalist themes in their papers, and did so in the early days before the repression. The terrible danger to which they were exposed, however, seems to have induced most to go even further than was necessary for safety's sake in eliminating every vestige of independent writing and in slavishly following the German line. This was, as some of them were ready to admit, largely a heritage from the spirit-crushing Soviet regime, for West Ukrainians in similar positions were willing to display more initiative even though exposed to greater risks.[70] It was also very probably due to the fact that the editors lacked any experience in journalism, for many had been teachers or had followed other professions which left them ill-prepared for their new tasks. The suspicion which attached to any who had worked for the
727 Soviet press, and had thus been compelled to write anti-German
186 material, forced journalists with Soviet experience to be especially
204 cautious.[71] Whatever the reasons, on the whole the East Ukrain-

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[69] Interview 47.

[70] This was admitted by an East Ukrainian in *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk* in a sharp criticism of the editorial staffs who continued the Soviet tradition of complete subservience to authority in journalism, so that in some cases the Germans themselves had to urge them to be more enterprising (March 22, 1945, p. 1).

[71] One of the causes for the dismissal of Pronchenko from directorship of *Dzvin* was the accusation by his enemies that he had written an article against Hitler in a Soviet paper (MS E); Liubchenko feared that a similar charge would be made against him, and wrote that Shtepa told him outright that persons active in the Soviet press could not be employed on *Nove Ukrains'ke Slovo,* although this may simply have been an excuse to avoid hiring the nationalist writer (Liubchenko, pp. 26, 64).

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ians, when deprived of Nationalist support, made a rather poor showing as journalists. With some notable exceptions,[72] they did not measure up to the standards of the West Ukrainians or of old veterans of the Republican period like Nicholas Stasiuk, the editor of *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta*. As will be shown, the administrative officials were also generally drawn from the intelligentsia, especially those of the academic or teaching profession, and had not been trained for the roles they assumed. That they nevertheless made a better showing of independence and devotion to national aims may possibly be explained by the fact that the Soviet regime had encouraged an attitude of limited self-assertion in local administrative bodies, so long as no questions of policy were at stake, while newspaper staffs were much more rigidly confined to transmission of Communist Party-inspired material and even more minutely controlled. Many persons of initiative must have felt it was better to take posts in which real service of a nonpolitical nature could be rendered, rather than assume the unattractive function of mouthpiece for a repressive regime. The question of the characteristics of the East Ukrainian intellectual can be considered in a larger context in the next chapter.

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[72] Among these were Voskobiinyk, Hrynenko (Zhitomir), and a number of editorial writers in Kharkov, as well as those mentioned earlier as founding newspapers, although their careers were generally limited to a few weeks.

p.236

X. NATIONALISM AND THE EAST UKRAINIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE

369 186 THE STUDY of the role of Ukrainian nationalist groups in administration and educational life has shown that urban-centered activities played a preponderant role in the development of the nationalist movements in the East Ukraine under German occupation. The more highly developed urban educational systems were primary targets for nationalist organizers, while the cities served as centers from which the nationalists sought to secure popular support by controlling cultural activities and the press. This emphasis on urban activity has a long history in the development of nationalism in both the East and the West Ukraine. Since the rural districts in both areas were strongly Ukrainian in all linguistic and cultural attributes, many felt that it was not immediately necessary to cultivate nationalist sentiment there; they felt these attributes would maintain the national distinctiveness of the villagers. Whether this was a wise view can be more adequately discussed a little later.

During the Second World War, however, this tradition did result in the nationalist groups' devoting a great portion of their limited resources to the East Ukrainian cities, where it was necessary to start almost from the bottom in building national life.
177 An impressive number of accounts by nationalist Ukrainians tes-
369 tify to the predominance of Russian speech and manners in the
186 cities of the East Ukraine throughout the war period.[1] The ex-

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[1] In addition to numerous remarks of this nature already cited in relation to particular situations, see *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 14, 1942, p. 3; November 27, 1942, p. 4; March 2, 1943, p. 2; T. Liakovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 17, 1942, p. 3; Iu. Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 12, 1942, p. 3. It may appear surprising that so many convinced adherents of the nationalist movement should have admitted and even stressed the non-Ukrainian cultural character of the cities, since usually

planation is, of course, that a vast number of city dwellers were [177]
Russified Ukrainians. Naturally enough, the nationalist leaders 369
felt that no secure basis for their program could exist as long as 186
the municipalities of the country were islands of foreign culture.

Within the urban group, nationalist efforts and nationalist 369
sentiment were largely concentrated in one social stratum. 186
Nationalist movements throughout the world have usually been the 565
work of the middle class. Since there had been no East Ukrainian capitalist middle class of any significance before 1920, and since there was no possibility that one could arise under Soviet conditions, except for a few traders carrying on a precarious business
under the NEP, a commercial class continued to be lacking. The 475
counterpart to private commercial enterprise which existed under 565
the Soviet regime, the state trading system, was apparently largely operated by Jews and other non-Ukrainian elements.[2] Unfavorable appraisals of the activity of this system, plus distasteful memories of the "profit-and-run" techniques of the nepmen had produced an unattractive image of the private businessman in the minds of most East Ukrainians.[3] Although, under German occupation, a few gestures were made by some city administrations toward encouraging individual enterprise, the chief factors in production and distribution, insofar as the appalling economic conditions made such activities possible at all, were public and

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nationalist movements endeavor to claim as large a proportion as possible of the inhabitants of a disputed area as members of their national group in origin and attitude. It must be remembered, however, that the OUN, and some other Ukrainian nationalist groups, were not democratic in ideology; hence the wishes of a majority at a particular time were of little importance in their eyes. Rather, this failure to possess the adherence of the inhabitants of an area which they regarded as theirs through the "rights" of history and blood served as an additional proof of the iniquities of the Soviet regime and of Russians in general and as a stimulus to more strenuous efforts to "correct" the situation.

[2] Some Ukrainians today (Interview 35) state that many wartime ascriptions of all the evils of the Soviet system to the Jews were highly exaggerated, in most cases a forced concession to Nazi racism, but insist that there was a good deal of anti-Semitism in the Ukraine because Jews predominated in retail distribution, and in the conditions of extreme shortage used their positions for selfish purposes. In view of the occupations of most Jews before the Revolution, their numerical predominance in the state distributive system is probably a fact, and it is fairly obvious that any recognizably alien group in such a position would be resented when they could not satisfy the consumers' wants, whether or not peculation played a role in their activities.

[3] Interview 65.

[475] cooperative enterprises. Hence the development of a middle class
565 on the traditional Western model did not take place.

Actually, in the Ukraine, as in many other countries in which
517 nationalist movements have developed, it was other components
186 of the middle class which played the leading role. These were the intellectuals, the professionals, and the bureaucrats, together with the student body from which they were recruited. All four of these categories, together with a vast number of persons who would in Western usage be classified simply as clerks, technicians, or even custodial personnel, are lumped together in Soviet classifications as "intelligentsia"—i.e., all whose work does not involve a large measure of manual labor.[4] The leaders of the nationalist movements came from a narrower stratum however. The majority of this leadership consisted of intellectuals par excellence; that is, it was drawn from the academic or literary profession.

This crucial statement requires some proof, which is difficult to present in the absence of statistics or the possibility of sampling, both of which are unavailable for obvious reasons. However, the preponderance of intellectuals is indicated indirectly by figures previously cited on the extremely high proportion of persons with higher or secondary education employed in the Kiev city and *raion* administrations in 1942,[5] and by the statements from well-informed participants that these and other administrations, as well as editorial staffs, served as refuges for intellectuals displaced from their normal occupations.[6] Furthermore, the efforts of nationalist groups, whether OUN or local, were directed very largely toward assisting and encouraging the teachers and writers, a factor which suggests that they were closely tied to these segments of the population. For example, Mel'nyk organizers in Kiev in the winter of 1941–42 made special efforts to secure work in the cooperatives for teachers in order to enable them to avoid forced labor for the rebuilding of bridges.[7] Similarly, the strong

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[4] For a discussion of the concept in Soviet usage, see Julian Towster, *Political Power in the USSR* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), pp. 324 ff.

[5] See Chapter IX.

[6] See Chapter V.

[7] Iurko Stepovyi, *Syn Zakarpattia: Ukraïns'ke revoliutsiine pidpillia v Kyievi 1941–1942 r.* (A Son of Transcarpathia: The Ukrainian Revolutionary Underground in Kiev 1941–42) (Munich, 1947), p. 16. According to one account, the Red Cross in Kiev also aided the intelligentsia (along with prisoners of war) to a special degree (*Krakivs'ki Visti,* December 4, 1942, p. 2).

East Ukrainian nationalist group in Kharkov took the unusual 517 step of utilizing Prosvita as a relief organization for educators.[8] 186 In addition, the very ability of nationalist elements to maintain themselves in the educational systems when other departments of administration had passed from their hands indicates that the staffs of these branches of administration were especially imbued with nationalism. The comparatively small number of cases and lack of availability of any sampling technique precludes generalization solely on the basis of cases known to the writer of this study. It may be noted, however, that of some sixty East Ukrainians prominent in the nationalist movement whose occupational background is known, about three fifths were either instructors in higher schools, teachers, journalists, or writers. As examples, some of the most prominent may be mentioned. All three mayors of German-occupied Kiev were educators. The chief of the *oblast* administration in Dniepropetrovsk, organized with OUN-B help, was the dean of the electro-technical faculty of the university; later, a member of its medical faculty played the leading role in organizing a "national council" for the OUN-M.[9] The great majority of the Kharkov group, including all of the major organizers of Prosvita, as well as at least two of the OUN-M Ekzekutyva, were university professors; so were the editors of the nationalist-oriented papers in Stalino and Voroshilovgrad (Luhans'k).[10] Among the new Autocephalous bishops, the single East Ukrainian who did not have a clerical background, Professor Haievs'kyi, was also an educator. Writers, while much less prominent, were important. Arkadii Liubchenko, perhaps the best known of all who joined the OUN, has already been described. Most of the nationalist editors were drawn from trained writers, although as in the case of the poet Pronchenko in Krivoi Rog, they appear to have been more often men whose careers were in belles-lettres than professional reporters or editorial workers.

That such a high proportion of available leadership for the nationalist movement came from educators and writers is probably due in part to the leading role played by "national Communist" educational commissars like Shums'kyi and Skrypnyk more

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[8] *Nastup*, September 26, 1943, p. 3, referring to *Vinnyts'ki Visti*, August 29, 1943.

[9] Interviews 1, 48.

[10] Interview 66.

517 than a decade earlier in fostering national culture. Evidently even
186 the repeated Communist purges could not wholly eradicate the permeation of the educational system by nationalist ideas. Indeed, Skrypnyk and other Communists of that period were praised openly by writers in the war years as defenders of the Ukrainian "national idea," [11] and Skrypnyk's plan for an orthographical commission to set standards for Ukrainian publications was formally revived. It should be noticed, however, that direct links between nationalist leaders of the war period and the Skrypnyk group were very few. Moreover, the Russophile leaders were also predominantly intellectuals.[12] The general conclusion appears to be that the intellectuals (using the term in the Western sense) as a group were the most disaffected stratum in Soviet society capable of assuming a leadership role. Of great significance is the fact that a very high proportion of all those who were active in nationalist life under the German occupation had direct reasons for resentment against the Soviet regime, either because they had been barred from intellectual work or because they had been imprisoned for anti-Soviet activity. Also they had a wider historical perspective and hence were quicker to react to the new situation.

463 The second most important group was composed of engineers
186 and other technical specialists like agronomy experts and chemists. Several of these were closely associated with academic life. Others seem to have been drawn from the operating staffs of Soviet industrial establishments, as in the great metallurgical center of Krivoi Rog, where a group of young men composed predominantly of engineers took over the rebuilding of city life soon after the Soviet troops withdrew.[13] One of their number became mayor, was active in nationalist work, probably in connection with the OUN-B, and as a result was executed by the Germans.[14] The most active local recruit of the OUN-M in Kiev, who

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[11] Victor Prykhod'ko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 2.

[12] Although two of their most prominent leaders (Bohatyrchuk and the mayor of Vinnitsa) were physicians, they were also occupants of academic chairs.

[13] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 22, 1941, p. 3.

[14] MS E; Ievhen (Eugene) Stakhiv ("E. Pavliuk"), "Borot'ba ukraïns'koho narodu na skhidno-ukraïns'kykh zemliakh, 1941–1944: spomyny ochevydtsia i uchasnyka" (The Struggle of the Ukrainian People in the Eastern Ukrainian Lands, 1941–44: Memories of an Eyewitness and Participant), in *Kalendar Provydinnia na 1947 rik. Stovaryshennia Ukraïns'kikh Katolykiv v Amerytsi* (Calendar for 1947 of the Providence Society of Ukrainian Catholics in America) (Philadelphia: Ameryka, n.d.), p. 39.

led the organization after the West Ukrainian and émigré leaders 463
had been forced to withdraw, was an engineer. On the whole, 186
however, it may be said that engineers were more concerned with material reconstruction than politics, and did not play proportionately as significant a role as did engineers in the nationalist movements abroad and in Galicia.

The predominance of intellectuals and technical specialists in 633
the nationalist movement imparted a certain specific color to the 727
activities. In the first place, from the purely administrative point
of view, the lack of trained men was a serious handicap. While 186
the purely material aspects of city life were carried on about as well as might have been hoped in view of the destruction, shortages, and German obstruction, the conduct of public administration was far from adequate. This was, indeed, one of the major causes of the downfall of the OUN-M regime in Kiev, whether the worst defects consisted of favoritism and speculation by officials, or simply poor organizational and human relations. Nationalist fervor, enthusiasm, facility in the use of literary Ukrainian, were no substitutes for managerial skills and personnel psychology. Yet it was precisely these abilities which intellectuals who were excluded from public life, as were Soviet Ukrainian educators suspected of adherence to the Skrypnyk group, could not acquire. At the same time, so much of their energy had been turned in upon their academic and cultural cultivation of things Ukrainian, such as language and history, that the intellectuals failed to place the emotional and abstract aspects of the nationalist cause in a balanced framework when the opportunity for action arose. It cannot be said that the intellectuals were less courageous than others might have been in striving for national ends in the face of German terrorism; many lost their lives, although, as has been pointed out in the case of some of the small-city editors, others were sometimes found to act as pliant tools for the occupiers. It does, however, appear that persons more inclined to take a functional instead of an emotional approach to administration might have been more successful in evading German demands.

Very striking is the almost total lack of legal expression among 693
almost all participants in administrative work. Probably the basic reason for this omission was that lawyers were few and far between among non-Communist elements in the Ukraine. A con-

693 fidential Wehrmacht report ascribes to this lack the difficulty experienced in getting the court system started,[15] and one Ukrainian account states that of two hundred and fifty lawyers in the Kharkov *oblast* under Soviet rule only thirty-five were not Jews.[16] While an anti-Semitic bias in this statement may need to be discounted, it does appear likely that the vast majority of a professional group which was already very small (there are few Western cities where there is only one lawyer per four thousand population!) was largely non-Ukrainian.

Of the few prominent legally trained Ukrainians, none had been able to practice his profession for many years. Alexander Semenenko, the mayor of Kharkov, had been educated as a lawyer under the tsarist regime and had practiced for a time in the early years of Communist rule. In the thirties, however, he was imprisoned for a number of years, and was a fugitive from the NKVD when the German army occupied the city.[17] Volodymyr Dolenko, who with Professor Dubrovs'kyi was the principal organizer of the strong nationalist group in Kharkov, had also been trained as a lawyer under the old regime, and he too had been prevented by the Communists from practicing.[18] Alexander Iatseniuk, head of the Zhitomir *oblast* administration, a judge under Nicholas II, had been relegated to the position of lecturer in a higher school by the Soviets.[19] His administration included a number of other jurists.

693 The want of training in the law was particularly striking in the
● 186 Ukrainian nationalist movements. The failure to attempt to form a codified set of principles of either a legal or an administrative nature, the frequent arbitrary action in allotting positions on a basis of partisan enthusiasm rather than objectively determinable qualifications, the frequent tendency to accept an extreme nationalist position and then to push it even further, might all have been curbed by a stronger legal tradition.

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[15] PS 1693.

[16] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* March 1, 1942, p. 4.

[17] *Krakauer Zeitung,* May 14, 1944, p. 4.

[18] Interview 73.

[19] Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* November 1, 1941, p. 2; the reporter states that the directives of the city administration were "precise and factual," not full of "romantic phrases."

been curbed by a stronger legal tradition. Perhaps by coincidence 633
the administrations in Zhitomir and Kharkov were comparatively 563
tolerant of minority groups, and awakened no such violent opposition from Russophile elements as in Kiev. Indeed, as has already been pointed out, the Zhitomir administration in 1941 included a Pole and a Russian in prominent posts, apparently working in harmony with other officials, while the nationalist group in Kharkov during the occupation attracted the lasting support of at least one academician of Russian origin. These groups were also able to avoid destruction by the Germans, in spite of considerable harassment, perhaps because their activities were not so violent as to arouse the public outcry which served as an excuse for the attack on the Kiev group.

The severe shortage of lawyers was paralleled by an even 633
greater lack of administrators with experience in posts of great 186
responsibility. This deficiency doubtless arose primarily from the fact that persons holding high administrative posts were almost universally strong adherents of the Communist regime. In a number of cases, leading Soviet officials such as chairmen of city soviets organized underground sabotage against German installations or led partisan groups for the Communist cause, and the large majority no doubt evacuated with the Red Army. It would have been difficult in any case for such a highly placed member of the Soviet regime to join the nationalist cause, as he would probably have been executed in short order by the *Einsatzgruppen*, whose tasks included the killing of all "kommissars." Nevertheless, it is worth remarking that no Soviet military, party, or state official of any importance, as far as is known to the present writer, ever joined the Ukrainian nationalist cause, either through the local groups in the East Ukraine or through the prisoner-of-war camps, although several from these groups did join the Vlasov movement.

What the East Ukraine lacked in trained legal and administrative personnel, the West Ukrainian organizers failed to supply. Indeed, they appear not to have seen the need. They recognized the desirability of sending in journalists (the West Ukrainians were more effective as editors, although the extremely propa-

633 181 gandistic nature of much of their work exacerbated the defects already existing in the intellectual nationalist tendencies in the east).[20] They also recognized the need for trained military officers to lead the police units, as well as for organizers of cooperatives, merchants, and other personnel to reorganize economic life.[21] Since the Galicians, unlike their East Ukrainian fellows, had been brought up under the influence of the Roman law tradition transmitted by the Austrian administration and the Catholic Church, one might have thought that they would provide a balancing [693] element of legal thought. Actually, although there were numerous lawyers in the legal parties in Galicia, lawyers were even rarer among OUN leaders than among prominent East Ukrainians. Moreover, the whole current of revolutionary romanticism and the glorification of "illegalism" necessarily militated against the development of legalistic elements in the thinking of the nationalist factions. At the same time, of course, underground oppositional work had afforded the western group no experience in the responsibilities of public administration; the older émigrés who might have provided a modicum of such experience were kept out of the East Ukraine by the Germans. As the following statistics on the émigré group in Bohemia-Moravia indicate, however, the possible supply was not great, even if one accepts the figures which were obtained by listing, presumably at their own valuation, persons available to return to the East Ukraine in 1941.[22]

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[20] Iu. Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 6, 1941, p. 2.

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] From a registration by a Ukrainian community organization in Prague, September 28, 1941 (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 4, 1941, p. 3). For comparison, the occupations of the postwar emigration (largely West rather than East Ukrainian, in contrast to the interwar émigré group) may be given:

ÉMIGRÉS IN GERMANY

	U. S. Zone *(total 85,646)*	*British Zone* *(total 44,987)*
Peasants	30 percent	44 percent
Workers	16	21
Artisans	18	14
Intellectuals	23	8
Miscellaneous	13	13

(Michael Pap, *Die Probleme der ukrainischen Staatlichkeit und der Emigration*, Inaugural Dissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde vorgelegt der Hohen Philosophischen Fakultät der Ruperts-Carola Universität zu Heidelberg, 1948 [Typescript available in the Library of Congress]).

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	Workers of various skills	1,788
	Students	560
	Liberal professions (journalists, writers, merchants, artists, etc.)	313
	Teachers	252
	Engineers	343
	Administrators	178
	Jurists	11

Compared to the occupational differences in nationalist activity, differences of age and sex played a minor role. There is little information on the activity of women. Evidently they carried on most of the welfare work; one German report states that a major reason for permitting the functioning of the Ukrainian Red Cross was a desire to absorb the energies of the women intellectuals, who had been highly "politicized" by the Soviet regime.[23] There are a few cases of prominent nationalist work by women, for example, by the poet Olena Teliha who headed the OUN-M literary circle in Kiev until its suppression by the Germans. In general, nationalist observers agree that the women were less active politically than the men. While there is too little evidence to warrant a firm conclusion on this score, it is just possible that the nationalist movements neglected a useful source of support, which was certainly tapped by the Communist underground.[24] 462 186

Youth, on the other hand, played a prominent part in nationalist work. While a large number of Mel'nyk supporters were drawn from the older generation, and the OUN-B made special efforts to capture the younger group, there was here no "conflict of generations" in respect to adherence to the two factions. Since only physically active persons were useful in the east, even the Mel'nyk organizers were predominantly youthful, and thus could approach their contemporaries more readily. The strength of the youth organizations dominated by the OUN-M in Kiev and Zhitomir has already been described. Other young men, of course, rejected both nationalist groups as too extreme, and formed centers of their own, while still others appear to have arisen in complete independence of outside stimulation. Thus the whole administra- 186 883 [668x]

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1 [Occupation specialization of Ukrainian émigré group in Bohemia - Moravia--Analyst]

[23] USSR Exhibit 278.

[24] PS 3876.

186 tion and cultural life of Pavlograd, a small town east of Dniepro-
883 petrovsk on the way to the Donbas, was organized by a group of graduates from the local *gimnaziia.*[25] They owed their nationalism, according to reports by visitors, entirely to the work of an inspiring teacher (who had in turn received his nationalist indoctrination in Kharkov University) who had taught there until caught by the NKVD some years previously.[26]

The division of nationalist youth among both factions of the
[668] OUN, and locally formed groups, parallels closely the division of their elders in the East Ukraine. In one respect, however, the younger generation was different; there was a considerable number of youths who had been active adherents of Communist organizations but who now joined the nationalist movements.[27] The most prominent ex-Komsomol was the son of Alexander Iatseniuk who, after an extremely active career in OUN-M organization in the Zhitomir area, fled to the Volhynian woods where as "Volynets' " he became an important nationalist partisan leader. On the other hand, large numbers of young people were daring enough to praise the Soviet openly, or took part in underground activity, while condemning the Ukrainian language and customs.[28]

On the whole, in their reaction to nationalist political activity, there does not seem to have been any marked difference between the younger and the older generations, at least not nearly so sharp a difference as in Galicia. It is fairly certain that a large percentage of the youth who joined nationalist activities were influenced by their parents. Others—sons of kulaks, priests, and intellectuals who had been persecuted by the Soviet regime—resented the Soviet order because of their parents' misfortune.

Apparently whatever advantage the nationalist movement may have enjoyed among the older generation because of the latter's memory of Petliura and the nationalist activity of the twenties was at least partly offset by the greater appeal of a romantic,

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[25] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* December 12, 1942, p. 3; *Nova Doba* (Berlin), July 5, 1942, p. 3; *Krakivs'ki Visti,* July 3, 1942, p. 2.

[26] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* July 3, 1942, p. 2.

[27] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* September 23, 1941, p. 2, based on an article from *L'vivs'ki Visti.*

[28] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* August 12, 1942, p. 3.

activist movement like the OUN to youth, or by the latter's desire 186 ●
in other cases to rearrange life to suit themselves. There is a faint 883
suggestion that the Soviet regime may already have become the "old order" against which revolutionary youth is wont to rebel. On the other hand, these very qualities which made the nationalist *political* movement attractive to the younger generation had the effect of keeping it antagonistic to religion. As has already [771]
been pointed out, there is almost universal agreement that youth in the East Ukraine was cool, even hostile, to the churches.[29] In the south, the Protestants and dissident Orthodox groups seem to have been somewhat more successful, but they had no direct relation to the nationalist movement.[30]

The OUN-B, it will be recalled, placed special emphasis on 565
securing the allegiance of youth, since its young agitators were 186
unable to attract the support of the intelligentsia.[31] There is a small amount of evidence to indicate that the nationalist movements attracted a broader occupational group from the youth than from among its elders. So little is known concerning the role of the laboring classes, however, that no conclusions can be offered. Historically, the working class in the East Ukraine had been predominantly Russian or Russified. The working class was also generally more loyal to the Soviet system than most of the other social groups. Even if the Ukrainian claim that a large influx of dispossessed peasants and their children during the thirties had resulted in a Ukrainization of the urban laboring class be accepted, there is no evidence that such persons became interested in politics or had any important part in nationalist activity. Probably those who were mature when they left the village continued to be peasants in outlook, while a few rose into the intelligentsia, acquiring its coloration.

As frequently observed in this study, the disproportion of material available is no sure indication of a corresponding difference in the importance of factors involved. Since in many instances only fragmentary evidence is at hand, what is presented may be 000

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[29] Cf. articles in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 12, 1941, p. 3; October 3, 1942, p. 2.

[30] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 3, 1942, p. 2; PS 1693.

[31] See the clandestine leaflet from the Odessa area previously referred to for sharp OUN-B criticism of the intelligentsia as tools of the Germans.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

000 drawn too heavily from particular sources or may too greatly concern special aspects. In the case of urban-rural differences in nationalist activity, it is certain that such a bias exists in the character and extent of the evidence. For one thing, any single activity in a city of some size, such as the development of a Prosvita society, or the control of an administration, is sufficiently important to merit a place in contemporary reports, while a similar rural activity, conducted on a much smaller scale but equally important in its limited area, would probably pass unrecorded. Since the main channels of communication—newspapers and personal contacts of West Ukrainian and émigrés with local figures—were predominantly urban, they would naturally leave behind many more reports on city developments. Perhaps most important is the fact that the higher degree of articulateness of urban dwellers, in the Ukraine as elsewhere, tends to give them a disproportionate share in the written expression which later becomes the historical record.

565 In the cities, there was no positive goal to compete with the
●186 nationalist movements for the hopes and enthusiasms of the popu-
369 lace. The terrible deprivations, the German executions, the *Ostarbeiter* program, the fear of Communist agents, were factors which had a far greater significance for the average urban person than did the efforts of the nationalist movements; but a general effect was to promote passivity and resignation. On the land, however, a positive goal was before all eyes, which for a large segment of the peasantry far outweighed any prospect of national inde-
565 pendence, however desirable that might be in itself.[32] This tran-
186 scendent goal was the destruction of the collectivized system of agriculture and its replacement by a system in which individual initiative and the demands of the peasants would play a greater part. The nature of the agrarian question and the Germans' fumbling efforts to use the peasants' desire to gain support, while retaining the old restrictive kolkhoz system to make exploitation of the peasant easier, has already been described in general terms; it would exceed the scope of this study to treat the subject itself

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[32] This is implied even by nationalist writers; for example, Iurii Tarkovych notes that the first question of peasants in the area between Kiev and Chernigov was, "When will the land be divided?" (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 3).

in greater detail. It is absolutely essential to stress the key nature 565 of this problem, however, for it is almost beyond doubt that any 186 movement which had offered a fully satisfactory solution to the agrarian problem would have won the adherence of the mass of the peasantry, regardless of its stand on the national question.

Superficially, the situation in the countryside was satisfactory 186 from the nationalist standpoint. It is true that certain peasant 369 traits of a distinctively national character had been subjected to erosion by the developments of the Soviet period. The handicrafts, including making of the national costume, had almost vanished under the joint impact of material shortages and growing availability of factory products.[33] The physical appearance of the villages had been altered too and much of their distinctiveness lost through the Soviet destruction of the cemeteries.[34]

In the more basic matter of language, the changes had not been 191 so great, although in some areas at least many "town words" in 369 the "all-Soviet" (i.e., Russian) tongue had been introduced.[35] 186 From the point of view of developing replenishments for the intellectual elite from peasant stock, the situation was worse, however, for the Ukrainian tongue was frequently scorned as the speech of "Ivany i Maryny z kolhospu"—"Johns and Marys off the farm." [36] Even more significant, the mere fact that the peasants spoke Ukrainian, and even had a certain affection for the language as their mother tongue, did not necessarily prove that they possessed any consciousness of nationality. A Ukrainian visitor to one of the villages in the Taganrog district of the lower Don, just beyond the border of the Ukrainian SSR, reported that all the inhabitants spoke pure Ukrainian and retained Ukrainian customs. When addressed as Ukrainians, however, they denied the appellation, insisting that the "Ukrainians" lived over to the west, across the border. The nationalist reporter pointed out the identity of speech and manners with the population to the west, but they replied, "Yes, they are our brothers," yet persisted in denying that they were themselves Ukrainian.[37]

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[33] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 26, 1942, p. 3.

[34] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 15, 1942, p. 4.

[35] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 12, 1942, p. 3.

[36] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 12, 1942, p. 3.

[37] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 22, 1942, p. 2.

186 The means at hand to stimulate a sense of nationality among
565 the peasants were rather meager. Most important, undoubtedly,
795 was the church. Within a few months after the Communists were driven out, many hundreds of parishes had been reestablished.[38] Undoubtedly the older people who had received some religious training welcomed the reappearance of the clergy. Baptisms and marriages took place in large numbers, and the churches were well attended. Since the Germans forbade the use of public funds for payment of the salaries of the clergy, the latter had to depend on the generosity of their flocks or the produce of their own land. Apparently the parishioners responded by furnishing their pastors with sufficient income in kind.[39] In most areas, there developed a conflict between the Autocephalous and the Autonomous clergy. At first, the latter (or, in the "Left Bank" region, simply the clergy consecrated in the orthodox fashion who used the Slavonic liturgy) predominated in the villages, but as more Autocephalous priests were consecrated, and more of the older priests came to accept the Ukrainian language service, they evidently won the support of the peasantry. Strange as it may seem in view of reputed village conservatism, the living language was apparently more popular as a religious vehicle in the country than in the town,[40] and cases are recorded in which the peasants actually drove out the priest who persisted in the use of Slavonic.[41]

793 Religion as a stimulus to nationalist feeling was, however, sub-
186 ject to severe limitations. One was the inadequate background of the clergy. Many were simple peasants up to the time of their consecration, although an effort was made to train them in short courses. Where such a man was of sound character and good common sense, as was the case in one Podolian village, he could accomplish a good deal. There, according to the report, the priest, one of the local peasants until his recent consecration, was highly respected for his good example. His sermons stressed brotherly love, the importance of industriousness, mutual assistance, proper

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[38] See Chapter XI.

[39] PS 1693.

[40] Report from a *gimnaziia* teacher in Poltava (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 12, 1942, p. 3); *Nastup*, April 26, 1942, p. 2; Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 25, 1942, p. 2.

[41] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 25, 1942, p. 2.

education of children, and self-control.[42] Generally, however, the 793
clergy was unable to reach many of the Soviet-trained youth; in 186
several villages the latter even objected to returning the church buildings to religious use, preferring that they should be used for Prosvita clubs.[43]

One of the chief agencies by which secular national concepts [575]
penetrated the village was indeed the Prosvita organization. How 369
effective it was in general is impossible to say in the absence of 186
more detailed evidence, but in some cases it evidently did at 875
least provide reading material and some cultural contacts of a nationalist character. In this respect the rural teachers were especially important. There is considerable difference of opinion as to their effectiveness as propagators of nationalism, some observers feeling that they did an excellent job under difficult circumstances, others asserting that they lacked national consciousness and were imbued with Communist ideas.[44]

The great difficulty was in finding persons who were sufficiently 565
educated and receptive to nationalist concepts to act as transmit- 186
ters of propaganda. In the Podolian village referred to above, for 369
example, the physician, who had been a UNR officer, played the 517
chief role in stimulating nationalist feeling. He was greatly assisted in his task by his wife, the village *feldsher* (a sort of trained nurse or secondary category of medical worker); the priest described above; four teachers; and a lawyer. These constituted the "real intelligentsia" as compared with the "half-intelligentsia," consisting of the village elder, the village secretary, two cooperative workers, three kolkhoz directors, three agronomists, four bookkeepers, and three account-keepers, who were described as having "no unified outlook," being still "under the influence of Bolshevik ideology." [45] This criticism of the lower strata of clerical workers in the Soviet intelligentsia, which formed such a key segment of the rural population, is not uncommon in nationalist

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[42] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk,* April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7.

[43] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* January 18–19, 1942, p. 3.

[44] Cf. *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk,* April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7; *Krakivs'ki Visti,* November 18, 1941, for favorable reports; and Zynovii Matla, *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa* (The Southern Task Force) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), pp. 28–29, for some criticisms of the rural teachers.

[45] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk,* April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

● 186 writers.[46] To a certain extent it may be due to resentment against
565 the clerical workers' unresponsiveness to nationalist propaganda,
369 or even to simple snobbery toward those aspiring to the title of
517 "intelligentsia" without a formal education. In part it appears, however, to correspond to a real lack of breadth of mind among this lowest group of the Soviet intelligentsia, a deficiency which would have made it difficult to use them for any political or social movement not tied immediately to their customary frame of thinking.

On the other hand, there were often elements in the villages which were available for some sort of political activity. The memory of Petliura was still present; some refused to believe that he was dead, thinking the story to be Communist propaganda.[47] In another area, both the president of the village soviet and the head of one of the collective farms remained behind and organized life in cooperation with nationalist elements.[48] Yet, in another case, a man of some education in one of the villages, who was related to an émigré minister of the UNR, after expressing fervently nationalist sentiments, recoiled with horror at the idea that his auditor might recommend him to the Germans for an official post, fearing the vengeance of Communist agents.[49] The presence of the latter was, indeed, a great handicap to nationalist organization in the rural areas, where the protection of the police force was not so great (especially in partisan-infested areas) as in the towns, and where the naturally cautious peasant hesitated to commit himself until assured the Soviet administration would never return.[50]

186 Since the organized nationalist forces were so few in members,
369 they could not undertake any direct or continuous indoctrination
208 of the rural population, unless they abandoned their efforts to win the cities. They had to rely primarily on the Prosvita branches, the country schools, and the village administrations. Printed material was also used whenever it could be controlled

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[46] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* September 23, 1941, p. 2, reprinting an article from *L'vivs'ki Visti.*

[47] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* June 13, 1942, p. 4.

[48] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* July 31, 1942, p. 3.

[49] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* June 13, 1942, p. 4.

[50] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* July 31, 1942, p. 3.

by nationalist Ukrainians. As a matter of fact, a large proportion 186
of the newspapers in the smaller towns were directed principally 369
at rural readers; the extreme shortage of papers[51] in many areas 208
prevented their being of great influence even when they had [204]
some nationalist content. Moreover, the central periodical for farmers, *Ukraïns'kyi Khliborob,* with a weekly printing of seventy thousand, was edited by Eugene Arkypenko, who later joined the Vlasov movement.[52] While this publication was not used against the nationalist cause, it was devoid of positive nationalist material, being confined entirely to technical agricultural articles.

The less-than-lukewarm supporters of the nationalist move- 186
ments who constituted the bulk of the personnel in positions 369
which provided access to the rural population apparently did not do a great deal to convert the dormant cultural nationality of the peasants into active nationalism. There is no question that the cities inevitably constituted a prime target for nationalist efforts. Probably, in view of the severe limitations imposed by lack of time and nationalist personnel, by Red partisans and German restrictions, the enormous task of overcoming village inertia toward a purely political movement could not have been carried out in any case. Nevertheless, the initial failure of the nationalist groups (at least the OUN and others coming from the west) to grasp the overriding importance of the land question, and the necessity of making this a prime means by which the rural population could be won to the nationalist cause, must certainly be ranked as one of the great lost opportunities of this period. If the nationalists had from the beginning used all their energies to present a positive program of agrarian reform as the heart of their message, they might not have left any tangible organization to withstand renewed Soviet occupation, but they might have left behind a concept of the Ukrainian nationalist movement as a defender of the interests of the peasantry. This, along with the vaguer memories of the Republican era, might have left an enduring imprint on the peasantry.

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[51] D. Myronovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* July 9, 1942, p. 4.

[52] *Volyn',* June 17, 1942, p. 4; Interview 45.

668* tionalists made a strong effort to extend their influence to the region. A large part of these efforts were concentrated on Kiev and Zhitomir. In Vinnitsa, the largest city of Podolia, on the other hand, the situation developed unfavorably for the nationalists soon after the German arrival. When the Germans captured the city, they were impressed by the activity of the director of the medical institute and his ability to speak German, learned while a student in Germany. Consequently, they appointed him mayor. Of mixed Russian and Ukrainian descent, the new mayor considered himself Ukrainian, but favored the continuance of ties with Russia. His administration contained other pro-Russian elements, while the Vinnitsa *oblast* administration was headed by an ethnic German said to have had Russophile tendencies. The police, on the other hand, and the newspaper were controlled by OUN-M adherents, although both were men of exceeding caution.[5] Vinnitsa played only an indirect role in stimulating Ukrainian nationalism; the unearthing in June, 1943, of enormous mass graves of victims of NKVD executions in 1937–38 and during the retreat of 1941, including, it is said, a number imprisoned for nationalist activities, served to increase the dread felt of the rapidly materializing prospect of Soviet reconquest.

668* If Vinnitsa was the chief anti-nationalist stronghold, Proskurov,
● 186 a smaller city to the northwest, was the headquarters for the OUN-M in Podolia. There the Mel'nyk group counted the mayor and the police chief (a Carpatho-Ukrainian trained in the
[304] Czechoslovak army) among its members.[6] It also controlled the newspaper, *Ukraïns'kyi Holos,* which had a circulation of thirteen thousand, said to have been more than double that of the Soviet paper which had been published in Proskurov.[7] Farther east, the districts west and southwest of Kiev were under strong nationalist influence. While the OUN-M was establishing its headquarters in Kiev, newspapers and local administrations were being formed in a number of small cities such as Vasilkov, Belaia Tserkov', Tarashcha, Korsun', Smela (Smila), Cherkasy, and Uman'. The formation of the National Rada by the Mel'nyk group made a great

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[5] Interview 1.

[6] Interviews 1, 50.

[7] *Nastup,* December 25, 1941, p. 4, citing *Ukraïns'kyi Holos.*

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

impression on the intellectuals of the smaller towns. OUN-M 668* writers and propagandists appear to have maintained regular contact 186 with them for several months in 1941, and it is apparent that the Kiev *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* served as a model for many of the new [204] editors.[8] Schools were opened under the direction of nationalist [258] educators, Prosvita and theatrical groups were formed, cooperatives linked with *Vukospilka* were active. Apparently, too, the town administrations were largely in Ukrainian hands; the municipal [191] authorities in Uman' issued a sweeping order forbidding the use of the Russian language in any office, school, or enterprise under their jurisdiction.[9]

The influence of the nationalists in the towns penetrated to some degree to the countryside in the area west of the Dnieper. For example, nationalist papers like *Nova Doba,* published in [204] Berdichev, seem to have had a moderately large circulation in the villages. There also seem to have been nationalist influences of a purely local character in some places, aside from those brought in by the nationalist parties. Zvenigorodka, a small town about a hundred miles due south of Kiev had been the home of the Free Cossacks, a nationalist organization of the wealthier peasants during the revolutionary period. The group was revived by some of the villagers under the German occupation, and, together with a mimeographed newspaper, served as a focal point for local nationalism.[10]

The influence of the church, especially in the rural areas, was 794 not entirely on the side of Ukrainian nationalism.[1] The Autonomous 186 clergy under Alexius made an early start in reorganizing religious life in this region. They established a diocese of Vinnitsa and Zhitomir, and during most of the period of occupation were supported by the influential Bishop Damaskin (Maliuti) of Kamenets-Podolsk. Damaskin's diocese included nearly five hundred churches, with a hundred and sixty priests.[11] Apparently most of this large organization, which was overwhelmingly concentrated in the rural districts, had no objection to Damaskin's allegiance to the Russophile church. The Autocephalous Church

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[8] Interview 30.

[9] *Nastup,* May 3, 1942, p. 2.

[10] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* July 31, 1942, p. 3.

[11] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 13, 1942, p. 2.

[1] [After Germans had occupied this territory--Analyst]

794 186 ● established its own organization, installing a bishop in Zhitomir, as well as the energetic Ihor in Belaia Tserkov'. Ihor was replaced for a time by Emmanuel, but when the latter passed over to the Autonomous Church, he took a new post in western Volhynia, perhaps because he found the rather strong nationalist atmosphere in Belaia Tserkov' unpleasant. The fact that the Autonomous Church was able to maintain such a strong organization indicates that sentiment in the rural areas was not always ardently nationalist, even in the most "pure" of Ukrainian lands.

631 The wooded steppe region east of the Dnieper, the "Left Bank," constituted the second half of the traditional Ukrainian heartland. The western part had been for centuries under Polish and Lithuanian rule, coming under Moscow in the late seventeenth century, together with Kiev. The eastern part, roughly equivalent to the Kharkov *oblast,* had never been under Polish rule, but had owed allegiance to the tsars. It served as a refuge for serfs escaping from their Polono-Lithuanian masters, and hence was known as the "Slobozhanshchyna" or "Free Land." Since even the western part of the "Left Bank" had been annexed by the Russian Empire long before the partitions of Poland, however, its history diverged considerably from that of the "Right Bank."

668* The most interesting nationalist developments in this region during 1941–43 took place in Kharkov. While Kharkov was always claimed as the second city of the Ukraine, it never occupied the place in nationalist thinking which Kiev held, and the fact that the Russian ethnic and linguistic element there was strong aroused less indignation. Some account of the differences in the nationalist movements in Kiev and Kharkov has already been given. The essential divergence arose from the fact that the OUN-M organizers reached the latter city only in November, when their period of grace was already running out. Enthusiasm was great enough for them to secure powerful support from local people. A strong *ekzekutyva* was formed with a mayor of one of the city *raions,* an ardently nationalist professor, George Boiko, and several other local people, in addition to Kononenko, the chief West Ukrainian organizer, as members.[12] The adherence of

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[12] *OUN u Viini* (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, p. 75; Interview 57.

surrounding areas, as because it exerted influence upon them. The 668*
chief channels by which it did so were the Prosvita organizations, the newspaper, and the church. A leader of the independent nationalist group estimates that its influence, exercised primarily through the Prosvita, reached as far west as Lubny and Poltava,[16] and there is evidence that it also played a part in organization as far south as the northern Donbas.[17] *Nova Ukraïna* was also widely known, serving as a model for nationalist editors in the "Left Bank" region who wanted to pursue as independent a line as possible and hence rejected the guidance of *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo.*

The special role played by the church of Kharkov merits more 793
than passing mention. When the Germans arrived, they found 578
that an elderly prelate, Archbishop Theophilus, had survived the 186 ●
Soviet period. Seventy-six years old, a native of a village of the Khoral (Khorol) region in the heart of the "Left Bank" Ukraine, he had become a priest in 1885.[18] With the aid of local clergymen, he reassumed control of ecclesiastical life in Kharkov in late 1941 and claimed to be in charge of the entire "Left Bank" as Metropolitan of the Ukraine.[19] Many—especially in the Autocephalous Church—criticized him because he was consecrated bishop in the Russian Orthodox Church (in 1923) and because he continued to use Old Slavonic in the liturgy.[20] Others, however, saw him as a Ukrainian patriot, since he was Ukrainian by birth, spoke pure Ukrainian, celebrated a service in commemoration of Kruty, and praised the Ukrainian newspaper.[21] At any rate the dissidents were able to make little progress against him; only two Lypkivite priests had survived, while Theophilus's clergy numbered more than one hundred.[22] However, the latter appear to have been subjected to very loose control by the archbishop and

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[16] *Ibid.*

[17] Interview 68.

[18] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* May 15, 1943, p. 3.

[19] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* March 5, 1943, p. 2; March 6, 1942, p. 3.

[20] Interview 69. A letter to Archbishop Hilarion from one of his former pupils in the Kharkov area, asking his advice on reorganization of the church, suggests that all were not satisfied with Theophilus' ascendancy, even at an early date (*Ukraïns'ka Diisnist',* February 10, 1942, p. 4).

[21] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* May 5, 1942, p. 4; January 24, 1943, p. 2; May 15, 1943, p. 3.

[22] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist',* February 10, 1942, p. 4; *Krakivs'ki Visti,* March 5, 1943, p. 2.

793 to have employed Ukrainian or Slavonic in the services accord-
578 ing to their own inclination. Consequently, the divergences of
●186 the clergy can be used as a gauge of popular feeling on the "Left"
as well as the "Right Bank," but the actual conflicts were muted, as were the strictly political rivalries, by the presence of a respected, moderate central authority.

668* It is true, however, that conflict was sharper in the area west of Kharkov than in its immediate vicinity. Poltava, the second city of the region under consideration, was one of the most purely Ukrainian of cities of considerable size. Too far east to have been the center for a large Jewish population, the removal of this group and the drastic reduction of the Russian element made it more than ninety percent Ukrainian, according to the city census. The nationalist groups were quick to organize there; largely with the help of OUN-M workers, the paper came under their control in November, 1941, and an East Ukrainian member of the Mel'nyk group, a former officer of the Republican army, became mayor.[23] Cultural life was rapidly renewed, two Ukrainian theaters being opened.[24] On the other hand, church organization was disrupted by quarrels between the priests preferring to introduce Ukrainian into the services and those wishing to retain Slavonic; the latter predominated in the city.[25] The former group, however, with sixty parishes in the countryside, joined the Autocephalous Church, and Ihor of Belaia Tserkov' was appointed their bishop.[26] Theophilus continued, however, to claim their allegiance.

727 Sometime in 1942, the Ukrainian editorial staff and the mayor
661 were shot by German police; the city passed under the control
204 of a Russian mayor, while the new Ukrainian editor could not
assert himself against the tight German control.[27] Even earlier, several other nationalist editors in the area had been shot for evading German restrictions.[28] Some of the newspapers came under the control of nonentities who were fully subservient to the

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[23] *OUN u Viini*, p. 76; Interview 42.

[24] D. Myronovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 9, 1942, p. 4.

[25] *Nastup*, April 26, 1942, p. 2; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 12, 1942, p. 3.

[26] *L'vivs'ki Visti*, September 6–7, 1942, p. 2. It is doubtful whether he actually resided in Poltava, however, since he is later again reported as bishop of Belaia Tserkov'.

[27] Interviews 1, 42; *OUN u Viini*, p. 76.

[28] Interview 47.

proportion of Jews was somewhat lower, but the Ukrainians were 369
even fewer, numbering scarcely more than one third of the popula- 563
tion.[85]

The figures for Kirovograd in 1942 are hardly enough upon 186
which to base generalizations.[86] Apparently, however, a great shift to Ukrainian national affiliation, much larger than that which took place in the average northern city, had occurred. As in the case of the other figures, it is not certain that this represents a real change, although it is probable that a large part of the interwar growth was composed of Ukrainian peasants. A number of circumstances suggest, however, that part of the difference arose from a real shift in allegiance of numerous elements of Russian origin, i.e., a shift induced not so much by expectation that persons classing themselves as Ukrainians would have a favored position in a new Ukrainian state, as by a sincere feeling of belonging to a "Ukraine" defined on a geographic rather than an ethnic basis. The readiness of technical specialists, who took the lead in Krivoi Rog, to adopt with enthusiasm Ukrainian symbols, while devoting their major attention to economic reconstruction, suggests that this acceptance of a territorial basis of national identity may have played a role, while the support of Russian cultural and political tendencies by a similar group in Dniepropetrovsk indicates the instability of this choice. Apparently the situation was something like this: as long as the Ukrainian state which the Germans seemed to favor appeared to be an instrument for the overthrow of Communism and the rebuilding of new life, it was readily acceptable; when it became a romantic creed of ethnocentrism it was repugnant as an obstacle to the satisfaction

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[85] *Ibid.*

[86] See Appendix. The necessity for caution in interpreting the extremely great shift in Kirovograd is indicated by the fact that the only other large city in the area for which data are available, Dniepropetrovsk, showed a comparatively small shift. It will be recalled, however, that the latter city was under a Russophile administration. Unfortunately, there is no information available concerning the tendencies of the city administration in Kirovograd for the time the census was taken. It is mathematically demonstrable, however, that the decline of the Russian group can be accounted for in Kirovograd only on the basis of a shift of persons formerly classed as Russians to the Ukrainian group, unless one of two rather unlikely assumptions is made, namely that (1) the Russian population actually declined between 1926 and 1941, or (2) numerous Jews later exterminated listed themselves as Russians in 1926.

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● 186 of down-to-earth needs and the development of smooth human relations.

668* There were, however, many variations on this theme. Both the initial stimulation and the ensuing withdrawal from nationalist ideology on the part of many persons in the area[a] was due, according to numerous and consistent reports of eyewitnesses, to the activities of Bandera organizers. The great predominance of Mel'nyk adherents in the northern Ukraine was matched by the ascendancy of the younger faction in the south. In part this circumstance was accidental. Both OUN parties had planned to send organizing groups into all areas of the Ukraine. The Mel'nyk group destined for the south, however, was evidently weakened intentionally to permit a concentration on the northern area, where historical tradition and experience in the revolutionary period led the older men to expect greater success.[37] For the most part, the Bandera groups in the north were wiped out by the SP, while their emissaries in the south got off to an early start and were well entrenched by the time the slower acting Mel'nyk group arrived there.[38] Although a certain amount of rivalry persisted in the largest city in each of the two main areas—Kiev and Dniepropetrovsk—after the Mel'nyk group was also proscribed by the Germans, there was for the most part a tacit acceptance of the territorial division of activity which had developed in the early months.[39]

This circumstance renders the investigation of the southern region more difficult. While the Bandera followers have been active since the war in describing their exploits, the fact that at no time, even in the early months, could they engage in large-scale open activities makes it difficult to check their accounts with contemporary journalistic reports. For example, German police reports state that in early October, 1941, a group of fifteen West Ukrainians, all or most of whom were Bandera adherents, tried to secure control of the administration and newspaper in

[a] [Northern part of the steppe industrial area -- Analyst]

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[37] Interview 61.

[38] The headquarters of the Bandera group remained in Kiev, where Myron, the director of its work in the entire East Ukraine, resided until he was killed (evidently by a German police agent) in the summer of 1942; after that OUN-B headquarters were in Dniepropetrovsk.

[39] Interview 1.

668* member actually joined the Natsional'no-Trudovoi Soiuz (NTS—
727 National Workers' Union), the Russian counterpart to the OUN. When the OUN parties, including a relatively important Mel'nyk group which was especially active in educational circles, continued their work underground, they were able to gain or regain some support, partly as a reaction to the lengths to which the Russophile element, especially the Autonomous Church, went, and partly also because of an increasing moderation in their own ideology.[44]

● 186 No simple conclusion can be drawn from an analysis of these complex situations. The picture is further complicated by a tendency, illustrated in a number of instances, for Russians living in the Ukraine to accept a moderate Ukrainian nationalist position when not exposed to the pressure of an extreme Nationalist and strongly anti-Russian ideology. One strong adherent of the Ukrainian ethnic nationalist position was much impressed on finding in Novomirgorod (Novomyrhorod), near Kirovograd, a young teacher and his wife who both felt themselves to be Ukrainian, although born in Russia, and who "hated the Bolsheviks just as much as we do." [45] In another small town in the area (Novo Ukrainka) a nationalist organizer found most of the teachers to be "still under the influence of Communist ideology," which probably meant among other things that they did not consider the "purity" of Ukrainian culture of the greatest importance.[46] There seems to have been a fairly widespread tendency on the part of many Ukrainians and of many Russians living in the Ukraine, to reject any ethnic national creed in favor of some ideology based on territorial identity. It would not do to overemphasize this factor, however, for there was considerable support, especially in the northwestern area around the see of Kirovograd, for the Autocephalous Church,[47] which stressed the Ukrainian language, and isolated smaller places like Pavlograd were real centers of devotion to all things Ukrainian. Even such a large center as Dnieprodzerzhinsk had a nationalist mayor and a 186 nationalist editor.[48]

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[44] Interview 1.

[45] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 2, 1942, p. 3.

[46] Matla, p. 28.

[47] On the question of language to be used in church service, cf. Chapter VIII.

The extreme south, the coastal strip along the Black Sea and 361 the Sea of Azov, from Odessa to Osipenko (Berdianka), had had a still shorter history of settlement than the area immediately to the north. Best suited of all Ukrainian lands to large-scale wheat farming with a small agricultural working force, it had a relatively sparse rural population, very mixed ethnically, with many German villages and some districts of Russian majority. The cities were still more heterogeneous, with Ukrainians forming a small minority in the larger ones, according to the census of 1926.

The study of conditions in this area is seriously hampered by 727 the fact that the western third fell to Rumanian-occupied Transnistria. 523 To prepare the way for the annexation of Transnistria, and, in addition, to gratify the desire of high officials for loot and profiteering, the Rumanians sent in a large number of their own administrators.[49] Since the rather backward Moldavians comprised only a small proportion of the total population, one of the Slavic elements had to be tolerated. Believing that German victory would lead eventually to the creation of an independent Ukraine, which would inevitably demand the land west of the Dniester as an irredenta, the Rumanians favored the Russians; the position of Russian nationalist elements in Odessa resembled that of the Mel'nyk group in Kiev and Zhitomir before their suppression by the Germans. Russian was an official language, along with Rumanian and German; a Russian theater was opened; several Russian publications were started.[50] The guiding organization of the Russians was a group called the Union of Russian Officers, which had the St. George cross as its emblem and evidently was strongly tsarist in its ideology.[51] It is said to have maintained contacts with émigré groups in Serbia and elsewhere and to have refused cooperation with the Vlasov movement.[52] At any work directed by Eugene Stakhiv did what it could to encourage 668* national tendencies among the local Ukrainians.[70]

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[48] Interview 10; *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk,* June 14, 1942, p. 7.

[49] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk,* February 7, 1943, p. 1, based on a Zentraleuropa agency report.

[50] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* April 17, 1943, p. 3; Interview 18; Arkadii Liubchenko, *Shchodennyk* (Diary), Vol. I, ed. M. Dmytrenko (Toronto: Novi Dni, 1951), p. 122.

[51] Clandestine publication from Odessa region previously cited.

[52] *Ibid.*; Interview 18.

The city of Mariupol' was an outstanding exception to the 186● conditions prevailing throughout most of the area. While Mariu- 668* pol' was administratively part of the Donbas, lying in the Stalino 369 *oblast,* it is over fifty miles from the Donets basin itself, on the shore of the Sea of Azov. Like the other cities of the Donbas, however, it had grown enormously, more than tripling in size between the two Soviet censuses. Even after the losses of war, its population numbered 178,358, placing it not far below the largest Ukrainian metropolises.[71] What is remarkable for a city in the Donbas, or indeed in the whole southern area, is that it was under full Ukrainian control. Its well-developed Prosvita society and Ukrainian educational system have already been mentioned. The Orthodox Church is said to have been active and oriented [794] toward Ukrainian nationalism, although here as elsewhere in the far south Protestants and dissident Orthodox sects played an important role.[72] In addition, the mayor was outspokenly nationalist, encouraging the formation of a Ukrainian military force.[73] Probably the guiding spirit in the nationalist development in the city, however, was Nicholas Stasiuk, minister of supply under the Rada in 1918, who had managed to survive the Soviet period by working as a park attendant.[74] He took over the [204] editorship of *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta* which, although restricted by the paper shortage especially acute in the treeless south, was the second most influential Ukrainian paper on the "Left Bank" (next to *Nova Ukraïna*). While necessarily cautious, its tone was strongly nationalist. Moreover, in addition to Stasiuk, there were a number of nationalist journalists to aid in carrying on the newspaper's work. Stasiuk himself is said not only to have carried on this legal pronationalist activity, but to have assisted the OUN-B underground which made its area base in the city.[75]

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[70] Ie. Stakhiv, p. 50; Interview 66.

[71] *L'vivs'ki Visti,* August 27, 1942, p. 2; *Krakivs'ki Visti,* July 24, 1942, p. 2.

[72] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 3, 1942, p. 2.

[73] Cf. Chapter VII.

[74] Interview 66; *Krakivs'ki Visti,* August 7, 1942, p. 2.

[75] Ie. Stakhiv, pp. 52–54; Interview 66. The nationalist tone of *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta* is apparent from the considerable number of its articles reprinted in the West Ukrainian and émigré press.

newspaper and that the only Ukrainian activities were cultural 668* and educational.[78]

The Kuban', the large and fertile region to the northwest of the Caucasus, undoubtedly has a larger Ukrainian ethnic component, but its distinct historical development—the area was settled by groups of the Cossack type recruited by the tsars to further expansion against the Moslem tribes—had apparently led to a different ethnic affiliation. During the war period the area was occupied only a short time by the Germans. In this period, five newspapers were founded in the principal cities, all in Russian.[79] That this may not be an indication of Russian predominance is suggested by a German official concerned with the area during the war who says that the army censorship authority was in the hands of an extremely pro-Russian Balt.[80] At any rate, there is practically no evidence of Ukrainian activity.[81]

Ethnic nationalist feeling—which included support of the 668* OUN-M, large-scale development of Prosvita, Ukrainian cultural 186● activities, Ukrainian newspapers, emphasizing national history, and above all a tendency to condemn and discriminate against all non-Ukrainian elements—was most prevalent in the old northern centers of Ukrainian life, especially in the northwest. In these areas the historic struggle against Polish overlords, the difficult position of the rising Ukrainian intelligentsia because of the predominance of Jews, Russians and Poles in the towns, the contrasting strength of Ukrainian popular culture in the village, appear to have led to bitterness or at least to a strong feeling of ethnocentrism among the nationalist intellectuals.

The south, on the other hand, had long been recognized as less

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[78] For a description of Ukrainian cultural, educational, and religious activity in Simferopol' see Iaroslav Savka in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 18, 1942, p. 4.

[79] They are listed in *Nastup*, January 10, 1943, p. 2; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 14, 1943, p. 2, also lists the paper in Krasnodar', the capital, as Russian, and says the Russian language also predominated in the theater.

[80] Interview 33.

[81] The Krasnodar' paper (*Kuban'*) published an article by "A. Kuban'skii" on December 20, 1942, telling of the Ukrainian cultural revival in the early days of the Soviet regime (*Nastup*, February 20, 1943, p. 4). There were also a few OUN organizers in the area, probably with German units.

668 *Ukrainian by all who were familiar with the country. Yet, while
186 the manifestations of Ukrainian cultural activity were sparser and the influence of the OUN groups much less, there seems to have been a fairly strong tendency for a large portion of the inhabitants, of whatever ethnic origin, to accept the Ukraine as their motherland because they lived in it and were attached to it. Moreover, if earlier experiences of the nationalist movements are a trustworthy guide, this feeling represented a change from the conditions of the "South Russia" and "New Russia" of imperial days. Hence there is strong ground for suggesting that territorial patriotism has grown under the Soviet regime. The significance of this observation, and other evidence which supports it, must be treated in a larger context in the concluding chapter.

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One knows that the movement of ideas aiming at the abolition of servitude began to appear in the higher layers of society at the epoch of the Napoleonic War. Quite naturally it appeared together with an interest for everything popular and was, at the same time, inspired by the ideas fashionable in the West: on the one hand encyclopædism and voltairianism and on the other freemasonry and carbonarism. It could not fail to spread in the Ukraine, as elsewhere.

Thus a secret society, the 'United Slavs,' was formed, among whose members were not only Ukrainian officers and officials, but also actual Great Russians. A naïve romanticism reigned—oaths were sworn on swords and speeches made in the style of Plutarch, associated with a passionate love of popular traditions and with the desire to lighten the destiny of the peasant masses under the burden of servitude. Following the example of the romantic revolutionaries of the West, the young conspirators dreamed of the epochs of the past and of the Cossack epics, the heroes of which appeared to them as champions of liberty. Kotliarevsky himself, without belonging to the 'United Slavs,' was intimately connected with masonic circles, and his amazing pamphlet, *Travesty of Aeneid*, already denounced the social weaknesses and injustices of the epoch.

Conforming to the ideas of romantic and revolutionary nationalism, the 'United Slavs' aimed at a republican and democratic federation of all the Slavs. Their pro-Ukrainianism represented only a link in the Pan-Slav revolutionary chain, and it was diametrically opposed to a rupture between the Ukraine and Great Russia. One of the principal chiefs of the Ukrainian movement, Gorbatchevsky, wrote in his memoirs, in Russian, that the success of the insurrection 'might have signified a new era in the history of the Russian people.'

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

668 186 The society of the 'United Slavs' was only one expression of the great liberating movement, and its failure was the logical consequence of the suppression of the Decembrist insurrection at St. Petersburg on 14 December 1825, which gave it its name.

This failure checked for a long time the attempts of political revolt in the whole of Russia. Nevertheless the intellectual movement continued, always inspired by the same sources and the same ideals.

538 The genius of Chevtchenko determined the path which the whole Ukrainian literature was to follow. It clung especially to the description of popular life, of the peasant life with its sadness and its injustices. Deeply steeped in folk-lore, it was especially inspired by the pity of the disinherited, by this social pity which is a feature of its affinity with the great Russian literature. In the writings of Marko Vovtchok (pen-name of Marie Vilinska Markovitch) in the *Popular Tales*, approved by Chevtchenko himself, we find again the touching picture of the peasant miseries. Later, in Galicia, Franko, Martovitch, and Stefanik give some pretty examples of this literature, more social than national. Parallel to this, in Russian Ukraine, this tradition was pursued until the revolution by Kotsiubinsky, Tobilevitch, and, above all, by Lessia Oukrainka, the niece of Michael Dragomanov, to whom we will presently return.

536 545 The Ukrainian Theatre experienced a remarkable development towards the end of the nineteenth century. We have already considered the taste of the Ukrainian people for dramatic art, a taste which had already found expression in the old marionette plays. The rise of the new Ukrainian literature could not fail to bring about the development of a modern theatre. As a result a troupe of Ukrainian actors, that of Kropivnitzky, was formed at Kiev and had a great success. The Imperial

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

An important group of Ukrainian politicians,[1] who had 186
formerly supported Petlioura, joined the Bolshevik 191
cause after his defeat. The Soviet Government in- 177
augurated a policy of Ukrainization from the beginning in order to satisfy their ambitions and to show the world their nationalistic Liberalism. But, as under Petlioura, it was a superficial one and never penetrated in fact either into the private life of the citizens or into the sphere of education, or even into the administration.

Although Ukrainian had become the official language, nobody used it and correspondence between official institutions continued, with rare exceptions, in Russian. One of the authors of this book, who held an administrative post in a Soviet enterprise in the Ukraine from 1921 to 1924, had never written a single word in Ukrainian and had never been prosecuted for this defection. It is not because the word 'Odessa' is now written with one 's' instead of two and the word '*plochtchad*' (in Russian a town square) is to-day replaced by the word '*maidan*,' that the Ukraine has ceased to be Russia.

The policy of Ukrainization continued without great changes and in spite of the lack of common sense until 1927, when the Central Committee of the Communist Party suddenly decided to introduce the Russian language as the second official language. One can explain this sudden change by the development of separatist anti-Soviet propaganda, undertaken by secret organizations,
formed under the protection of Poland. There occurred 661
in the Ukraine the first wave of purification which was directed against the 'Nationalistic Chauvinists,' accused of spiritual connection with Galician 'counter-revolutionary' elements, which had been affected by the propaganda of Polish 'Fascists.'

The people's commissar for education of the Ukraine,

[1] [i.e. in 1923---Analyst]

T:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

661 Choumsky, and a group of his friends had opposed this policy of the Central Government. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine accused Choumsky himself of ‘ spiritual connection ’ with the counter-revolutionaries of the Polish Ukraine and especially with the U.N.D.O., the most important among the Ukrainian political parties in Galicia and working under Polish influence. At that period one still didn't shoot Soviet Ministers. But Choumsky was forced to leave the Ukraine and to accept a small administrative post in Moscow.

•186
177 To regain the initiative in the Ukrainian question, the Executive Committee of the Comintern passed a resolution in November 1927 directing the Communist Party in the Polish Ukraine to struggle resolutely for the separation of this country from Poland and for its re-inclusion in the Soviet Ukraine.

On the other hand the inauguration of the first five-year plan, which strengthened the economic ties between the Ukraine and the rest of the Soviet Union, and the creation of the Red Army on a basis of discipline and of modern military science, made the use of Russian necessary throughout the whole Soviet territory.

669 This pro-Russian tendency did not last long. The forced collectivization of the land, undertaken in execution of the five-year plan, turned the Ukrainian peasantry against the Soviet Government. This resistance soon changed into a kind of civil war and became underlined by hundreds of thousands of deportations, by thousands of executions, and by a terrible famine.[1]

The resistance to collectivization, which was incompatible with the spirit and the vital interests of the

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[1] See the work of Calvin B. Hoover: *Economic Life in Soviet Russia*, M.R.S., Paris, 1934, in which many pages are given to the question of collectivization.

peasant proprietors, was so violent and seemed so 669
justified that it carried certain Communist circles of peasant extraction with it, and especially the former *borot'bistes* (Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries of the left) who had accepted the Soviet programme in 1917. A new and violent purification followed.

Fearing a connection between the discontent of the 186
peasants, the opposition within the party, and the 661
nationalist movement supported from abroad, the Soviet Government took Ukrainianism under its control in order to prevent its use by the opponents of collectivization as a weapon against the Soviet regime. This time Ukrainization was pushed to the extreme and was maintained by the huge apparatus of repression. In all the enterprises, and in workers' syndicates, special cells were formed for the propaganda of the Ukrainian language and for the rigorous control of the knowledge of Ukrainian, which had become the obligatory language, established by the officials. The number of Ukrainian teachers was increased, new Ukrainian theatres, clubs, and libraries were created in industrial centres. Russian newspapers were almost completely suppressed. Those who resisted Ukrainization were mercilessly expelled from the administration and everything was put under the direct control of a special commission of the Council of People's Commissars. To all the countless suppressions to which the Soviet citizens were subjected that of the Ukrainization was added.

The attempt to snatch Ukrainianism from the hands of circles socially opposed to the Soviet regime was not successful. A veritable nationalistic anti-Soviet propaganda spread everywhere, supported by the officials of the regime. Then came the second change of policy. 661
Two trials, one of the 'Union for the Deliverance of the Ukraine' and the other of the 'National Centre'

that it was in the interest of Prussia to help the Ukrainian people 175
to cast off the chains of Muscovite slavery. During the Great French 648
Revolution the person of Napoleon was very popular in Ukraine. Ukrainian patriots were pleased by the victories of the French Emperor, and hoped that, after the defeat of Russia in a war with France, the time for the liberation of Ukraine would come, and the odious serfdom would be abolished. But Napoleon had no understanding of the Ukrainian problem. He planned the creation of two states 'Napoléonides' in Ukraine under his protectorate . . .*)

Ukrainian history has gone its own way, different from that of Russia. This has created the peculiar national character of the Ukrainians.

The foreigners who had visited Ukraine in the 17th and 18th 175
centuries pointed out the higher level of civilisation among the 181
Ukrainians in comparison with the Russians, and the highly deve- 517
loped feeling of personal dignity of the Ukrainian people. This love of freedom of the Ukrainian people appeared also in the fight against Tsarist absolutism in Russia, where revolutionaries of Ukrainian origin occupied the first places, Zhelyabov, Kybalchych, Konashevych, Osynsky, Kravchynsky (Stepnyak), Popko, and many other members of the party '*Narodnaya Volya*'.

In the 19th century, under the influence of the ideas of that time (the Great French Revolution, romanticism) the regeneration of the so-called unhistorical pepoples (Serbians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Baltic peoples) began; in the beginning it was the interest for the language and history of the peoples among the educated classes, and the attempt to write in the 'common people's' language.
In Ukraine the regeneration of the popular literary language began [538]
with the publication of the satirical poem of Ivan Kotlyarevsky *Aeneid:* 1798. In this poem the author underlines his dislike of serfdom and the lords

"who did not give the people freedom
and treated them like cattle."

Democratic ideas were widespread in Ukraine; the representatives 175
of the Ukrainian educated classes took an active part in the 186
revolutionary organisations directed towards the fall of the Tsarist régime (the uprising of the 'Decabrists', 1825—26, was most active in Ukraine, near Kiev).

In 1846 a Ukrainian political organisation, *The Society of St. Cyrill and Methodius,* was founded in Kiev. Many prominent representatives of Ukrainian culture like Taras Shevchenko (the

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*) *Revue des Etudes Napoléoniennes:* Paris 1922.

175 greatest Ukrainian poet), Mykola Kostomarov, historian, Pantelei-
186 mon Kulish, historian and poet, Mykola Hulak, and others, took part in this organisation.

In the declarations of this society the idea of an independent Ukrainian democratic republic was promulgated: "And Ukraine will resurrect from her grave ... And Ukraine will be an independent republic" *(The Books of the Being of the Ukrainian Nation*, the work of the Society of St. Cyrill and Methodius).

The Russian Government punished the members of this society severely and acted rigorously against Ukrainian political and cultural regeneration.

[191] In 1863 the Russian Minister Valuyev declared that "the Ukrainian language did not exist, does not exist and cannot exist." In 1876, by a secret order of the Tsar, the printing and circulation of Ukrainian books, periodicals etc. in the Russian Empire was prohibited. Even the Bible in Ukrainian was forbidden. Ukrainian could not be tought in schools. The Ukrainian press in the Russian Empire was forbidden until 1905. Only the revolution of 1917 made the introduction of Ukrainian in schools possible. This prohibition of the living language of a considerable nation, the instrument of its culture, had disastrous consequences for the Ukrainian people and is a feature absolutely unique in universal history.

[871] The prohibition of the Ukrainian language in the schools and in
175 the press hindered the development of education in Ukraine. The
517 statistics show that the number of schools and the level of education in Ukraine were higher in the 18th century than in the 19th*). On the other hand, the Russian schools separated the educated classes of the Ukrainian nation from their nationality, and put the intelligentsia of Ukrainian origin into the service of Russian culture. Thus, besides the economic exploitation to the advantage of the Russian Empire, Ukraine was deprived of her best intellectual forces which were drowned in the 'Russian Sea'. We can quote here only some names of prominent Ukrainians who, by virtue of circumstances, helped to create the Russian civilisation, and gave their talents for the increase of the Russian Empire: Archbishop Theophan Prokopovych, the deputy of the Patriarch of Moscow Stephan Javorsky, Bishop Dmytro Rostovsky — were prominent Ukrainian scholars of the time of Tsar Peter I. who were forced

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*) Thus there were in 1748 in four regiments (Ukraine had a military Cossack administration) of the Hetmanate (for three regiments the figures are missing) 866 elementary schools, i. e., one school for 1000 inhabitants. From this, little or almost nothing remained in the 19th century.

to leave Ukraine and to serve the Muscovite State. The Ukrainian, 175
Prince Alexander Bezborodko, directed for many years Russian 517
foreign policy in the time of Catherine II. (1762—1796) and of Paul I., who is known, however, to have disliked Russia and to have dreamt of a free Ukraine. The greatest talents of modern Russian literature, Gogol and Dostoyevsky, were of Ukrainian origin; Gogol did not master Russian exactly until the end of his life, it was strange to him. Far-famed scholars — Maxim Kovalevsky, sociologist; the philosophers Lesevich and Yurkevich, Vladimir Vernadsky, geologist, the famous painter Ilya Repin, — were Ukrainians of whom Russian culture is proud.

The Ukrainians in the provinces of Austria, Galicia and Buko- 175
vina had lost their educated classes under the rule of the Poles and 186
Turks. Here, as well as in the Ukrainian territory to the West of [668]
the Carpathian Mountains, Carpatho-Ukraine, which was under Hungarian rule, the Ukrainians were principally peasants; the cities were mostly not-Ukrainian. During the 'Spring of the Peoples' in 1848 the Ukrainian national movement in Austria and Hungary also appeared. In Galicia the Ruthenian Supreme Council — a political representative of the Ukrainians in Austria — was created. At the elections for the Austrian Parliament the Ukrainians secured a considerable number of mandates. The national rebirth began also in the Ukrainian territory on the western side of the Carpathian Mountains. But the reaction which occured in Austria hindered the Ukrainian national development. The Vienna Government put the Ukrainians in Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine under Polish and Hungarian rule respectively in order to make the Poles and Hungarians loyal towards Austria. This enabled the Poles and Hungarians to conduct a policy of denationalisation against the Ukrainians. Only at the end of the 19th century, in spite of great hindrances on the part of the Poles, a Ukrainian political
and cultural life developed in Galicia. In connection with this, [517]
Ukrainian science and literature, prohibited in Kiev, Kharkov, and [814]
Odessa, found a home in Galicia (Lviw), and Bukovina (Chernivtsi). Ukrainians from Tsarist Ukraine published here their periodicals and books; here, under the direction of the famous Kievan historian Michael Hrushevsky, the Ukrainian Shevchenko Scientific Society developed. It was by its energy a real Ukrainian Academy of Science.

Gradually the Ukrainians in Austria were overcoming the obstacles created by the ruling class of the Polish nobility, and secured new mandates in the Austrian Parliament and the Galician Diet.

186 665 The development of Ukrainian political and cultural life in Austria had a great influence on the Ukrainians condemned to ruthless Russification under Tsarist rule. When the first modern Ukrainian political organisation in Tsarist Russia, the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party, was founded in 1900 (from 1905 this party was named Ukrainian Social Democratic Labour Party) its first publication *Independent Ukraine* was printed in Austria, in Bukovina.

186 668 The Ukrainian patriots under Tsarist Russian Government, morally and materially supported the fight of the Ukrainians in Galicia and Bukovina for their national rights; these territories were a Ukrainian Piedmont. For not even the revolution of 1905 gave the Ukrainians in Russia their national rights. Of course, the Ukrainians had their deputies in the Russian 'Duma' who demanded autonomy for Ukraine. But the Ukrainian language was not admitted in the schools, the rights of the Ukrainian press were restricted, and active Ukrainians were persecuted by the Russian authorities. Among the Ukrainians in Russia the fight of the Austrian Ukrainians for the creation of a Ukrainian University in Lviw roused great interest. The Russian Government regarded the creation of a Ukrainian University in Galicia as a great danger for the 'indivisible Russia' and sought an agreement with the Polish nationalists in Galicia against the Ukrainian movement. The Russian nationalists regarded the opening of a Ukrainian University in Lviw as a 'casus belli' for Russia against Austria.

668 661 The Russian Government closely watched the Ukrainian movement in Austria and was much alarmed by its successes. In consequence, the Petersburg Government prepared to annex Galicia and Bukovina long before the war of 1914, in order to wipe out 'Mazeppism'. When, in 1914, at the beginning of World War I, a Ukrainian delegation visited Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov to protest against the new prohibition of the Ukrainian press in the Russian Empire, the Minister replied cynically:

"Now the time has come to put an end to your Ukrainian movement once for all ...".

727 661 The suppression of the Ukrainian movement was one of the main aims of Tsarist Russian policy in World War I. The occupation of Galicia and Bukovina by the Russian armies in 1914-1917 brought heavy damage to the Ukrainian movement; the Ukrainian schools, press, co-operative societies, scientific and educational institutions
727 were destroyed. Thousands of Ukrainians, Austrian citizens, were
659 deported to Siberia. In the occupied territories a ruthless Russifica-
661 tion was started, and in Galicia the forced conversion of the Greek-

669 indignation was caused by the bloody Communist terror that took thousands of innocent people as its victims. The war of Soviet Russia against Ukraine and the terror by the Russian 'Red Guards' in 186 Ukraine, still strengthened among the Ukrainians the will to fight for their national independence. This was expressed in an essay by the President of the Ukrainian Central Council, Professor Hrushevsky, the most authoritative personality of Ukrainian political life of that time. Hrushevsky wrote:

> "The first matter I have to lay stress on is that from now, in our relations with Moscow, a radical change has taken place. It is vain to look for a possibility of living with the Russians in the boundaries of one state. We had sincerely believed that in a new Russia the Ukrainian nation could find the necessary conditions for its manifold development. Now we have lost this belief. We have convinced ourselves that our ways differ from those of a reactionary or a revolutionary Russia. After the unprecedented barbaric atrocities of the Russian Bolsheviks against the Ukrainian people, after the cruel shelling of the Ukrainian capital by the Soviet Russian troops, in our relations with Russia a new period begins. Ukraine has to continue her struggle for liberation in order to create an independent state. Our social and political ideals must be based not on the examples of oriental despotism, but on the principles of the life and development of civilised Europe, where, before all, human dignity is valued. Ukraine has always stood in her history culturally and politically nearer to Western Europe. If we want to liberate ourselves from foreign violence, we have to conform to the civilised West" (*On the Threshold of New Ukraine:* Kiev, 1918).

8. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk

728 The Soviet Russian Government had by its ruthless propaganda for an immediate peace treaty definitely disorganised the front against the Central Powers. Thus the representatives of the Ukrainian Government took part in the peace negotiations with the Central Powers in Brest-Litovsk. The diplomats of the Central Powers gave the Ukrainian Government in the negotiations with the Ukrainian delegates various facilities in order to secure a 'grain treaty' with Ukraine. For the food situation of the Central Powers at that time was fatal. The peace treaty between Ukraine and the Central Powers was concluded in Brest-Litovsk on February 9, 1918. As at that time a great part of Ukraine was occupied by the Soviet Russian troops, it was in the interest of the Central Powers to interrupt the export of grain to Russia, and to use the food

669 December 12, 1918, a treaty was signed between the Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic and the command of the German troops in Kiev that the German troops had to leave the Ukrainian capital. After this Skoropadsky abdicated and fled abroad with the German troops, having no one to lean upon.

642 The Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic was restored in Ukraine. The five member Directory and the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic were headed by the representatives of Ukrainian Socialist parties (President — Volodymyr Vynnychenko). The first Government of the Directory was formed by Volodymyr Chekhivsky.

11. The Ukrainians in Austria Declare their Independence (1. 11. 1918)

563 The Ukrainians in Austria (Galicia and Bukovina) had had heavy losses during World War I from the Tsarist occupation which tried to destroy the Ukrainian movement. On the other hand, the Poles who had the control of the administration in Galicia instigated the Austrian military authorities against the Ukrainians as
[661] against 'Russian followers'. In consequence of this provocation thousands of innocent Ukrainians were put to death in Galicia.

563 In October 1918, the Ukrainian deputies to the Austrian Parlia-
668 ment and the Diets of Galicia and Bukovina created the Ukrainian
● 186 National Council as the political representation of the Ukrainians in Austro-Hungary.

On October 18, 1918, the Ukrainian National Council declared its resolve to create a Ukrainian state in the Ukrainian territories of Austro-Hungary. When Austro-Hungary fell asunder the Ukrainians declared the independent Western Ukrainian Democratic Republic (November 1, 1918, in Lviw).

Though the Ukrainian National Council of the former Austrian territories had passed a resolution on the preparation of the union of all Ukrainian territories in one state, the Ukrainians of Galicia and Bukovina distrusted the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev. Just at that time the Ukrainian democratic parties made their preparations for the overthrow of the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev. At the beginning of this action the key position was held by the regiment of the Galician Sich Riflemen which consisted of former Austrian Ukrainian prisoners of war taken by the Russian troops. This was the vanguard of the Ukrainian democratic movement against the Skoropadsky régime.

186 After the overthrow of the Skoropadsky régime in Kiev the
642 favourable moment came for the union of the Ukrainian terri-

tories that had been formerly under Russian and Austrian rule. 186
The Directory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic issued a 642
special Act on January 22, 1919, in Kiev which declared:

"From this day, the parts of Ukraine — the Western-Ukrainian Democratic Republic, Galicia, Bukovina and Hungarian Ruthenia (Carpatho-Ukraine) and the Great Ukraine on the Dnieper, unite. The ancient hopes which the best sons of Ukraine had lived and died for become reality. From now there is one indivisible independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic".

Relying on this Act, the delegation from Western Ukraine, numbering 65 people, took part in the Congress of Ukraine which had been called to Kiev on January 23, 1919.

The Western-Ukrainian Republic, from the first days of its [726]
existence, had to fight in a heavy struggle against the Poles who 728
pretended to rule in Galicia even after the dissolution of Austria. The Poles invaded the Western Ukrainian Republic after having concentrated large forces on this front. The Ukrainian Government asked the Entente Powers and the Paris Peace Conference for mediation in the Polish-Ukrainian war. In February 1919, a Mission of the Peace Conference arrived in Galicia headed by the French General Berthélemy, and with the participation of the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and Italy. This Mission presented to the Poles and Ukrainians a plan for an armistice on February 28, 1919. According to this plan, until the final decision of the Peace Conference, the territory of Galicia eastwards of the Bug and Stryj Rivers should remain under Ukrainian administration, while the Western part of Galicia should be administered by the Polish authorities. The Galician territory which remained under Ukrainian administration should be recognised by the Big Powers 'de facto' as an independent state, and the Ukrainian Army should be recognised and trained with the assistance of the Entente Powers. The Ukrainian Government did not accept the demarcation line proposed by the Mission of General Berthélemy as unfavourable for Ukraine. In May 1919, a new Mission of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference arrived in Galicia, headed by General Botha (South Africa). General Botha's Mission altered the previous armistice draft, and the Ukrainian Government agreed to accept it. However, the Poles rejected this plan.

The small country — Ukrainian Galicia — had to strain all her 726
forces in order to hold the front against the whole might of Poland. From Eastern Ukraine Galicia could not receive any considerable help, because the Ukrainian forces had to fight the Skoropadsky

nian Communists who wished to create an independent Soviet 642
Ukraine participated in these uprisings. The policy of the Russian 669
Communists in Ukraine had a clearly predatory character. The Communist Commissar Schlichter said of the tasks of the Soviet Russian campaign at a session of the Moscow Soviet on March 22, 1919:

"You all remember that when Ukraine was becoming Soviet with every day of the advance of the Red Army we became easier in our minds; the rich-in-bread Ukraine is ours! . . . We have four central supply detachments. We set all hopes on them. We have a lot of workers we have sent out who will be able to overflow all Ukrainian villages. We shall always remember that the looks of the proletariat of Russia are turned towards Ukraine" (*Annals of Revolution*, No. 2: Kharkov, 1928).

Not only by the ruthless pillage were the Ukrainian people put [186] ●
against the Russian Communist dictatorship; by its nationalist 656
policy, too, it roused great dissatisfaction among the Ukrainians. 191
The Rumanian Communist Rakovsky, who was appointed by Moscow as Premier of the Soviet Government of Ukraine, declared that the Ukrainian language and culture were 'petty bourgeois' and that the use of the Ukrainian language in public institutions was necessary only for 'Ukrainian counter-revolutionaries'.

For this reason the 'dictatorship of the Russian culture' was introduced in Ukraine by the Russian Communists as a 'proletarian' one. "The Soviet Government in Ukraine in 1918 made in fact Russian the official language", — writes the Communist N. Popov in his *History of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine* (1929). Against the declarations of an 'independent Soviet Ukraine', the Rakovsky Government proclaimed the 'federation' of Ukraine with Russia. There could not be free elections to the Soviets in Ukraine. The power in the villages was given to the 'Comittees of Poor Peasants' consisting often of people sent from Russia. According to the instruction these Comittees were given they had the duty — "to fulfil precisely and relentlessly all orders of the supply authorities . . ."

13. Risings in Ukraine

In spring 1919, when the Soviet Army had reached the Dniester 669
River, Moscow prepared its forces for the support of Soviet Hungary. But at that time the same troops who had fought against the Franco-Greek forces under the command of Hrihoriev, Tyutyunnyk and others, started the fight against the Russian Communists. Of the strength of this movement Rakovsky, Premier of

people took place. The Ukrainian Government and Army were 669
forced under the pressure of Denikin to leave the temporary capital of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, the city of Kamenets in Podolia, on November 15, 1919. The Ukrainian Army marched into the hinterland of the enemy. The enormous partisan movement in Ukraine in autumn 1919, stopped Denikin's offensive on Moscow. Of this the Russian Red Army took advantage, broke through the front of Denikin and marched into Ukraine again. The front of the Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, brought into disorder by the war with Denikin, could not be restored at once, and the Soviet Russian troops seized almost the entire territory of Ukraine again.

When the leaders of the Russian Volunteers saw the coming of their definite defeat, they offered the command of the Ukrainian Army which was carrying on a partisan war against the oppressors of Ukraine, an alliance against the Russian Communists. The delegate of the Russian Volunteer Army, Colonel Popov, wrote in January, 1920, to the Ukrainian Supreme Command: "We have what you want — arms, but you have that we have not — the confidence of the population". The Ukrainians declined this offer of the Russian 'Whites' convinced that any alliance with them would bring only damage to the Ukrainian struggle for liberation.

The Army of the Ukrainian Republic began its 'Winter-Campaign', famous in the history of the Ukrainian struggle for liberation, in Lubar in Volhynia on December 6, 1919. This army, by order of its Government, made partisan war on the territories of Ukraine against 'White' and 'Red' Russia until May 5, 1920. Only leaning upon the confidence and the active support of the population could this army cover distances of thousands of miles carrying the banner of the independent democratic Ukraine. The want of equipment did not allow the Army of the 'Winter Campaign' to accept in its ranks many thousands of Ukrainians who wished to fight actively for the independent Ukraine.

16. The New Tactics of the Russian Communists in Ukraine

The failure of the Soviet Russian policy in Ukraine in 1919 656
caused much discussion among the Communists themselves. By 186
order from Moscow, in October 1919, not only the 'Government of 668
Soviet Ukraine', headed by Rakovsky, was abolished, but also the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine. Among the Communists who had worked in Ukraine in 1919 a group of the so-called federalists appeared that demanded from Moscow more rights for Ukraine. The leader of this group,

656 **G. Lapchinsky, explained that Ukraine must be an independent state**
and not a Russian colony.

•186
668 The powerful Ukrainian movement forced the Russian Communists to alter for a certain time their tactics in Ukraine. The Soviet Russian Government ordered the Communists to pay attention to the national peculiarities of Ukraine. In December 1919, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party passed a resolution on the recognition by Russia of the independent Soviet Ukraine. Among other matters this resolution states that the "members of the Communist Party in Ukrainian territory are obliged to realise the right of the working masses of learning their mother language in schools, and speaking it in all Soviet institutions".

The resolution recommends the restriction of the requisition of food from the Ukrainian peasants. Besides, this resolution of the Russian CP pointed out that the principal task of Soviet construction in Ukraine was the requisition of arms from the population.

The President of the Soviet Russian Government, Lenin, wrote in *The Letter to the Workers and Peasants of Ukraine on the Occasion of the Victory over Denikin* on January 4, 1920:

"The independence of Ukraine has been recognised both by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Russian Soviet Republic and the Russian Communist Party. Only the Ukrainian workers and peasants themselves can decide the question on their Soviet Congress — whether Ukraine should be united with Russia or left an independent Republic . . . We want a voluntary union of nations, a union that would not permit violence of one nation against another".

All these declarations of the Russian Communist Party leaders had the aim to lull the vigilance of the masses of the Ukrainian people. In reality the Soviet Russian Government did not even intend to change its imperialist course against Ukraine. Moscow feared the armed Ukrainian people and distrusted them. Therefore, for instance, a conference of the members of the Russian Communist Party in Homel passed the following resolution in October 1919:

"The advance to the South and the organisation of Soviet administration in Ukraine are possible only with the aid of regular disciplined troops, who, in any case, must not be of local origin" (*Annals of Revolution*, No. 6: Kharkov, 1926, p. 4).

669 The Soviet Russian troops, after having seized the Ukrainian
661 **territory until the spring of 1920, began at once the struggle against**

CHAPTER III

UKRAINE UNDER SOVIET RUSSIAN RULE SINCE 1920

1. The Soviet Régime in Ukraine 1920—21

[656] 668 ● 186 After the resolutions of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party and Lenin's letter to the Ukrainian workers and peasants announcing a new approach to the Ukrainian problem (December 1919; January 1920) the policy of Moscow towards Ukraine did not change in substance. Soviet Russia did not trust even the Communists of Ukrainian nationality or those Russian Communists who wished to meet the Ukrainian national demands even partly. The group of Communists-Federalists headed by G. Lapchinsky published in February 1920, a pamphlet entitled *Project of a Resolution on the Party Policy.* The authors of this pamphlet protested against the rule of the Russian element in Ukraine. They wrote on the "mad, and, for the cause of the revolution, disastrous plan of the occupation of Ukraine by the military and political forces of Soviet Russia. After the enslavement of the Ukrainian nation in the times of the Romanovs and Hapsburgs, every attempt to direct the fate of the country from outside will arouse the growth of nationalism".

[665] In the pamphlet, facts on the full dependence of the Communist Party of Ukraine on the Central Committee of the Russian CP are quoted: thus the Communist organisation in Ukraine — "had to fulfil all demands of the Central Committee of the Russian CP, even, if it regarded them injurious to the cause of the revolution in Ukraine".

656 666 Moscow deported the opposing Communists from Ukraine or expelled them from the Party. The Soviet Russian régime in Ukraine thereto was strengthened. For this purpose Moscow gave preponderance to the Russian element in the Soviet administration in Ukraine. For instance, the election system for the 4th Congress of the Soviets in Ukraine in 1920 was the following: from 1000 soldiers of the Red Army one deputy was elected, from 10,000 workers one deputy, and one deputy from 50,000 peasants. It should be remembered that 1920 in the ranks of the Red Army in Ukraine

731 Gouvernement had its own 700,000 sufferers, that is, about one half
656 of the population".

"The measure of misfortune here surpasses all that can be seen throughout the famine-stricken Volga areas", the author of the report on the famine in Ukraine remarks.

The horrible famine in Ukraine aggravated by the special 'hunger policy' of Soviet Russia helped the Russian Communists to destroy the partisan movement in Ukraine and to strengthen their rule.

185 *3. Ukraine in the Time of the 'New Economic Policy' (NEP)*

656 [423] In 1921 Lenin proclaimed the 'New Economic Policy' in the Soviet state. From 1922 peasants and small private contractors were given some facilities. Small landownership was secured for 9 years for the peasants. Instead of requisitions a tax was introduced. Free trade was re-established. In order to appease the masses of the peasants of the peoples oppressed by Moscow, the Communist dictatorship made some concessions for the development of the [191] national cultures. In Ukraine the Ukrainian language was given rights in schools, administration, in the press and judicature. This was the so-called policy of 'Ukrainisation'.

[631] The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics was proclaimed at the end of 1922 at the Soviet Congress in Moscow. The Communist organisation in Ukraine, consisting of foreign imported elements, particularly insisted upon the strengthening of centralisation with regard to the separatist tendencies of the Ukrainian movement (*Resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Ukraine* from October 17, 1922).

●186 668 But there were also voices among the Communists speaking against Russian centralism. Thus, for instance, at the 12th Congress of the Russian CP in Moscow (April 1923) the Ukrainian problem extensively was discussed. The President of the Soviet Government in Ukraine, Rakovsky himself, had, after the experience with Ukrainian resistance, changed his former opinion on the Ukrainian national rebirth as a 'hopeless matter', his own expression in 1919. Now Rakovsky attacked those Communists who did not understand the importance of the Ukrainian problem and followed in Ukraine a policy of Russification. Rakovsky declared at this Congress that the Ukrainian problem belonged to those problems that "promise us a civil war ... I am beginning to fear for the further fate of the Soviet Government ... In Ukraine we succeed only with difficulties in forcing our organisations, carrying on their work in the conditions of a national fight, to understand the national problem. All our national policy in international relations

is looked at by the majority of the Communist Party in Ukraine, 186
and here in Russia even more, as some sort of strategy, a diplomatic 668
game".

Rakovsky explained that, through the proclamation of the Soviet Union, Moscow had gained ten and twenty times more power in comparison with the previous state. Therefore Rakovsky demanded that the Government of the whole Union in Moscow should surrender 9/10 of its competence, and that this be transferred to the separate Soviet Republics. Together with the Commissar of the Interior of Soviet Ukraine of that time, Skypnyk, Rakovsky demanded that the relations between Ukraine and Russia should be these of a confederation.

Skrypnyk protested at the Congress of the Russian CP against the disregard of the national and cultural rights of the Ukrainian soldiers in the Red Army that led to a forced Russification of Ukrainians. He regretted that Ukrainian schools were not allowed [162] for the 7 millions of Ukrainians in the Russian Soviet Republic, outside the Ukrainian Soviet Republic,[1] Skrypnyk sharply criticised the nationalism of the Russian Communists in Ukraine who did not admit the Ukrainian language in public and Party institutions.

The Russian Communist N. Bukharin stated in a speech at the 12th Congress of the Party that the Communist organisation in Ukraine had a Russian-Jewish composition with a very small number of Ukrainians. And in the meantime, Bukharin said, — "in Ukraine there is a very strong national movement" (*Records of the 12th Congress of the Russian CP*).

However, the demands of those Communists who wished to re- 631
strict Russian centralism and enlarge the rights of the separate Soviet Republics did not attain a majority at the Congress of the Russian CP. In July 1923, the strictly centralist Constitution of the USSR was ratified. Besides the theoretical declaration of the equality of rights of nations and the 'right of separation' of the peoples from Russia this constitution actually concentrates all power in the hands of Moscow, so that the acts and orders of the 'All-Union Government' are valid even then if the separate Soviet Republics would protest against them.

The policy of Soviet Ukrainisation was limited mostly to those 186
institutions which had to deal with the peasants. But in the towns 665
and industrial centres the Russian Communists tried to prevent the admission of the Ukrainian language by every means. For this reason quarrels between Ukrainian and Russian Communists arose in the ranks of the Communist Party in Ukraine. Thus the Communist Alexander Shumsky, the Commissar of Education in

[1] [in the year 1922--Analyst]

186 Ukraine, demanded that the Communist Party stopped its policy of
665 Russification of the Ukrainian workers. On May 12, 1926, Shumsky declared at a session of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP of Ukraine:

"In the Party, the Russian Communists are ruling, who treat the Ukrainian Communists with distrust and enmity".

In a letter to the Central Committee of he CP of Ukraine of February 1927, Shumsky wrote: "The Ukrainian Communist feels himself indeed a stepson of the Party".

[558] For this 'deviation' the top institutions of the Communist Party resolutely condemned Shumsky. He was deprived of his office and sent to Russia.

656 A new 'deviation' was detected in the CP of Ukraine in 1928.
186 The Communist Volobuyev showed in his articles that economically Ukraine was a Russian colony. He demanded for Ukraine
687 the securing of a free economic development. Volobuyev published figures which proved that Ukraine was giving Russia almost $^1/_3$ of her incomes without equivalent. He pointed out that Russia was sending workers from Russia into Ukraine, thus artifically creating a majority of Russian elements in the Ukrainian industrial centres *(The Bolshevik of Ukraine,* No. 3: Kharkov, 1928). Volobuyev was punished alike for this 'nationalist deviation'.

186 In spite of all these difficulties and hindrances created by the
517 Russian Government for the development of Ukrainian culture, the time of 'Ukrainisation' gave some gains for cultural Ukrainian progress, even in the conditions of the Communist dictatorship: Ukrainian shools — elementary, secondary and academic — had been organised; the Ukrainian Academy of Science developed its work extensively. In a few years of cultural work the cadres of a
[538] new Ukrainian intelligentsia were created. The Ukrainian literary production developed in spite of all obstacles on the part of the Soviet régime. The protest against the oppression of Ukraine by Moscow appeared also in the Ukrainian literature: a trend arose in the Ukrainian literature with orientation towards the free civilisation of Western Europe, against Russian Communist rule (the Communist Khvylyovy). Against such 'heresy' Moscow acted with ruthless repressions.

4. *Ukraine in the Time of the First Five Years Plan*
(1929—1934)

185 The policy of collectivisation and industrialisation started in 1929 with enormous demands on Ukrainian national economy. Moscow used the Ukrainian national economy predominantly for

[1, Alexander Shumsky, Commissar of Education -- Analyst]

appointed their own people though without scientific merits, but 000
politically faithful to Moscow.

The economic and national oppression of Ukraine was felt also 661
by the Ukrainian Communists. They saw the pernicious results of 651
forced collectivisation in Ukraine. The Ukrainian peasants, though 243
terrorised by executions and deportations, had no desire to work for the Soviet dictatorship. In 1931/32 the plan for the delivery of grain for the Soviet state was not carried out in Ukraine. The cultivation area was disastrously diminished. But Moscow's demands on Ukraine grew steadily. In summer 1932, Molotov and Kaganovich arrived in Ukraine from Moscow in order to demand from the Communist organisation in Ukraine the increase of grain delivery. At a Party conference in Kharkov the Commissar of Education Skrypnyk declared that in Ukraine all had been 'swept out' and that in the villages there was a great want of food. With Skrypnyk's view the majority of the members of the Communist Party in Ukraine agreed, and therefore it was decided in Moscow to make a radical 'purge' among the Ukrainian Communists.

5. *Moscow's Terror against the Communist Opposition in Ukraine*

The Central Committe of the Communist Party of the Soviet 661
Union passed a resolution of non-confidence in the leaders of the 665
CP of Ukraine on January 24, 1933, and 'strengthened' the directory of the Communist Party in Ukraine with Stalin's agents, headed by Postyshev. Postyshev directed the repressions, particularly against Communists of Ukrainian nationality. By arrests and executions of Ukrainian Communists Postyshev wanted to terrorise the entire Ukrainian population which was listening to the opposing attacks of the Ukrainian Communists against the policy of Moscow. Postyshev carried out a massacre of Communists coming from Western Ukrainian territories, which at that time belonged to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania (Galicia, Volhynia, Bukovina, Carpatho-Ukraine). Many of them were declared without any reason 'agents of foreign Fascism' and shot without trial — Badan, Maksymovych, Sydorak, Mondok, the last two members of the Czechoslovakian Parliament, and many others.

During this bloody purge the 'old Bolshevik', Lenin's companion 687
from the days of the Soviet revolt in Petersburg in 1917, Commis- 186
sar of Education in Ukraine from 1027—1933, Mykola Skrypnyk, perished. Skrypnyk was accused of 'nationalist' deviations, for he thought that the national problem was not worked out sufficiently in Communist theory, and for this reason himself investigated the

687 national problem and encouraged others to do likewise. In Moscow
Skrypnyk's theoretical works on the national problem were treated
186 with distrust: for in the CP one is to believe that Lenin and Stalin have given unchangeable dogmas an orthodox Communist is not expected to discuss. In the meantime Skrypnyk in his speeches and articles summoned the Ukrainian Communists to a 'national construction not restricted by anything'. He pointed out that national consciousness should be developed among the masses of Ukrainian people, and that through the development of the national culture certain values should be given to the Ukrainian workers and peasants.

Skrypnyk described the practice of the Russian Communist Party in the national question in the following words:

"For the majority of our Party, Ukraine as a national element did not exist. There was only 'Little Russia', as a part of the indivisible Russia, something uncertain both in its relations with Russia and with regard to its territory and even its language" (Skrypnyk, *Articles and Speeches,* vol. I, p. 291; Kharkov 1932). Frequently, in the Congresses of the Communist Party, Skrypnyk demanded the organising of Ukrainian schools in the territories of the Russian Soviet Republic inhabited by Ukrainians. These views and demands of Skrypnyk Moscow recognised as 'nationalism', he himself was declared as an 'instrument of intervention'. In order to avoid being the principal figure in a new trial Skrypnyk thought it better to end this life by suicide. This happened on July 6, 1933, on the 10th anniversary of the ratification of the first constitution of the USSR, of which Skrypnyk was one of the coeditors.

661 Moscow's fears of the Communist opposition in Ukraine are
shown by the dimensions of the 'purge' which had been made among
665 the Communists in Ukraine in 1933. During 1933, 35,5% of the members were expelled from the CP of Ukraine (*Communist:* 1, 2, 1934). In some regions, for instance in that of Kiev, half of the members were expelled from the Communist Party. Many Communist organisations in villages ceased to exist and were replaced by 'political detachments' sent from Russia. In the course of 10 months in 1933, in Ukraine, 237 secretaries of Rayon Committees of the Communist Party, 279 Presidents of Rayon Executive Committees, and 158 Presidents of Rayon Control Commissions were dismissed (*Izvestia:* Moscow 28, 11, 1933).

The purge in the public institutions of Ukraine was directed principally against the Ukrainians. The Communist Mykolenko,

CHAPTER IV

THE UKRAINIANS OUTSIDE SOVIET UKRAINE AFTER 1920

I. The Ukrainians in Poland

563 186 After the signing of the Treaty of Riga (1921) between Soviet Russia and Poland, about 6 million Ukrainians remained under Polish rule (Galicia, Volhynia, Polissia, Pidlyasha, Kholm Region). The case of Galicia as that of a former Austrian territory appeared from time to time in international policy. The members of the Ukrainian National Council of Galicia remaining in Western Europe demanded the right of free self-determination for this territory. In February 1921, the Council of the League of Nations stated in its resolution: "Galicia lies outside the borders of Poland", "Poland is only the actual occupant of Galicia". But this and other resolutions could not remove the Polish rule in Galicia. Poland did not care for the resolutions of the League of Nations. However, in order to appease foreign public opinion, the Polish Diet passed in September, 1922, a bill on the autonomy of the Counties into which Galicia had been divided in 1920, and a bill on the creation of a Ukrainian University. In November 1922, elections to the Polish Diet took place. The Ukrainians, having regard to the special situation of Galicia, did not take part in these elections. In other Ukrainian territories under Polish rule, particularly in Volhynia, the Ukrainian political parties attained at these elections a great victory.

On March 15, 1923, in a resolution of the Conference of the Ambassadors of Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan in Paris, the frontiers of the Riga Treaty between Poland and the USSR were recognised "with regard to the fact that Poland had admitted with respect to Eastern Galicia that the ethnographic situation demanded unconditionally an autonomous order".

563 661 But the Polish authorities had no intention to grant political autonomy to the Ukrainians. Even the rights of the Ukrainians for cultural development were narrowly restricted in Poland. Against the Ukrainians in Poland, a police régime was introduced. In 1920 there were in the Polish concentration camps many thousands

727 volunteers. At the end of World War II the Soviet Army occupied Carpatho-Ukraine. In June 1945 the Czechoslovak Government ceded this country to USSR.

4. The Ukrainians inside the Russian Soviet Republic (RSFSR)

563 Inside the administrative boundaries of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic there are not all territories inhabited by the Ukrainian nation. Soviet Russia did not permit the joining of the north-western parts of the Ukrainian ethnographic territory (the southern parts of the Kursk and Voronez districts) with Soviet Ukraine, though the population of these territories wished union with Ukraine. The Crimea had a considerable Ukrainian population. Together with the Tartars they had the majority in the country. Though the Russians were in minority, Crimea became part of RSFSR as an autonomous republic.

In all these provinces the Ukrainians are deprived of all national rights: they are condemned to Russification.

5. The Ukrainian Movement in the Kuban Region

175 The Ukrainians began to settle in the Kuban region from the end
of the 18th century. Here the Russian Government allotted land for
the Zaporovian Cossack Army that, after the destruction of the
Cossack Fortress 'Sich' in 1775 had been for a certain time under
162 a Turkish protectorate. Before the revolution of 1917 the polulation
423 of the Kuban region consisted of 42,9% Cossacks who were obliged
to do military service, for their whole life, and of peasants 52,8%.
The rest were Circassians. 78% of all the land of the Kuban Region
belonged to a state fund, and the Cossacks received allotments for
their military service. The peasants took land on lease from the
[517] Cossacks. The Tsarist Government did not admit the Cossacks to
education. Thus, in this country there was a lack of intelligentsia
of local origin. In the towns there was a considerable influx of Rus-
186 sian intellectuals. After the revolution of 1917 a strong autonomist
631 movement arose in the Kuban Region. The Kuban Cossacks created
their Military Council and their Military Government. In October
1917, the Kuban Military Council proclaimed itself 'State Council',
with the participation of all the nationalities of the Kuban Region,
and a Kuban State Government was created, headed by the Social-Democrat Luka Bych.

669 After the Communist revolt in Russia, the Soviet Russian Government waged war against the region of the Don Cossacks and against the Kuban Region. During the war an alliance was formed between the Kuban State Council and the Russian Volunteer Army

Attempts on a rising

661 were cruelly suppressed by Russia: large masses of the Kuban population were deported to Siberia.[1]

6. *The Ukrainians in Siberia and the Far East*

167 The lack of land on their own territory forced the Ukrainian peasants to move behind the Volga, the Ural, and into the regions of Siberia. This movement of settlers developed especially after the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway at the end of the 19th century. Thus, large territories behind the Volga, the regions of Samara, Astrakhan, in Central Siberia, the regions of Tomsk, Omsk, Akmolinsk, in Turkestan and in the Far East, the Amur and Sea Region — the so-called Green Quoin, were colonised.

668 Before World War I in the Green Quoin about 500,000 Ukrainians, mostly farmers, were numbered. ● 186 At that time a Ukrainian national movement began: educational organisations, bookshops, theatre performances etc. (centre Vladivostok). After the revolution of 1917, in the Far East, Ukrainian cultural, national, political and other organisations were created, and Ukrainian periodicals appeared for the first time. In June 1917, the 1st Ukrainian Far East Congress was called, which decided to demand national autonomy for the Green Quoin, a territory the size of Italy. The 2nd Ukrainian Far East Congress created the 'Ukrainian Far East Secretariat' for the administration of Ukrainian political affairs of the Ukrainian population of the Far East. The Japanese occupation of 1920—22, the war of the 'Red' and 'White' Russians for the Territory of the Green Quoin, did not forward the development 150 of the Ukrainian national movement there. After having taken possession of the Far East, the Russian Communists were hostile to the Ukrainian movement, and hindered especially the 170 development of Ukrainian schools. Though the demands for the introduction of the Ukrainian language in schools for the Ukrainians of the Far East and Siberia came from the Ukrainian population itself and from the Commissariat of Education of Soviet Ukraine, the Russian bureaucracy did not recognise the Ukrainian language, declaring that this was "a separate group of Russian population speaking a special jargon" (Z. Ostrovsky, *The Problems of Ukrainisation and Byelorussianisation in the RSFSR: Moscow,* 1931, p. 33).

7. *The Ukrainian Emigration to Europe and America between the World Wars*

167 In consequence of the occupation of Ukrainian territory by Soviet Russia and Poland in 1920, a great number of Ukrainian emigrants

[1] [During collectivization and famine in the Kuban region and the RSFSR, 1932-33--Analyst]

— soldiers of the Ukrainian Army, politicians, state officials etc. 167 had to go into exile. The neighbour states which had divided the Ukrainian territory among themselves had one common interest: to prevent the growth of a Ukrainian movement. However, Czecho- 563 slovakia met the cultural needs of the Ukrainian emigrants. On the 873 recommendation of President T. G. Masaryk the Czechoslovakian Government from 1921 procured funds for the creation of Ukrainian Academic Schools in CSR — University, Ukrainian Economic School, Pedagogic University etc. In Prague prominent Ukrainian scholars were living, and here the political life of the Ukrainian emigration developed.

In Berlin the Ukrainian Scientific Institute at the Berlin [815] University was created in 1927. A Ukrainian Scientific Institute was founded in Warsaw in 1929. These institutes developed a considerable activity.

The Ukrainian emigrants, officers and soldiers of the Ukrainian 563 Army who had left Ukraine with their Government in 1920, 186 remained faithful to the traditions of the independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Ukrainians in exile were that part of the Ukrainian nation who could speak freely to the world in the name of their enslaved brethren.

The Ukrainians in America are mostly from the Western terri- 563 tories of Ukraine — Galicia, Bukovina, Carpatho-Ukraine. They 575 are grouped around insurance associations. The oldest Ukrainian organisation in USA is the Ukrainian National Association in New York, founded in 1894. This Association publishes the daily *Svoboda*. The Ukrainian Workingmen's Association in Scranton, Pa., founded in 1910, publishes the weekly *People's Will*. There are also smaller organisations of a similar nature. Between the two World Wars the Ukrainians in Poland had considerable financial support for their cultural institutions, especially for the schools, from American and Canadian Ukrainians.

The Ukrainians in USA are mostly workers; in Canada, far- [162] mers. The number of the Ukrainians in the United States is about 1 million, in Canada about 300,000. The Ukrainians in Canada have their co-operative associations, educational institutions and private schools. The centres of the Ukrainian emigration are Winnipeg, Toronto, Edmonton, Montreal and Hamilton. The strongest political organisation of the Canadian Ukrainians is the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League of Canada, publishing *Ukrainian Voice* in Winnipeg. Among the Ukrainians in USA and Canada the Com- 563 munist Party is conducting its destructive activities, possessing the 575 means even for the publishing of big daily papers in Ukrainian 668

657 ing World War II, the Soviet Government abolished the Ukrainian
798 Greek-Catholic Church by force, against the will of the population,
661 and destroyed the hierarchy of this Church. The Ukrainian Greek Catholics who were in union with Rome were ordered to become subordinate to the Greek-Orthodox Patriarch of Moscow, who is backed by the Soviet Government.

000 The struggle of the Ukrainians against Russian imperialism did not cease after World War II. It is being conducted in various forms. In this struggle other peoples who are oppressed by Russia, from the Baltic Sea to the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Turkestan, participate. Thus a common front of freedom-loving peoples against despotic Russia is being created.

656 In 1949, Moscow has permitted Ukraine to use an own flag and
● 186 an own different anthem. However, this cannot be regarded an extension
661 of the rights of Ukraine in the Soviet Union. It seems to be more an attempt to bring the so-called satellite countries to the Ukrainian level.

Moscow is watching attentively every expression of Ukrainian political thought and national sentiment, and wants to have everything under its control. The Decade of Ukrainian Culture held in Moscow in July 1951, ended with rebukes and threats against the participants of the Decade, and a 'purge' among the Ukrainian Communists whom Moscow imputes 'bourgeois nationalism'. Only the Russian Communists have beeen beyond any doubt as regards their 'internationalism'; there was no case that the manifestations of nationalism among the Russian Communists had been condemned by the Communist Party. On the contrary, Moscow is cultivating an exaggerated national pride among the Russian people. The Ukrainian Communists are under a especially heavy control of
[554] Moscow. No Ukrainian has been General Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine. This position has always been occupied by people sent from Moscow: Molotov, Kaganovich, Postyshev, Khrushchev, finally Melnikov.

'Titoism' is no isolated phenomenon in the relations between imperialist Russia and Yugoslavia. Similar trends hostile to Russian imperialism have existed among Ukrainian Communists since the first days of Soviet Russian occupation in Ukraine. The Russian terrorism prevented these trends, however, from getting strong. Nevertheless, they exist clandestinely. Moscow's persecution of 'burgeois nationalism' among the Ukrainian Communists gives an eloquent proof of Ukrainian opposition against Russian imperalism.

P: Fedenko H-4,5 (no date) 1951 RO1 Ukraine RO1

3. *The New Ukrainian Political Emigration*

In consequence of the occupation of all Ukrainian territories by 167
the armies of Soviet Russia, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians
had to remain outside the borders of their fatherland. In the first 186
years after the termination of the war, the Ukrainian emigrants liv- 668
ed in Displaced Persons' Camps in Germany and Austria. Now the Ukrainians can be seen in all European and American countries, in Australia and New Zealand. These are all people who, for national and political reasons, opposed repatriation into a Ukraine oppressed by the Communist Government. They declared repeatedly, when they were threatened with forced repatriation, that they would sooner commit suicide than fall into the hands of their oppressors.

The Ukrainian emigrants in Europe and America are developing a considerable political and cultural activity. The central institutions of the Ukrainian political parties are remaining in exile where their press is being published, the elementary, secondary and academic schools are being operated — the Ukrainian University in Munich, the Ukrainian Technical University in Germany, until 1945 in Bohemia, and others.

After World War II the Ukrainian émigrés have created more [815]
scientific institutions: The Scientific Shevchenko Society, a continuation of the identical Society which had existed in Lviw since 1874, and had been destroyed by the Communist régime, and the Ukrainian Free Academy of Science. These Ukrainian Scientific Societies are working effectively and have their branches in Europe and in America.

Under these circumstances, when in Ukraine enslaved by Soviet Russia, the Ukrainian political life is suppressed and cannot show itself freely, the Ukrainian emigrants think it their duty to speak in the name of their nation in the defence of its rights before civilised mankind. For this purpose the leaders of the Ukrainian parties created the Ukrainian National Council in July 1948, as the political representation of the Ukrainian nation. The Ukrainian National Council continues the tradition of the independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic which had been created through the will of the Ukrainian nation in 1918—1919. Many of the participants of the Ukrainian fight for liberation and many of the leaders of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic are still living. These men believe firmly that the time for the free state existence of the Ukrainian nation will come.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

the Ukraine were mostly of the 'seminarist' type and 793
often of Ukrainian nationality, and hence of peasant descent. In the Ukraine the secular clergy were, if anything, more popular than the monastic.

(*b*) *Jews.*—Next in number to the Orthodox are the 795
Jews. Records make it clear that since the seventeenth 798
century the Ukraine has been the centre of the Jewish 186 ●
'pogrom' movement, and is more anti-Semitic than any other East-European country. A Hebrew-Jewish scholar, Nathan of Zaslavl, has left a document[1] containing the record of terrible atrocities perpetrated by the Ukrainians and Cossacks on the Jews during the Cossacks' War against Poland. The 'pogroms' of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries may appear less cruel; but, though they were organized by the Russian secret police, it has been proved in the law-courts that the local population was quite ready to fall in with the suggestions of these agents.[2] The reasons for this hatred are partly economic—for the Jews are very successful middlemen between the Ukraine and other countries, and hence in possession of capital, which they lend at a high rate to the peasant—but are also racial, since the hatred between these two races is stronger than that between either Poles or Great Russians and the Jews. All the traditions of the steppe-country peasant are opposed to those of the Jewish townsman. This is shown by the facts that there is hardly any mixed Jewish-Ukrainian population, and that the Jews live chiefly in the towns and industrial settlements where Russians and Poles predominate. The Jews came to the Ukraine on the first wave of colonization from Poland in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

According to data obtained in 1897, the percentage 795
of the Jewish population in the Governments of the 162
Ukraine was as follows: Volhynia, 13·2 per cent.; Podolia, 12·24 per cent.; Kiev, 12·09 per cent.; Kherson, 12 per cent.; Chernigov, 5 per cent.;

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[1] *Jawein Mesula: a Chronicle of Events from 1648 to 1652.* First printed in Vienna, 1656.

[2] I. Luchitski, *Legal Speeches concerning the Jewish Pogroms*, Kiev, 1908 (in Russian).

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

of Volhynia and Podolia conditions are better, and 421
the peasants have larger holdings, though only 16 per cent. own above five *desyatines*; in Kharkov, 33 per cent. own above five *desyatines*. In no place do the Ukrainian peasants equal in land-ownership the German and Czech colonists. The average holding among the German colonists is from 10 to 12 *desyatines*, and they specialize in cattle-breeding. The Czechs are concentrated in south-western Volhynia (in the districts of Dubno, Rovno, and Lutsk); and their average holding is 13 *desyatines*. The peasants' holdings are in a striking contrast to the big estates. In the Kiev Government there are some 43 estates of above 5,000 *desyatines* each, mostly owned by the nobles (some of them descendants of the old independent dukes, *knaz*) of Russian, Polish, or German nationality.

About 10 per cent. of the inhabitants of the Govern- 162
ments of Yekaterinoslav, Kherson, Taurida, Kiev, and Chernigov are occupied in industries other than agricultural. Trade occupies between 6 and 7 per cent. of the population in the Governments of Kherson, Kiev, Podolia, and Taurida.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

Ukrainian Nationalism.—The feeling of nationality, 186
as it exists to-day, dates from Chmielnicki's rising in 515
1648. The old history of Kiev-Russ is common to Great Russians, White Russians, and the Ukrainians (Little Russians), and has been continued after the Tatar invasions chiefly in Great Russia, while the Ukraine ever since has been subject to one of her neighbours. Since Chmielnicki's time, the Ukrainian nationality has made progress only in one direction, i.e. in producing a small but energetic *intelligentsia*, which does not consider itself Russian or Polish in addition to being Ukrainian, though it is obliged to seek its higher education in Russia, Poland, and other foreign countries. The national feeling of this class is

186 different from that of the bulk of the peasants, whose
565 local differences in dialects and customs are sufficiently great to obscure the idea of national unity understood by the *intelligentsia*. Not only has the Dnieper peasant no conception of a Ruthenian in Eastern Galicia, but he knows very little more about the Don or Kuban Ukrainian. But all these peasants, now as in the time of Chmielnicki, are conscious of their social and economic disabilities, and also of the fact that all the business and management of the country is in the hands of rich and educated foreigners.

Hence, the so-called feeling of nationality of the Ukrainian peasant is based on social unrest; and nationalist enthusiasm was aroused on that ground by the Rada and the Soviets of 1917, as it had been by Chmielnicki 250 years before. As soon as Chmielnicki's rising became political rather than social in aim, it failed, and even its foreign supporters did not save it. The same can be said about the nationalist movement of the Rada Directory of the Ukrainian *intelligentsia*. It went down before the Soviets because it was too political, while the Soviets are more intent upon social conditions.

The military strength of the Ukrainian nationalists is less now than it was in the time of Chmielnicki, since the strong military class of original Cossacks on which Chmielnicki relied either disappeared through successful Russian repressions or else amalgamated with the present Cossack community of the Don and the Kuban, which is only partly Ukrainian and has different political and social predilections. On the other hand, the rivalry between Russia, Austria, and the Poles, and the respective propaganda of the three rivals, have created among the *intelligentsia* of the Ukraine a feeling of self-confidence and a political programme that surpass Chmielnicki's and Mazeppa's dreams. In the struggle between Nationalist and Socialist interests, the bulk of the population has in the last three years given precedence to the latter; and it is still uncertain whether the peasants will care to support the ideals of the *intelligentsia*, if the latter cannot provide 186 them with the economic advantages to which they 565 aspire.

The *Ukrainian territory* claimed by the propagandist literature, i. e. from San to Don, never formed a political unit, either independently or under the sway of any empire. It is a well-defined geographical unit with most favourable economic conditions, but the people living in these lands do not form a homogeneous nation of one linguistic, social, and cultural type. The essentially Ukrainian country lies on both sides of the Dnieper. In the Don and Kuban regions, the Ukrainian colonists were preceded by the Great-Russian colonists, in Eastern Galicia by the Poles. But it is true that during the time of the greatest Russian oppression Eastern Galicia played the part of Piedmont for the *intelligentsia* from the Russian Ukraine. The nine [162] Governments grouped by the Russian Administration into (1) South-west Territory (Podolia, Volhynia, and Kiev), (2) Malorossiya (Chernigov, Poltava, and Kharkov), and (3) Novorossiya (only Kherson, Taurida, and Yekaterinoslav out of the five Governments of Novorossiya), have a population which is preponderantly Ukrainian in the rural districts; in the towns the Ukrainians are outnumbered by Jews, Russians, Poles, Greeks, Germans, Italians, &c.

It is remarkable how small a part is played by the 184 *intelligentsia* in industry and trade, in the Church, and 565 in legal and educational institutions. All Ukrainians are agriculturists, but in most cases they are merely labourers, not concerned with the management of agricultural industries. Since 1905, however, the co-operative societies have brought to the Ukrainian peasant the social education which the *mir* gave to the Great-Russian peasant in the two last centuries. The claim, therefore, that these nine Governments are Ukrainian means that people speaking various Ukrainian dialects and having similar customs inhabit them, though, so far, they have not managed it politically, socially, or culturally, and are hardly likely to do

10: Weinstein S-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1
SovietUnion R1

LANGUAGE AND EDUCATION IN THE SOVIET UKRAINE[1]

By HAROLD R. WEINSTEIN

000 One of the most painful lessons mankind has learned since the rise
of nationalism in the last hundred years is that language diversity
fosters conflicts between states and among peoples living within one
state but speaking different languages. Conversely, language uniformity
makes for unity. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
most governments have strongly desired such uniformity. In some
countries, as in America, assimilation into one language has been
achieved by allowing national groups the free use of their native
languages, and by relying upon the advance of education and of
u commercial and industrial development to break down the barriers
563 those languages erect between various linguistic groups. In the period
191 before the First World War, many governments sought language uniformity
SU by forcibly repressing the languages of minorities, by Germanizing,
563 Magyarizing, Russifying their national minority groups. Of
191 no government was this more true than of that of the old Russian
Empire, in which the "minorities" — that is, the groups other than
the Great-Russians — constituted over half the population. But by
attempting to suppress the languages of the Ukrainians, Georgians,
u Tatars and so on, the Tsarist régime did not achieve its goal of
●[186] unity; rather, it aroused a host of nationalist movements which put
language repression first on the bill of grievances against the government
and which helped drive Tsarism to its death.

u Lenin believed that the Tsarist method defeated its own ends and
829 that the goal of unity had to be approached by other paths. First of
191 all, literacy would have to precede any attempt to obtain language
SU uniformity: as long as none other than oral means of communication
829 existed between the minorities and the Russians, the Russian language
191 could not really permeate the minorities and break down their
national horizons. Literacy, of course, could be most easily reached
by universal education in the minority languages themselves. Then,
once the art of reading was mastered and great cultural vistas were
opened to the minorities, they would be in a position to go ahead and
adopt Russian as a second language. The Russian language would
appeal to them because it is the language of a stronger culture than

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122 [1] This study is based on material gathered for a book on the policy of the Soviet Union with regard to national minorities. The book is being written under a grant from the Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences, and it is being sponsored by Professors Carlton J. H. Hayes and Geroid Tanquary Robinson of Columbia University.

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languages as the media of instruction; and the study of Russian as a separate subject.

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In setting out to nationalize education, the Soviet régime has encountered many obstacles: Russian nationalists — and there were some even among the Communists — opposed the policy; text-books and teachers were scarce; and the more backward minorities did not

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even possess a written language of their own. As the exigencies of space prevent the investigation of all the problems encountered in the nationalization of education, this study will be limited to examining the policy as applied in the Ukraine; that is, to the Ukrainians and

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[563]

to the other minorities — Poles, Jews, Germans and others — living among them. The Ukrainians, it may be noted, are the largest minority in the Soviet Union; they are the most significant from the point of view of current international relations; and the difficulties encountered by the nationalization policy in the Ukraine were sufficiently complex to provide some insight into the policy as a whole.

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Among the Ukrainians, as among the other minorities, the nationalization of education has stemmed from the program on the national question which Lenin formulated before the overthrow of the Tsarist régime. This program, intended to overcome minority nationalism, had to assign a conspicuous place to the language question. To many Ukrainians the treatment of their language by the Imperial government appeared even more onerous than the political oppression which was meted out to Russians and Ukrainians alike. The Ukrainian language was regarded by the government as an uncouth dialect of the Russian language; it was harried from the schools; and it was badgered throughout the literary, scholarly and theatrical worlds. The resulting Ukrainian nationalism, Lenin believed, was a threat to the international unity of the Ukrainian and Russian masses, a unity he regarded as essential for the achievement of socialism; and this Ukrainian nationalism would have to be met with the promise of linguistic equality for the Ukrainians and for all other nationalities. This conception was written into the program on the national question adopted by the Bolshevik wing of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party in 1913, a program which was first intended to apply to a period of "capitalist democracy" but was retained after the establishment of the Soviet government in 1917. The first point in the program stated: "Insofar as national peace is possible in a capitalist society, which is based on exploitation, profits and wrangling, such peace is obtainable only by means of a thoroughly, consistently democratic, republican governmental structure, guaranteeing complete equality to all nations and languages, and by the inclusion in the con-

10: Weinstein S-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

stitution of a basic law nullifying every kind of privilege of one nation 871
and every kind of violation of the right of the national minorities."[2] 191

While defending this point in the program, Lenin explained that he 186
did not desire to turn Russia into a "Babelesque confusion" in which
one national group could not communicate with another; and he 829
thought that sooner or later the minorities of Russia would become assimilated, probably through adopting the Russian language he cherished so highly and which he expected would be taught as a subject in the schools.[3] However, Lenin argued, such assimilation could be achieved not by compulsion, not by the Tsarist method of repression, but by the natural process of commercial and industrial development and intercourse. To force the minorities to study the Russian language by "the use of the stick" merely estranged them and turned them against that language. If, on the other hand, the minorities were allowed to use their own language in education, they would willingly accept the study of Russian also and would, as in America, voluntarily use it because of its advantage in economic intercourse. Hence, wherever minorities lived compactly, their languages would be used as the medium of instruction in the schools; and where members of minorities were isolated among other nationalities, they would be given the opportunity to study the language of their nationality.

Although the Provisional Government, ushered in by the February Revolution in 1917, intended to alter the policy of Russification and proclaimed linguistic freedom for the minorities, it did not succeed in overcoming the hostility of the minority nationalists who were then rapidly extending their influence among the peasantry. The Provisional Government, for example, wrangled with the Ukrainian nationalists not only on the question of political autonomy, but also on the expediency of Ukrainizing some of the army units; and in the Ukraine itself the former Tsarist officials remaining at their posts obstructed the Ukrainization of the school system. As the discontent of the peasantry with the land policy of the Provisional Government fed the flames of Ukrainian nationalism, Lenin was more than ever resolved to overcome minority hostility by, among other things, establishing linguistic equality.

After the October Revolution had put the Bolsheviks in control, the Soviet régime introduced into the schools the policy of national

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[2] *VKP(b) v Rezoljucijach i Rešenijach S"ezdov, Konferencii i Plenumov Ts.K., 1898–1932* (Moscow, 1933), I, 238–240.

[3] For the views of Lenin contained in this paragraph, see Lenin, V. I., *Sočinenija* (Moscow, 1935), XVI, pp. 509, 551–554, 595–596; XVII, pp. 66, 89, 114–115, 133, 139–154, 178–181, 361.

871 languages as the medium of instruction. Lenin stigmatized as "Great-
191 Russian Chauvinists," those people in the Commissariat of Education
●186 who favored teaching only in the Russian language; and referring
827 specifically to the Ukrainians in a resolution he wrote for the Central Committee of the Communist Party, he stated that if the Bolsheviks wanted to overcome the hostility of the Ukrainian peasants (a hostility quite clearly evident during the Civil War from 1918 to 1920), the Ukrainian language could not be pushed into the background of either educational or political life.[4] Stalin argued that education in the minority languages would facilitate the raising of the cultural level of the minorities to that of the Russians and would thereby forge bonds of union between them.[5] The educational policy for the minorities, he stated, must have it as its aim: "to develop national culture; to build up a wide network of courses and schools for both general education and vocational and technical training, teaching in the native languages, for the purpose of training Soviet, party, trade-union and economic cadres from among the native people."[6] These views of Lenin and Stalin were incorporated into party resolutions, adopted in the decade after 1919, on education and on national policy generally.[7]

871 It was, of course, much easier to make speeches and pass resolutions than to realize the aims set forth therein. Even in the relatively advanced Ukraine it promised to be very difficult to establish a "wide network" of schools giving instruction in the national languages. The heritage of buildings, school supplies and qualified teachers bequeathed by Tsarism was meager in comparison with the needs of a régime aspiring to universal education: in the Kiev Educational District, for example, only twenty-two of every thousand people attended school in 1913.[8] Educational facilities, moreover, were reduced by the disastrous Civil War, during which constant fighting, famine, typhus, cholera, economic collapse and bankruptcy levied a high tax on the educational system; and the lack of funds and personnel long hampered its recuperation.[9] By 1924 the system approached its status

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[4] *Ibid.*, XXIV, pp. 155, 552–554.

[5] J. Stalin, *Stati i Reči ob Ukraine* (Kiev, 1936), pp. 111–112, 194–195.

[6] J. Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question* (New York, 1935), p. 208.

[7] *VKP(b) v Rezoljucijach* . . . I, pp. 155, 637.

[8] The Kiev Educational District comprised the provinces of Kiev, Poltava, Podolia, Volhynia and Chernigov. The number of pupils is from Ministerstvo Narodnogo Prosvieshcheniia,, *Vsepodanneiši Otčet, 1912* (St. Petersburg, 1915), p. 196. The estimate of the population is from Centralny Statističeski Komitet, *Ežegodnik Rossii, 1912* (St. Petersburg, 1913), pp. 33–59.

[9] For the condition of the educational system up to 1924, see *Urkainska Socialistična Radianska Respublika. Zbirnik Spravozdan Narodnich Komisarijativ i centralnich ustanov U.S.R.R. ta Upolnivaženich Narodnich Komisarijativ R.S.F.S.R. 5-mu Vseukrainskomu Z'izdovi Rad Ukraini. Otčet Narodnogo Komisariati Osviti U.S.R.R. za 1920 rik* (Kharkov,

In 1933 Zatonski censured the nationalists in the Commissariat 871
of Education for neglecting the teaching of Russian which, because 191
it was the means of all-Union communication, "should be taught in 656
all the Ukrainian schools and in the schools of other nationalities."[84] 186
But the real interest in the teaching of Russian appeared in 1937 and 1938, when the Commissariat was again over-hauled. During these years there was another intensified drive against Ukrainian nationalism, as well as against other varieties of opposition to the Party's policies and against every manifestation of inefficiency. Even Zatonskii was removed from his post. And while the renewed attack on nationalism in general was proceeding, a large amount of criticism was directed against the Commissariat of Education for its neglect of the Russian language as a subject of study. The critics — one of whom was E. N. Postnikova, a teacher and a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. — stated that because of "the wrecking activities of the bourgeois nationalists," there was a higher percentage of failures in the courses on Russian language and literature than in any other subject.[85] In the first place, not enough time was being allotted to the study of Russian. Secondly, there was a dearth of text-books and of Russian literature in the school libraries: even such works as Gorki's *Mother*, Tolstoi's *War and Peace*, Goncharov's *Oblomov* and the collected works of Lenin were to be found only in Ukrainian translations. Thirdly, the Commissariat had not devoted sufficient attention to methods of teaching Russian and had failed to provide methodological programs for the guidance of teachers. Finally, the knowledge of Russian possessed by the teachers themselves was entirely inadequate; even the graduates of the pedagogical institutes did not know the language well enough to teach it. Since, the critics argued, the pupils themselves were strongly inclined to study Russian, the Commissariat should provide more thorough preparation of teachers, assign more time for this subject, provide more text-books and more Russian literature.

As a result of these criticisms the re-organized Commissariat pro- 871
vided new programs, several of which are in the hands of the author, 191
and it increased the time allotted to the study of Russian. The num- 656
ber of hours specified for the study of languages during the entire period of attendance in the various types of schools, according to the

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[84] *Visti*, Aug. 23, 1933.

[85] *Za Kommunističeskoe Prosveščenie* (organ of the commissariats of education of the union republics), May 16, 1937; *Učitelskaia Gazeta* (organ of the commissariats of education of the union republics), Feb. 27, 1938, Mar. 19, 1938, Mar. 29, 1938.

11: Obermaier--82 J-3(no date)1942 RD1 Ukraine RD1

[Ruthenians]

728 ies in Austria and boundaries of the various gub-
631 ermyas in Russia./

/81/ Fair Play

•186 In the winter of 1938/39 the Ukrainian peasants in Poland were no longer recognizable. If after the pacification of 1930 they went about for many years bent and timid like beaten dogs, they now carried their heads higher. It was as though they felt a fresh breeze, and whenever they had business with Polish officials they omitted expressions of due respect, in fact they became cynical. They stood around in groups, talked in the most animated fashion, nudged each other meaningfully and sometimes laughed out loud.

[186] 101 642 What happened? Since the end of October 1938, there was the "Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy" beyond the Carpathians. There on the southern slopes of the Carpathians live the Ukrainian tribes of Lemki, Boyki and the Huzul. On poor soil they eke out a precarious living as small farmers, woodsmen and shepherds. In the warmer season many of them hire themselves out as harvest workers in the fertile Hungarian lowlands, and there they also trade in carriage grease. Before the First World War they shipped salt to Warsaw and fruit even as far as Moscow. Ruthenia, as their little country was once called, always belonged to the Kingdom bearing the crown of Stephen. After the downfall of the Hapsburg monarchy Czech insatiability succeeded in having "Carpatho-Russia" - that is what Ruthenia was now called - assigned to the Czechs by the edict of Saint-Germain. The "autonomy" which the little country was promised on paper in the edict remained an unfulfilled dream for its inhabitants. "Carpatho-Russia" was a province abounding in forests, which Prague could and would exploit. It was only after the solution of the Sudeten

[Ruthenians]

101 642 crisis when the centralistic /82/power of the Czechs slackened and the Slovaks stubbornly insisted on their autonomy, that the "Carpatho-Ukrainians" - this is the name they henceforth adopted - were also granted a certain autonomy.

•186 This seeming independence, nothing more than a weak, short-lived light which the Hungarian storm was to blow out only a few months later, in March 1939, sufficed, however to nourish vigorously the hopes of West Ukrainians north of the Carpathians. Therefore Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy was more important to them than sunshine and rain. This was the great event which they were discussing and on account of which they even neglected their fields. Just as all Ukrainians from the Kuban to the Carpathians honor the same heroes in their common folksongs, the seafarers of the Rus and the Cossacks of the sech, just as they shared the experience and the suffering of the wars of liberation between 1917 and 1923, so they now regarded as their own good fortune the fact that a piece of land, if only a small one, was apparently under independent Ukrainian administration.

In Ruska Lane and on the "Ring" in Lwów the newly-awakened Ukrainian self-awareness made itself felt in demonstrations. In the middle of October and the beginning of November 1938, the Ukrainians of Lwów protested against the foes of the "Silver Land". Not only in the Galician metropolis, but also in Przemysl, in Stryj, in all of West Ukrainia, the Ukrainians mustered: cries of abuse against Poland and cries of "Slava Ukrajini!" - "Glory to - the Ukraine!" - were heard, and the national anthem was repeated innumerable times. It did not cool the hot passions to have Poles on these occasions beat to death a few Ukrainians or shoot them down. The fever of hope that they might shake off Polish domination seized them. Ukrainian daily papers filled their front pages exclusively with reports from Carpatho-Ukraine.

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[Volhynia] [Ruthenia]

•186 Nothing happened there which their special reporters did not describe in detail. In neighboring
Volhynia which, for easier Polonization, was
separated from Galicia by a Chinese wall, /83/
and where Ukrainian newspapers from Lwów were forbidden, people paid two zloty, the equivalent of
186 two marks, for the smuggled papers. Radios were
208 much in demand[1] and the cooperatives which ordinarily sold shoelaces, underwear and soap, were
suddenly supposed to furnish radio sets. The
members wanted it. They brought their zloty, and
when these did not suffice they paid in chickens
and eggs. Half the village listened to the reports
from a friendly broadcasting station in the Ukrainian language, picked up by a common receiving set.
The people did not mind at all that they were
obliged to stand or squat as close together as
sardines in a can.

The "audition" cost five groschen which amounts to two and one-half pfennig. Anyone who had no money paid with an egg for news taken from the ether. What they heard on these occasions were sometimes their own wish-dreams. The autonomous government, which set up its residence first in Uzhgorod and then, until the country's reintegration into Hungary, in Khust, had great plans. The listeners discussed this with great animation.

648 The peasants who could write set down on
186 paper the result of long deliberation about exist-
208 ing conditions as well as their wishes for the
future, in the form of letters and sent them to
the Polish President as well as to the Carpatho-Ukrainian Prime Minister Voloshyn and to a foreign
statesman from whom they hoped to get help. Most
of these letters got only as far as the office of
648 the voivode. Thereupon Poland's fist became day
by day more oppressive. The autonomy of the
neighboring small country, however meager it was,
was a violent shock to Polish power. Warsaw
desired the quickest possible disappearance of
Carpatho-Ukraine. On December third the head of

[1] [i.e., 1938-39 among the Ukrainians in Volhynia -Andy.]

[Ruthenia]

648 the "Camp of National Unity", General Skwarszynski, said in the Sejm: /the Polish parliament/ "... The common boundary with Hungary as a Danubian state and as a people traditionally friendly to us, corresponds not only to our feelings, but also to our interests. Therefore Hungary's aim to /84/ obtain Carpatho-Ukraine must be energetically supported by our foreign policy." The ● 196 speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament Mudryj protest- 648 ed against this Polish policy[1] at the same meeting: "We must not forget that the Ukrainian people, on the basis of common blood, common tradition and a common spirit feels itself to be a unified national organism, regardless of what state it lives in and under what governments it falls. No power will crush this feeling of national unity." (48)

48. "Osteuropa", January issue, 1931, page 260.

When Mudryj referred to the devastation caused by the "diversional detachments" in Carpatho-Ukraine, he was silenced.

000 Poland had a bad conscience. The Carpatho-Ukrainian question, unimportant though it was, made it nervous. The great power grew unsure of itself and from old habit tried to set force against the right to live. According to the Polish political thesis only "another dialect" is to separate the Ukrainians from the Poles. If one took away their Greek Orthodox religion and their Cryillic script, they would differ from the Poles merely by reason of their dialect.

197 However, the Ukrainians have changed tremendously since the days when Emperor Joseph II said, at the end of his journey through Galicia, which was freed after hundreds of years of Polish domination: "The peasant is an unfortunate creature possessing nothing but a human exterior and physical life." In the 150 years that Vienna was their capital, the Ukrainians experienced an ex-

[1] [i.e., 1935-39, to aid Hungary to obtain Carpatho-Ukraine - [illegible]]

[Ruthenia]

177 traordinary national, economic and cultural advance, and the war of liberation from 1918 to 1919 became indelibly fixed in their national consciousness. Volhynia, too, awakened as a nation.

186 648 N wonder, then, that after a mock autonomy was granted by the Polish parliament on September 22, 1922 - in accordance with the request of the Supreme Council of June 25, 1919 - and after the conference of the Parisian emissary /85/ of March 15, 1923, which adjudicated Galicia to the Poles, no wonder that the Ukrainians in Poland have continued to fight against Warsaw's rule with other means. The Ukrainians are helpless against drastic measures such as the introduction of Polish civilian administration or the closing of Ukrainian schools. They suffer national losses especially in the parcelling of large estates, which brings new Polish settlers into the overpopulated country and which leaves the Ukrainian small farmer out in the cold. The Poles have already succeeded in pushing back the western Ukrainian boundary by about thirty kilometers; they are successfully Polonizing Polesia where, because of the extreme backwardness and poverty of the inhabitants, hunger is a stronger motivating power than anything else. In 1905 the Ukrainians already lost 250,000 citizens in Lublin, which was then Russian, and which, after the first World War, became Polish. These people who were forcibly converted to the orthodox faith in 1870 went over to the Roman Catholic Church 35 years later; for their return to the Greek Catholic Church to which they had belonged before that was denied them. But becoming Roman Catholic means becoming Polonized. Once the Polish clergyman has set foot in a town, he is soon followed by the teacher, Polish societies are founded and the village is isolated from the Ukrainian neighborhood as from the area of infection.

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668 661 of the triumph and success of "brotherly" cooperation among various nations under the leadership of the great Russian people and the "wisest" Stalin. Nevertheless, these proclamations of co-operation were soon negated by existing facts. Again *Pravda* reported new anti-Soviet activity of the "enemies of the People" in the youth organization (Comsomol) in the Ukraine:

> There is uncovered again the unseemly sight of the work of counter-revolutionaries and spies within the Comsomol of the Ukraine. Masking themselves in a base fashion, they carry on disruptive counter-revolutionary work. They consciously fouled the cadres of the Comsomol and the propaganda apparatus and they ruined political education. They served the fascists, conducted spying activities and prepared sabotage and terroristic acts. . . . These enemies of the people placed their own men in executive posts. When these men fell at one post they were immediately transferred into another region.[45]

The resistance of the Ukrainians to Moscow's domination could not be denied. However, such statements had double meaning and were produced by the Soviet press in order to justify the policy of strict centralization and Russification in the Ukraine. Even such a loyal Moscow servant as Liubchenko, President of the Soviet Ukraine, was by now considered as a dangerous and undesirable individual since he was a Ukrainian and could hinder, as Skrypnyk did in the past, the realization of the Soviet Russian policy. For this reason he was compelled to commit suicide on September 11, 1937. In the familiar Bolshevik manner, the Soviet press informed the people that Liubchenko was involved in anti-Soviet connections and, "evidently" afraid to face his responsibility before the Ukrainian people for betraying their interests, had ended his life. Such an interpretation of Liubchenko's death—who in 1934 had praised the GPU for its successful work in "totally" destroying the "nationalist" groups within the Ukrainian Communist Party—gave the Soviet regime the "legal" right to replace most Ukrainians holding higher positions in the Soviet administration by Russians whom the Kremlin could trust. Nevertheless, passive resistance to the existing order was continually felt and could not be wiped out entirely.

• 186 In 1938 world tension and fear of World War II increased. Therefore, even the rise of national consciousness in the small Carpatho-Ukraine (which after 1918 became a part of Czechoslovakia and gradually developed into an autonomous entity with its own national Ukrainian Government) caused great concern in the Kremlin. 186

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[45] *Pravda*, July 25, 1937.

In order to diminish the fear of insecurity, Khruschev, Stalin's new deputy in the Ukraine, declared that Soviet patriotism prevailed in the Ukraine and that the people were filled with hatred for all bourgeois nationalists, all those "spies, Liubchenkos, Khvylovists, Zatonskis and other evil spirits."[46] In reality, however, Khruschev was not certain of Ukrainian loyalty to the Kremlin. For this reason, he considered it necessary to remind the people of their indebtedness to Moscow for the realization of their dreams:

> Ukrainian people had struggled for many years with the Tsarist autocracy, landlords and capitalists, demanding their right to develop their own culture, to possess their own schools, publish their own literature and to learn in their own language. Only as a result of the October Socialist revolution, as a result of Lenin-Stalin national policy and Stalin's personal interest in the development of the Ukrainian culture, did we win a world-wide historical victory in the field of cultural achievements.[47]

The invasion of Carpatho-Ukraine by the Hungarian Army on March 15, 1939 was received by Moscow with relief. Stalin interpreted Hitler's approval of the Hungarian occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine to mean that Germans had abandoned their plan to invade the Soviet Union in the near future. On August 23, 1939, the Soviet Government concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany. This pact was followed by the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939 and the Red Army invasion on September 17 of Eastern Poland, which was inhabited mostly by Ukrainians and Byelo-Russians. The old and practically abandoned Soviet declaration of the right of nations to self-determination was once again proclaimed as valid so as legally to justify the right of the Soviet Union to intervene and to "liberate brothers", Ukrainians and Byelo-Russians, from Polish oppression.

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On June 22, 1941, the German Army invaded the Soviet Union.

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[46] *XVIII. Sjezd Wsesojuznoji Communisticheskoji Partiyi (B), March 10-21, 1939,* Stenograficheskij otchet (Partizdat, Moscow, 1939), p. 169.

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 173.

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov 21, 1949]

666 Art. 121. Elections of deputies to Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR are held by election districts on the following bases:

[634] in elections to regional Soviets - one deputy for every 15,000 to 30,000 of the population, depending upon its size;

[630] in elections to district and area Soviets - one deputy for every 1,000 of the population; in a district or area whose population does not exceed 25,000, twenty-five deputies are elected, and in a district or area whose population exceeds 60,000, not more than sixty deputies are elected;

[632] in elections to city Soviets or city district Soviets - one deputy for every 350 to 900 of the population, depending upon its size; in a city or city district whose population does not exceed 12,000, thirty-five deputies are elected;

in elections to the Kiev and Kharkov city Soviets - one deputy for every 1,000 of the population;

[633] in elections to village or settlement Soviets - one deputy for every 100 of the population; in a village or settlement whose population does not exceed 1,000, nine deputies are elected, and where the population exceeds 2,500, not more than twenty-five deputies.

The basis of representation for each regional, district, city, village and settlement Soviet of Working People's Deputies is fixed in the "Ordinance Concerning Elections to Regional, District, City, Village and Settlement Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR," within the range of the bases of representation indicated in the present article.

Art. 122. Candidates for elections are nominated according to electoral district.

The right to nominate candidates is secured to public organizations and societies of the working people: Communist Party organizations, trade unions, co-operatives, youth organizations and cultural societies.

Art. 123. It is the duty of every deputy to report to his electors on his work and on the work of the Soviet of Working People's Deputies, and he is liable to be recalled at any time upon decision of the majority of the electors in the manner established by law.

Chapter X. Arms, Flag, Capital

186 Art. 124. The state arms of the Ukrainian SSR are a sickle and hammer of gold in relief, placed crosswise, handles down against a red background in the rays of the rising sun, and surrounded by ears of wheat, which are placed symmetrically, from bottom to top, forming a circle. Between the tops of the ears of wheat is a red star. At the bottom of the wreath are the words, "Ukrainian SSR" on a red band, and at the bottom of the ears of corn the words, "Workers of all Countries Unite!" in the Russian language on the right, and in the Ukrainian language on the left.

Art. 125. The state flag of the Ukrainian SSR is of cloth divided into two horizontal bands of color: the upper band, in red, is two-thirds of the width of the flag, and the lower band, in azure, is one-third of the width of the flag. In the upper part of the flag, about one-third of the distance from the staff, are a hammer and sickle of gold and above them a five-pointed star with a gold border.

The relation of width to length of the flag is 1:2.

Art. 126. The Capital of the Ukrainian SSR is the City of Kiev.

Chapter XI. Procedure for Amending the Constitution

642 646 Art. 127. The Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR may be amended only by decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR adopted by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the votes of the Supreme Soviet.

101 among themselves. They can be divided into three well-defined tribes
162 —the Lemki on the Slovak border, the Boiki in the centre, and the
Huculs in the eastern tip of Ruthenia.

The most interesting tribe are the Huculs. They have preserved
186 their tribal characteristics better than their kinsmen. Their standard of
education is higher, and they are more conscious and proud of their
national individuality. When the Hungarians invaded Ruthenia after
the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, the Huculs offered the stiffest
resistance, and during the war they were the core of the partisan force
fighting against the totalitarian powers. Like the other Ruthenian
463 mountaineers, the Huculs are largely wood-cutters and raftsmen. But
342 they are distinguished by their skill as carpenters and wood-carvers.
This is clearly reflected in their mode of life. Their wooden-cottages
are neatly built and furnished and impress the visitor by their scrupulous
cleanliness. Their tribal individuality and artistic skill find
expression in the numerous carvings with which they like to decorate
their unpainted houses.

181 The neighbouring Boiki have also, to some extent, preserved their
pride in racial individuality, and their mode of life, though more primi-
511 tive, has some interesting features. They are kind-hearted, sincere and
hospitable, in spite of their poverty. Though less proud than the
Huculs, they fly into a temper when crossed, and impulsive outspoken-
342 ness is one of their traits. They live in cottages and huts which they
like to paint in blue and brown, and this makes their exterior rather
attractive. But the interior does not always live up to the façade. The
better-off Boiki manage to live in fairly decent cottages with two or
more rooms, but the huts of the poor often consist of one room only—
a dark room with no chimney, one small window, and some roughly
352 made furniture. Some have no bedsteads in the true sense of the
word; along the whole wall of the room one may find a long "plank-bed"
where the grown-ups sleep at the one end and the children at the
other. When the children grow up they sleep on separate beds of the
same kind. Unlike the Hucul houses, the Boiki huts have no wooden
342 floors. The domestic animals often share the same room with their
511 masters in winter, sleeping on the bare earth. For many families such
a room is therefore a kitchen, living room, bedroom, hall and stable
in one.

511 Much the same applies to the Lemki tribe who live partly on
Slovak territory. They are the poorest Ruthenian tribe and their racial
181 character has undergone a certain deterioration. Their standard of
life is often appalling, the hygiene leaves much to be desired, and they
have the largest number of illiterates, though some improvement has
taken place under the Republic

000 Mountainous Ruthenia is a country of traditional costumes. The

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
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S.U. Soviet Russia has often followed in the footsteps of Czarist Russia,
523 but as far as the appraisal of the Ukraine is concerned there is no
635 continuity between old and new Russia. Czarist Russia simply denied
UK. the existence of a Ukrainian nation and denounced all Ukrainian national
698 feeling as 'South Russian separatism'. Soviet policy, on the other hand,
175 has encouraged Ukrainian nationalism in as far as it was able to serve Russia's territorial expansion. The most spectacular territorial advance which the Soviet Union has made since 1939 was that realized under the slogan 'unification of all Ukrainian lands in one national State'. In the course of this unification the Soviet Union not only re-annexed territories which Russia had lost in the Civil War but also occupied territories which had ceased to be 'Russian' ever since the Middle Ages, such as Eastern Galicia with the city of Lvov.

UK. There cannot be the slightest doubt about the existence of a Ukrainian
[101] nation which some Russian nationalists tried to deny in the past, but it would be a mistake to consider the Ukrainians, despite their numbers, as a nation equal in character to the French, Italians, Spaniards, etc., as the extremists among the Ukrainian nationalists would like to represent it. The Ukrainians cannot claim to be historically and culturally a nation so complete that they could afford to cut themselves loose from their Russian neighbours and exist without them.

All foreign invaders fighting Russia had illusions in this respect; they all believed in a separation of Ukraine and Muscovy and conducted their political warfare accordingly. The Swedish King, Charles XII, allied himself with the Ukrainian Cossack Hetman Mazeppa; Napoleon came to Russia with the project of a Ukrainian State, 'Napoleonide', cutting Russia off from the Black Sea and the Dardanelles. The Third Reich of Adolf Hitler also tried to play up the Ukrainian issue against Great Russia.

'LITTLE RUSSIA' AND 'NEW RUSSIA'

UK. There is every justification in the demand for a genuinely autonomous
101 Ukraine but there is no logic and no life in an anti-Russian Ukrainian
● 186 nationalist ideology. Neither Russian and Ukrainian history, nor the
538 area of Russian and Ukrainian settlement, nor even Russian and Ukrainian literature can be separated from each other. Gogol, for instance, who wrote in Russian only, can be claimed by the Ukrainians not only because he was born in 'Little Russia', as the Ukraine used to be called in Czarist times, but also because some of his great works are devoted to his homeland, including the most Ukrainian literary work *Taras Bulba*. The Ukrainians have failed to produce any Ukrainian-writing poet or writer who even approximates to the importance of a Gogol.

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Nor is Gogol an isolated example. Count Alexey Tolstoy too belongs 101
to some extent to the Ukraine and no Ukrainian poet has succeeded in [186]
paying to his homeland a more beautiful lyrical tribute than Tolstoy's [538]

Were the Ukraine 'Little Russia' only, the land of the Cossacks, the problem would be more straightforward; but the Ukraine is, apart from minor territories, at least Little Russia plus New Russia. New Russia comprises those territories along the shores of the Black Sea which were incorporated into the Russian Empire for the most part under Catherine the Great. It was only by the amalgamation of Little Russia with a large part of New Russia that the Ukraine obtained a sea-coast and was able to include within its borders places like Odessa, Kherson, Mariupol and Nikolayev whose history was in no way linked with that of the Ukrainian Cossack Hetmans. New Russia became a true microcosm of Europe. [167]
Just as the ancient and medieval history of New Russia is a mosaic of the history of many peoples which had settled on the northern shores of the Black Sea, traded with the goods and products of its hinterlands and founded states, a history of Greeks and Scythians, Khazars, Goths, Genoese and Tartars, so too the history of modern New Russia is a tale of all sorts of races. People from many lands transformed the steppe into arable soil, built ports and railway lines and developed the industry of the Donets Basin. New Russia was a little America in the sense of being a melting-pot of European races, with the difference, however, that not all pioneer settlers forgot the language of their forefathers in the Ukrainian-Russian surroundings.* The people who brought New Russia into being included sons of every nation of the Balkans, many Germans and even individual Frenchmen who assumed high administrative posts there. At least one Briton played a distinguished part in the development of New Russia, John Hughes, a pioneer of coal-mining in the Donets region, to whose initiative is due the foundation of the big industrial centre now called Stalino. (Until the early twenties the place was called after him 'Yuzovka'.)

UKRAINIAN DIASPORA IN THE U.S.S.R.

Whilst Russians and other peoples shared with the Ukrainians the credit 167
for the colonization of what is to-day the Ukrainian S.S.R., millions of Ukrainians now live dispersed all over the Soviet Union.

The Ukraine, being a densely populated country, was able to contri-

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* An ethnical group of colonists in New Russia, who were completely assimilated by their 563
Russian-Ukrainian surroundings, were the Serbs, of whom about 100,000 came to the Southern Ukraine between 1739 and 1752. The Serbs colonized two Ukrainian regions, one on the right bank of the Dnieper, originally called 'New Serbia', and the other in the Donets Basin, called 'Slavyanoserbia'. A century after the Serbian pioneer immigration into New Russia the Serb element could no longer be traced in any population statistics of the Russian Empire.

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THE UKRAINE

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According to the 1926 census there were but 8 per cent Great Russians 162
in the Ukraine, but these were mostly town-dwellers and proletarian 369
elements and thus were able to play a considerable part in the political history of the Ukrainian S.S.R. since, according to Bolshevik principles, city workers necessarily lead the peasants, and the towns the countryside.

The towns of the Ukraine during the inter-war period had been not only bi-national Russian-Ukrainian but tri-national Russian-Ukrainian-Jewish, with the Jews frequently gravitating culturally to the Russian side. In Kiev, the largest Ukrainian city, the Ukrainians were originally the smallest ethnical group of the three. The 1926 census showed that Kiev's population consisted of 25·4 per cent Ukrainians, 36·2 per cent Russians, 32·1 per cent Jews and 3 per cent Poles. After 1926 the balance improved in favour of the Ukrainians but basically Kiev remained a Ukrainian-Russian-Jewish city. Kharkov, almost equal in size to Kiev, had in 1933 48 per cent Ukrainian inhabitants, whilst there were 30·3 per cent Russians and 17·7 per cent Jews. Of all the big cities of the Ukraine, Odessa, the capital of 'New Russia' has always been the least Ukrainian. Even including Odessa's country district the Ukrainians accounted for only 41 per cent of the total population against 23 per cent Russians and 20 per cent Jews. In the city of Odessa there were 17·5 per cent Ukrainians against 38·6 per cent Russians and 36·4 per cent Jews. Dniepropetrovsk, the fourth largest city of the Ukraine, in 1933 comprised 36 per cent Ukrainians, 31·5 per cent Russians and 26·6 per cent Jews.

The drastic reduction in the number of Jews through Hitlerite massacres and evacuation during the war improved the position of the Ukrainians in the cities of the Western and Central Ukraine, but in the industrial regions of the Eastern Ukraine the Ukrainians cannot keep pace with the tempo of urbanization and the needs of manpower. The two eastern border provinces of the Ukraine, Voroshilovgrad and Stalino, making up the Donets Basin, are inhabited by an international working-class, in particular by a strong Russian element, and are steadily growing in importance in relation to the Ukraine as a whole. The population of the Stalino Province rose by 91 per cent between 1926 and 1939 and that of the Voroshilovgrad Province by 37 per cent during the same period. The growth of the Stalino Province can be even better assessed by comparing the numbers of inhabitants of its three largest towns in 1926 and 1939. Stalino, the provincial centre rose from 174,000 to 462,000, Makeyevka from 79,421 to 240,000, Mariupol from 64,000 to 222,000.

STALINIST CENTRALISM VERSUS UKRAINIAN AUTONOMY

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The fact that Russians and Ukrainians are from the historical, geograph- 631
ical and ethnical point of view objectively inseparable calls for a certain 186
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co-ordination of the affairs of the two peoples. The Bolshevik régime has failed to bring about this co-ordination. The Russian-Ukrainian union as determined by the constitutions of 1923 and 1936 amounted to a subordination of the Ukraine to Moscow and indirectly to the Great Russians.

The foundation of the U.S.S.R. on December 30th, 1922, constituted in itself a triumph for the Russian people and a defeat for the Ukrainians. It signified the end of the loose constitutional ties which during the first years of the Soviet régime existed between Great Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians and the peoples of Transcaucasia. A firm centralistic organization – the U.S.S.R. – took the place of the treaty relations between the R.S.F.S.R. and the Soviet Republics of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaidzhan. Stalin, in his capacity of Peoples Commissar for Nationalities, played a leading part in this process of transformation which rendered a great service to Russian nationalism but ignored the aspirations of the non-Russian peoples.

It is easy to understand why Stalin followed in the footsteps of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great in his desire for a strong centralistic Russian State. He knew the strength of local nationalism and distrusted many of the local Communists. He thought that the future of the Soviet Union could not be left in their hands and that Moscow, the capital of the Russian people, was the only suitable centre of gravity of the Soviet State. This is the psychological background against which the foundation of the U.S.S.R. has to be considered. Lenin was still alive when the U.S.S.R. was proclaimed and Stalin was then by no means all-powerful. That is why the discussions preceding the foundation of the Soviet Union took place in an atmosphere of comparative freedom. Both Stalin and his opponents clearly showed their cards.

The opposition to the formation of a centralized Soviet Union, as Stalin conceived it, was led by the Ukraine with the prominent participation of Georgia. The principal spokesman of the Ukraine in the discussion on constitutional issues was Khristian Rakovsky, an old Bolshevik, whom Stalin later on never ceased to consider as a dangerous 'wrecker'. Rakovsky was no Ukrainian himself, but a Bulgarian who at the First Congress of the Comintern in March 1919 represented the 'Revolutionary Balkan Federation'. There is no doubt that Rakovsky, strongly aided by the old Ukrainian Bolshevik, Mikola Skrypnik, proved to be an excellent defender of the interests of the Ukrainian and indirectly of all non-Russian communists of Soviet Russia.

Rakovsky and Skrypnik wanted to preserve the statehood of the Ukraine and opposed to Stalin's 'Union', a loose 'confederation' of Soviet Republics. Instead of Stalin's 'Soviet of Nationalities' Rakovsky proposed a 'Council of States'. He further rejected the establishment of the 'Presidium of the Central Executive Committee', which until the new Stalin Constitution of 1936 was the most powerful constitutional organ

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of the Soviet State and served the purposes of a centralistic leadership. The Ukrainians, led by Rakovsky and Skrypnik, also made efforts to keep their own Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, to maintain at least some degree of control over the railway system and postal services in their territory and in general to curtail the prerogatives conferred on the all-Union Peoples Commissariats.[3]

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The Ukrainians were defeated and Stalin got his centralistic constitution accepted which, in the long run, enabled him to rule in Kharkov and Kiev almost in the same way as in Moscow and Leningrad.

COMMUNIST IRREDENTA AND 'UKRAINIZATION' POLICY

Though ignoring the wishes of the Ukrainians regarding their constitutional status within the U.S.S.R., Stalin offered them a glittering consolation prize; the promise of a future Ukrainian State, to include all the Ukrainian lands which the peace settlement after the First World War had allocated to Rumania, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

This aim was to be achieved with the help of the Comintern and its policy on the national question. Many Ukrainians, though anti-Soviet 'bourgeois nationalists' at heart, were inclined to make peace outwardly with Bolshevism in the first years of the Soviet régime, because world-Communism stood for the most far-reaching fulfilment of Ukrainian national aspirations.

The Fifth World Congress of the Comintern in 1924 included ~~in~~ its resolution on the 'National Question in Central Europe and the Balkans' the following passage 'The Congress . . . considers it necessary for the Communist Parties of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania to launch the general slogan of separation of the Ukrainian lands from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, and their union with the Soviet Ukraine and through it, with the U.S.S.R.'. The congress was satisfied that the Communist Parties of Poland and Rumania had successfully promoted the demand for Ukrainian self-determination. From the details of the resolution it appeared that the frontiers of a future united Ukraine were to be drawn slightly to the west of the Russian-Polish border as fixed in 1945.[4]

The wish of certain groups of Ukrainian nationalists to come to terms with the Soviet régime was reinforced by an apparent readiness of the Soviet Government to grant to the Ukrainians a certain measure of freedom in the cultural field, provided that they recognized the totalitarian aspirations of the Communist Party. An expression of this policy of communist-nationalist co-operation was the fact that the historian of Ukrainian nationalism, Mikhail Hrushevsky, returned to Kiev in 1924 to take over the direction of the historical section of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.

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● 186 517 For the next few years Ukrainian intellectuals were absorbed with the cultural 'Ukrainization' of the Ukraine, for which Moscow gave a free hand while firmly controlling the posts of political command. The Ukrainian language came into its own, a scientific Ukrainian terminology was created, and Ukrainian book production had a boom.

THE FIRST PURGES

186 665 The Soviet authorities soon discovered that the Ukrainian nationalist renaissance could not be arrested halfway and that cultural nationalism was bound to lead to political nationalism. The Ukrainian nationalists on the other hand, found out that in a totalitarian State like the U.S.S.R. there could be no real freedom, not even for Ukrainian cultural nationalism. From 1926 onwards the contradictions between Ukrainian nationalism and the communist State became more and more noticeable. Before hitting out against the bourgeois Ukrainian nationalist groups which conspired against the Soviet régime, the Kremlin had to make order within the Ukrainian Communist Party itself. The latter had originated from the amalgamation of the Bolsheviks with a genuine home-grown communist movement, the Borotbists. They were a left-wing extremist group called after the Ukrainian émigré newspaper *Borotba* published in Geneva in 1915. From the ideological point of view they had much in common with Marshal Tito's Yugoslav communists. They insisted on unconditional national independence, but in every other respect their aims were indistinguishable from those of the Bolsheviks. In 1919 the Borotbists assumed the title of 'Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbists)' and applied for membership of the Communist International. Together with the Ukrainian Bolsheviks proper they formed the first Ukrainian Soviet Government, the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee which organized the fight against General Denikin's White Guards. Lenin valued the co-operation of the Borotbists and stated that the question of Ukrainian independence should be no reason for disunity between them and the Bolsheviks, the more so since a section of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks favoured an independent status for the Ukraine.[5] The merger of the two communist fractions in March 1920 was of great value to the Bolsheviks for the Borotbists exercised considerable influence on the Ukrainian masses.

The Borotbist traditions of Ukrainian communism explain to a considerable extent the particular strength of nationalist heresy within the Ukrainian Communist Party. The first Borotbist deviations were officially labelled as 'Khvylovy-ism' and 'Shumsky-ism' after Mikola Khvylovy, an outstanding Ukrainian writer and Oleksandr Shumsky, Minister of Education. Both Khvylovy and Shumsky scandalized orthodox communists in the middle of the twenties by their outspoken western

1/1 [Cf. cat. 186, pp. 129-130, 21: Kolarz --Analyst]

orientation. Khvylovy considered that Ukrainian literature should go 665
its own way and look towards Western Europe, no matter whether 186
bourgeois or proletarian. Shumsky advocated that the Ukrainian Communist Party should be independent of the Russian Communist Party.

This crisis within the Ukrainian Communist Party prompted the 661
Moscow Bolshevik leadership in 1926 to make one of Stalin's principal 665
assistants, L. M. Kaganovich, Ukrainian party secretary for a short
period during which the first great purge against the nationalist deviation 186
was carried out. Khvylovy was ejected from the party and Shumsky expelled from the territory of the Ukrainian S.S.R. When Khvylovy repented he was given another chance and re-admitted as a party member, but in 1933 he committed suicide after a new campaign against Ukrainian nationalism had been launched.

Admittedly the methods of repression in the Ukraine were comparatively liberal until 1929-30. From that time onwards the oppressive policy of the Soviet State overshadowed in the minds of the Ukrainian nationalists in the U.S.S.R. the contribution which Polish, Rumanian and Czech communists were ready to make for the establishment of a Greater Soviet Ukraine. Many Ukrainian nationalists became convinced
that national unity was less vital to the Ukrainians than cultural and [177]
political freedom, in particular that free intercourse with the West which
Moscow was unwilling to grant.

The Soviet State inflicted many heavy blows on the representatives 668
of the western orientation among the Ukrainians, but never vanquished 661
it entirely. In this struggle Ukrainian nationalism commanded an almost inexhaustible reservoir of resistance forces. Bloodshed and terror seemed incapable of stamping out the longing for spiritual freedom. Almost every year brought the discovery of a new conspiracy, a new series of trials, a new trend in national Ukrainian deviations. In 1929 the G.P.U. discovered the 'Spilka Vyzvolenia Ukrainy', the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine', in 1931 the 'Ukrainian National Centre', in 1933 the 'Ukrainian Military Organization' (UVO).

The offensive by the central Government against the Ukraine's trends [814]
towards a more independent existence was conducted not only in the political sphere but also in the field of culture, where the régime had originally granted some scope to Ukrainian nationalism. One of the main bulwarks of Ukrainian nationalism was the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The history section of the Academy had turned out to be so anti-Bolshevik that it had to be disbanded altogether while its head, Professor Hrushevsky, was exiled to Russia proper. This banishment of* the 'great old man' of Ukrainian nationalism from his place of work showed better than anything else that the policy of reconciliation which Moscow had originally pursued in its relation towards Ukrainian nationalism had been but a short-term manœuvre.

*[Cf. category 665, p. 130 --Analyst]

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THE WESTERN BORDERLANDS

Political and cultural oppression of Ukrainian nationalism[1] was co-
661 ordinated with a tough fight against the Ukrainian peasant masses
668 opposing the policy of collectivization. Famine, total disorganization of
423 the Ukrainian agriculture and the formation of armed peasant bands
were characteristic features of this period. The central Government got the situation in hand by physically annihilating peasant resistance, by making partial concessions on the tempo of collectivization and by thoroughly purging, between 1930 and 1932, the staff of the Ukrainian Peoples' Commissariat for Agriculture of alleged Borotbist wreckers.

THE SKRYPNIK AFFAIR

661 The Ukrainian crisis in the early thirties culminated in the 'affair
Skrypnik', which was the most important single event in Ukrainian
●186 history of that period.

665 After his unsuccessful fight in 1922 as an associate of Rakovsky[2] for a 'Confederation of Soviet Republics' and for the quasi-independence of the Ukraine, Skrypnik in his day-to-day work as Peoples Commissar for the Interior, Justice, and Education tried to save for the Ukraine what could be saved in the way of an autonomous status. One of his main preoccupations was to prevent as far as possible the foundation of all-Union institutions such as the All-Union Agricultural Academy; but he failed.

Skrypnik had been a Marxist since 1897, and a member of the Bolshevik Party since its foundation. After the Revolution he was not just a local Ukrainian figure but became a Vice-Premier in the central Government of the U.S.S.R. and member of the Comintern Executive Committee. Nobody could with any shadow of justification denounce Skrypnik as nationalist. Skrypnik, it is true, considered that the central Government should bring proletarian internationalism and justified national aspirations into harmony with each other. 'Our work', he used to say, 'should be organized in such a way as to give the working masses of each nation the possibility of developing its national consciousness as much as possible'.

This conception amounted from an orthodox Bolshevik standpoint to the 'triumph of nationalism over the proletarian revolution' and was bound to get Skrypnik into trouble sooner or later. The men whom Stalin commissioned to liquidate the 'Skrypnik affair' were a Pole, Stanislav Kosior, and a Russian, Pavel Postyshev, first and second secretary respectively of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

The final clash occurred on June 10th, 1933, in Kharkov, when Postyshev and Kosior, at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, accused Skrypnik of being an enemy of the State and the actual head of the Ukrainian counter-revolution. At

[1] [Cf. cat. 186, p.p. 130-131 --Analyst]

[2] [Cf. cat. 642, p128 Analyst]

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that meeting the Ukrainian Communist Party decided that Great Rus- 661
sian chauvinism had ceased to be the main danger in the Ukraine and
that Ukraine nationalism had become enemy number one. The decision 186 ●
constituted an important landmark in the history of the Soviet Ukraine 665
and the prelude to a purge on a tremendous scale.

Skrypnik drew his conclusions from the 'new situation' by committing
suicide less than four weeks after the decisive meeting of the Ukrainian
Communist Party Executive Committee. Skrypnik's disappearance,
whilst affecting the situation in the Ukraine in general, was particularly
important in the field of Ukrainian cultural policy. After Skrypnik's
death Postyshev and Kosior stopped the 'Ukrainization of the
Ukraine', a favourite slogan of Ukrainian communists up to 1933, and
started a determined campaign against 'over-Ukrainization'. 'Fight [563]
against over-Ukrainization' was in reality nothing else than the re-
capture by the Great Russians of some of the positions which had been
lost to the Ukrainians, particularly in the Donets Basin. There is no
doubt that the Ukrainization had been overdone and had actually led
to the imposition of the Ukrainian language on non-Ukrainians,
particularly in the schools.

THE 'GREAT PURGE'

In 1934 and 1935 the party leadership discovered a big terrorist organiza- 661
tion of Borotbists in Kiev and Kharkov, as well as an alleged 'Nation- 665
alist-Trotskyite Bloc'.[6] In 1936 the situation seemed to be more stable 668
in the Ukraine, but 1937 was again a disastrous year for that country.
Official Soviet statements claimed that in 1937 Ukrainian nationalism had made particularly extensive efforts to detach the Ukrainian S.S.R. from Russia by plotting with German and Polish fascists. Some of the plots and conspiracies uncovered had nothing to do with Ukrainian nationalism and were simply Ukrainian off-shoots of anti-Stalin currents within the All-Union Communist Party. It is true, however, that the Ukraine suffered much more during the big purge of 1937–38 than any other Soviet Republic. Moreover, the purge went on in the Ukraine after it had been ended on the whole in other parts of the Soviet Union.

The new chain of dramatic incidents started in the Ukraine in the summer of 1937, when the Ukrainian Prime Minister, Panas Petrovich Lyubchenko, committed suicide in anticipation of his arrest, trial and execution. Lyubchenko had been Prime Minister for three years during which he had made himself conspicuous by his passionate speeches denouncing Hitler's plans of aggression. Lyubchenko was a former Borotbist and thus suspect to the Kremlin. He was charged with having formed a secret Ukrainian fascist party and allying it to the 'right-wing Trotskyite centre'.[7] Lyubchenko's successor, Bondarenko, was arrested

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Thus in Russia itself the 'Uniate heresy' was liquidated and it survived UK 795
only in the Ukrainian territories which until 1918 belonged to the S.U.
Austrian Empire and after 1918 to Poland, Czechoslovakia and 795
Rumania. It was only after the final establishment of the Soviet power in Lvov, the see of the Ukrainian Uniate Metropolitan, that the great historical opportunity presented itself of accomplishing the work of Catherine II and Nicholas I with regard to the Uniate Church.

Soviet interference in Ukrainian church affairs proceeded as follows. S.U.
In April 1945 the Metropolitan Slepoy, four bishops and several priests 659
of the Uniate Church, all opponents of Orthodoxy and faithful supporters UK.
of the Pope were arrested as 'accomplices of German occupants'. 659
One month later a 'Central Initiative Group for Reunion of the Greek Catholic Church with the Orthodox Church' was formed and in April 1946 a Synod in Lvov solemnly proclaimed the union of the two churches. Considering the conditions prevailing in Russia the 'initiative group' could not have been set up, nor could the Lvov Synod be summoned without the active support of the Soviet authorities, and particularly of the 'Plenipotentiary for Religious Affairs of the Ukrainian S.S.R.'. The decisions of the Lvov Synod were not accepted by a number of parish priests who despite official pressure refused to abandon the Uniate Church. By January 1948 the resistance, according to official Soviet reports, seemed on the whole to be broken.

The Synod of Lvov was an ecclesiastical event only in name. In reality its decisions constituted a victory of the Russian State over Western tendencies in a frontier territory and the Orthodox Church was nothing but the accidental instrument by the help of which the victory was achieved. The Synod was merely an episode in the repression of the Western influences which after the end of the Second World War challenged Bolshevism in almost every sphere of Ukrainian life.[17]

UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD

Apart from receiving additional strength from the Western Ukraine, UK
Ukrainian nationalism of the war and post-war period derived inspiration 186
from two diametrically opposed sources. On the one hand, Ukrainian ●
nationalism was encouraged under the German occupation. Without granting to the Ukrainian people the slightest shadow of an independent status, the German occupants favoured and consolidated the negative anti-Russian and anti-Jewish features of Ukrainian nationalism.

On the other hand, official Soviet propaganda also gave a fresh impetus to Ukrainian nationalism by allowing some expression to Ukrainian national hero-worship, for instance, by the creation of a war decoration commemorating the popular Ukrainian Cossack Hetman

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186 of the seventeenth century, Bogdan Khmelnitsky. The Kremlin, like Hitler, had no intention of satisfying the essence of Ukrainian national aspirations; all it wanted was to secure a greater degree of Ukrainian co-operation in the war effort, in guerilla fighting and sabotage behind the enemy lines. The Soviet Government could not prevent its war-time emergency measures from being misunderstood and mistaken for some sort of *carte blanche* for future nationalistic deviations.

669 The full extent to which Ukrainian nationalists may have betrayed the Soviet Union during the war with Germany is, of course, impossible
[671] to estimate. The Ukrainian Soviet Government indirectly recognized, however, that the militant anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalists must have constituted a fairly considerable body by proclaiming an amnesty in 1944 for the members of the U.P.A., the 'Ukrainian Insurgent Army'. This amnesty is unique in the history of the U.S.S.R. since it applied collectively to an entire group notable for its fanatical hatred of the Soviet régime and its contempt for the Russians.

This amnesty offer was so unusual for Soviet conditions that many U.P.A. members refused to take it seriously. The U.P.A. continued to terrorize the Soviet Ukrainian-Polish-Czechoslovak border areas, and in 1945–47 carried out daring raids deep into Czech and Polish territories. The members of the U.P.A. detachments were often referred to as 'Banderovtsy' after their leader Stephen Bandera.

[728] The 'Banderovtsy' exploited for their ends the fact that a comparatively small strip of land in Eastern Poland which was inhabited by Ukrainians was not included in the Ukrainian S.S.R., the area of Kholm and Hrubeshov. According to the nationalities programme of the Comintern the Kholm area was to be included in the Soviet Ukrainian State. The Ukrainian State President, M. S. Grechukha, in a Supreme Soviet debate on February 7th, 1944, also demanded the incorporation of this 'Ukrainian Far West' into the Ukrainian S.S.R.[18] However, the Soviet central Government apparently found it impossible to convince the Western Allies and even the Polish communists that another slice of Poland should be cut off. Thus the Ukraine was denied its 'Far West' and a repatriation of the Ukrainians of the Polish areas concerned was carried out instead.

The activities of the 'Banderovtsy' found particular support among the peasants of the Ukrainian villages of the Polish border area earmarked for evacuation; for one of the foremost tasks of the U.P.A. detachments was to render the evacuation impossible and to prevent by terrorist acts any Polish colonization on former Ukrainian farmland. It has been asserted that the Banderovtsy enjoyed support from local Ukrainian Soviet authorities in the border areas because of their anti-Polish character. This allegation is difficult to check. It is certain, however, that the U.P.A. detachments could not possibly have maintained themselves so long without assistance from a part of the Soviet Ukrainian peasantry.

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themselves so long without assistance from a part of the Soviet Ukrainian peasantry. 000

While the armed struggle of Ukrainian nationalists was confined to 186
a small fringe along the Ukrainian border, the Soviet Government had 814
to face more subtle forms of opposition throughout the Soviet Ukraine. 661
One of the outstanding features of the post-war development in the Ukraine was that the same cultural institutions which in the purges of the thirties had been compelled to change their nationalistic Ukrainian personnel from top to bottom, were again involved in difficulties with the Soviet authorities.

This was particularly true of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and especially of its Institute for Language and Literature and its Institute for History. The former produced in 1945 an *Essay on the History of Ukrainian Literature*, whose authors stressed the dependence of Ukrainian literature on the West and 'concealed that Russian and Ukrainian literatures exercised a mutual fertilizing influence on each other in the course of centuries'.[19]

Even more serious 'nationalist excesses' were committed in the field of history writing. It seems that practically all major historical works which the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences published in 1941–5 contained 'serious mistakes of a nationalistic character'. For several years the party and state authorities did not pay much attention to the works of Ukrainian academicians; but after 1946–7 the leading party organs restarted to analyse Ukrainian historical writings and pointed out that Ukrainian historians had never, in fact, succeeded in overcoming the influence of the nationalistic-bourgeois school of Professor Hrushevsky.[20]

In the light of official Soviet admissions the ideological consolidation of the Ukraine seemed not to have advanced by a single inch since the days when Hrushevsky was still the teacher of the historians and Khvylovy the authority for those dealing with problems of Ukrainian literature. Twenty years after Khvylovy's first expulsion from the Communist Party, and fifteen years after his suicide, orthodox Ukrainian Bolsheviks were still haunted by the fear of 'Khvylovy-ist ideas' and were active in opposing them.

The first step in the purge of Ukrainian literature in the post-war 186
period was the replacement of the editorial boards of the three leading 661
Ukrainian literary journals *Vitchizna* (Fatherland), *Dnipro* (Dnieper) 538
and *Radyansky Lviv* (Soviet Lvov). All three journals had been accused of systematically printing nationalist novels and articles. As the Ukrainian Union of Soviet Writers was obviously responsible for ideological offences committed in literary journals published on Ukrainian territory, the purge had to be extended to this organization as well. The leading personalities of the writers' union, including its president,

*[Cf. cat. 116, pp. 30-31, R1 Sov. Union; 21: Kolarz -- Analyst]